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Introduction 
It is my pleasure to introduce to you the second 
volume of the Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War 
Era.  With support from our faculty advisors, this publication 
had the unique opportunity to solicit papers from outside 
institutions that dealt with topics concerning any facet of the 
American Civil War.  Although this opportunity is a great one, 
it also caused the editorial board the added pressure of 
selecting from a wide spectrum of expertly written 
manuscripts. In working with the material for this volume, I 
became increasingly aware and appreciative of the laudable 
achievements of the members of this editorial board.  These 
students spent their Tuesday or Thursday evenings gathered 
on the top floor of Weidensall Hall discussing and debating 
the content of each submission received for publication.  The 
deliberations and comments made during our times spent 
together truly demonstrated their competence. 
Additionally, the papers selected for publication in 
this volume are masterfully crafted.  Shae Adams‟ Cultural 
Distortion: The Dedication of the Thomas Stonewall Jackson 
Monument at Manassas National Battlefield Park, explores 
the memory of the American Civil War in the 1930s, as 
reflected in the creation of one of the nation‟s most discussed 
tributes to the Southern Confederacy.  Our second article, 
Loose Party Times: The Political Crisis of the 1850s in 
Westchester County New York by Zachary Baum depicts the 
political changes occurring in pre-Civil War society, not 
among those living within large cities, but rather those 
inhabiting a relatively small suburban area.  In Evan Preston‟s 
“All May Visit the Big Camp”: Race and the Lessons of the 
Civil War at the 1913 Gettysburg Reunion, he explains the 
lack of African Americans‟ attendance at the 1913 
commemoration exercises in Gettysburg and the presence of a 
strong white nationalist sentiment that fostered a sense of 
reunion among the North and the South.  And finally, 
Katherine Titus depicts the major problems inherent in 
Confederate government and society, especially concerning 
the South‟s reevaluation of its traditional identity, in her 
article, The Richmond Bread Riot of 1863: Class, Race, and 
Gender in the Urban Confederacy.  
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Those of us connected with the Gettysburg College 
Journal of the Civil War Era hope you enjoy our second, 
Spring 2011 volume.  We believe that our audience will find 
these four pieces both enlightening and inspiring. 
 
Rachel Santose 
Gettysburg, Spring 2011 
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Cultural Distortion: The Dedication of the Thomas 
“Stonewall” Jackson Monument at Manassas National 
Battlefield Park 
Shae Adams 
 
The Stonewall Jackson monument on Henry Hill at 
the Manassas National Battlefield Park stands as a testament 
to the propensity of Americans to manipulate history in order 
to fit current circumstances. The monument reflects not the 
views and ideologies of the veterans of the Civil War, but 
rather the hopes and fears of those who spent the prime years 
of their lives immersed in the Great Depression. Those of the 
latter generation searched in vain for heroes among the 
corrupted businessmen on Wall Street who ran the economic 
affairs of the country, and who, in the eyes of the public, 
plunged the nation into insurmountable debt. Historian 
Lawrence Levine observed that fear served as a motivator for 
1930s Americans as they struggled to feed their children 
during the Great Depression. One reflection of this 
overwhelming fear appeared in President Franklin Roosevelt‟s 
1933 inaugural address as he insisted “the only thing we have 
to fear is fear itself.”1 In order to cope with this stress, 
Americans turned to a plethora of heroes as guiding lights for 
the dark days of the Great Depression. Some turned to 
gangster heroes like Bonnie and Clyde who undermined the 
financial and legal systems by lashing out against the 
institutions. Others devoured the serialized adventures of 
Superman, a new kind of hero created by the sons of Jewish 
immigrants in 1938.
2
 Still others turned to literature that 
reminisced about other crises in American history, namely 
                                                        
1
 Lawrence Levine, “American Culture and the Great 
Depression,” Yale Review, no. 74 (1984-85): 200, 208. As 
mentioned in Bradford W. Wright, Comic Book Nation: The 
Transformation of Youth Culture in America (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 10. 
2
 Bradford W. Wright, Comic Book Nation: The 
Transformation of Youth Culture in America (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 1, 7. 
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Margaret Mitchell‟s Gone with the Wind, a bestseller in 1938.3 
It was in this cultural setting that the Virginia State Legislature 
conceived and financed the idea for a Stonewall Jackson 
monument. 
 During the 1938 legislative session, the state of 
Virginia appropriated $25,000 for the construction of a 
monument to General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson on Henry 
Hill at the newly created Manassas National Battlefield Park. 
As of March 19, 1938, the day the federal government took 
over the deed to the land, the property was bare of even a 
visitor center that would not be constructed until two years 
after the erection of the monument.
4
 
5
 The legislature charged 
the Virginia Fine Arts Commission with finding a suitable 
monument for the location. In response, the Commission sent 
out a call for models for the Jackson monument. For the most 
part, the Commission left the details of the sculpture to the 
artist, naming only a handful of guidelines. One guideline 
stipulated that the sculpture would include both Jackson and 
his horse, Little Sorrell, cast in bronze. The other demanded 
that “[t]he nature, quality, and significance of Stonewall 
Jackson must be considered and expressed in the design of the 
Monument.”6 After reviewing eighty entries, the Virginia Fine 
Arts Commission announced the winner of the contest on 
March 4, 1939. New York sculptor Joseph Pollia came with 
the experience of sculpting Civil War era figures; he had 
                                                        
3
 Levine, 223. 
4
 Memo to the Director, “Information Concerning Unveiling of 
the Statue of Stonewall Jackson,” 12 July 1940, Stonewall 
Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian Files, 
Manassas National Battlefield Park. 
5
 Joan M. Zenzen, Battling for Manassas: The Fifty- Year 
Preservation Struggle at Manassas National Battlefield Park 
(University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1998), 31. 
6
 Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond, Virginia, 
“Prospectus—The Stonewall Jackson Monument Sculpture 
Competition and Exhibition,” 29 October 1938, Stonewall 
Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian Files, 
Manassas National Battlefield Park. 
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created a monument to John Brown in North Elba and General 
Philip Sheridan in New York, in 1935 and 1936, respectively.
7
 
The nature of the statue reflected not the General Jackson of 
the Civil War, but rather the General Stonewall as seen 
through the cultural eyes of the 1930s. 
 In Pollia‟s rendition, a Herculean Jackson sits tall 
upon an equally muscular horse as he gazes out across Henry 
Hill. He wears a cape that appears to be lifted by a dramatic 
wind, lending itself to his heroic stance. The large lettering on 
the base of the monument boldly declares, “There Stands 
Jackson Like a Stone Wall,” referencing the words 
purportedly spoken by General Barnard Bee at the Battle of 
First Manassas, immortalizing Jackson with his nickname. 
One of the largest monuments on Henry Hill, it commands the 
attention of any visitor to the battlefield.
8
 The Commission 
proudly presented the model to the public on March 4, 1939, 
after awarding Pollia the job.  
 However, they did not expect the virulent attacks 
from Confederate organizations and the few remaining 
Confederate veterans. These attacks began only a few days 
after the announcement of Pollia‟s design. One veteran, 
Colonel John Wesley Blizzard, grumbled that the statue made 
the famed General appear to be sixty years old, despite the fact 
that Jackson had died as a young man.
9
 Another veteran, 
claiming to be the only remaining living veteran to see 
Jackson and Lee at their last meeting on May 2, 1863, was 
appalled at the depiction of Jackson‟s steed, Little Sorrell. 
“That model makes the horse seem three times as big in front 
as behind,” he remarked in disgust, “It looks more like a 
buffalo.”10 Still other veterans complained that the depiction 
                                                        
7
 "Joseph P. Pollia." New York Times (1923-Current file), 
December 14, 1954. 
8
 As observed by the author on a visit to the park on 
November 10, 2010. 
9
 AP, “Last Vet in Virginia‟s Confederate Soldiers‟ Home, 
Sgt. Jack, Is Dead,” Miami News (Miami, FL), Jan. 28, 1941. 
10
 “Confederate Vets Don‟t Like Model of Jackson Statue.” 
Free Lance-Star (Fredericksburg, VA), Mar. 23, 1939. 
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resembled General Grant rather than the Jackson.
11
 Veterans 
were not alone in voicing their concern. Confederate groups 
like the Sons of Confederate Veterans and United Daughters 
of the Confederacy united to protest what they considered a 
monstrosity and an insult to the memory of Jackson. These 
groups petitioned that the Arts Commission instead favor 
sculptor F. William Sievers‟ model that depicted a humanly 
proportioned Jackson astride a rather dejected but realistic 
Little Sorrell. The cape, so despised by these Southern 
organizations, was conspicuously missing in Sievers model.
12
 
The Commission refused to change its decision, although in 
the hailstorm of protests, Pollia offered to make any changes 
to his model the Commission deemed necessary.
13
 
 The choice of Pollia by the Arts Commission 
reflected the mindset of 1930s Americans. Confederate groups 
accused the Commission of selecting a “distorted conception” 
of Jackson.
14
 In this instance, the Commission was guilty of 
such accusations. Those on the panel chose a distorted image 
of Jackson because they themselves had created a distorted 
image of the American past in order to provide cultural succor 
and guidance during the difficult years of the Great 
Depression. Over the previous decade, Americans had created 
a hollow mould for an idealized hero that desperately needed 
filling; to the Arts Commission, the sentimentalized Jackson 
of the Civil War could fill that mould. In the era when no 
heroes seemed to exist, Americans looked to the past for 
inspiration.
15
  The Civil War provided ample romantic figures 
to ease this burden, despite the distortion of those figures. On 
the one hand, Jackson symbolized the “spiritual strength” 
many felt they had lost during the Depression.
16
 On the other, 
he represented a rebel akin to the outlaw heroes Bonnie and 
                                                        
11
 Virginius Dabney, “Statue Plans Irk Virginia,” New York 
Times, Apr. 9, 1939. 
12
 “ „Battle of Manassas‟ Rages Again in Dixie,” Miami News, 
Apr. 23, 1939. 
13
 Dabney. 
14
 “Confederate Vets Don‟t Like Model of Jackson Statue.” 
15
 Wright, 10. 
16
 Dabney. 
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Clyde. Just like Bonnie and Clyde, Jackson had fought to 
undermine a government institution he found corrupt and 
against his state‟s prosperity. However, while Bonnie and 
Clyde worked only for themselves, Jackson‟s memory stood 
exalted on a pillar of self-sacrifice to country and freedom.  
Interestingly, the statue itself bore several similarities 
to the newly created and popularized Superman comic book 
character. Jackson‟s abdominal muscles are comparable to 
those of the Superman that appeared in Action Comic #1 in 
1939. In addition, the heroic looking capes of both men appear 
oddly similar in cut and dramatics.
17
 These similarities point 
to the need of Americans to see heroes of almost superhuman 
status within their own past in order to create a cultural 
mythos that could carry them through the weary drudgery of 
unemployment and near starvation. Superman did not 
represent the only embodiment of the physical exaggeration 
conveying heroic status. Sculptures across the country, 
including others created by Pollia, reflected the tendency of 
Americans in the 1930s to idolize the physical strength of 
cultural icons as the manifestation of moral heroism. For this 
reason, Pollia may have seemed a socially relevant sculptor 
for the Jackson monument. In the mid-1930s, Pollia sculpted a 
number of monuments dedicated to American heroes, each 
one exaggerating the physical muscularity of the depicted 
figure. His 1935 statue of John Brown at North Elba, New 
York creates the image of a figure whose physical robustness 
reflects his spiritual strength.
18
 Two years later, Pollia erected 
a monument to Admiral Robert E. Peary in Cresson, 
Pennsylvania, depicting a well-defined explorer, his physical 
                                                        
17
 Wright, 8. 
18
 West Virginia Archives and History, “His Soul Goes 
Marching On: The Life and Legacy of John Brown: John 
Brown in Print, Stage, Film, and Art,” West Virginia Division 
of Culture and History, 
http://www.wvculture.org/history/jbexhibit/playsandbooks.ht
ml (accessed December 8, 2010). 
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prowess matching his courage in facing the arctic unknown.
19
 
Pollia‟s monuments represented a trend paralleling other 
movements in American popular culture during the 1930s. 
Through the art and literature of this decade, the reshaping of 
the American hero is apparent. Societies create heroes in order 
to provide themselves with direction and meaning; some 
cultures enshrine these heroes in stories for children, while 
others create works of art to immortalize such individuals. In 
the case of Virginia, they built a statue to a man whose image 
they had distorted to give their tribulations meaning and hope.    
 Once the Commission decided upon the Pollia model, 
the Park Service went to work planning the logistics that 
accompanied its placement and dedication. Before the land 
became a National Battlefield Park, the Henry Hill farm area 
belonged to the Sons of Confederate Veterans. After the 
United Daughters of the Confederacy, under the leadership of 
Mrs. Westwood Hutchinson, gained an option to buy the 
property at $25,000, the Sons of Confederate Veterans worked 
out a deal with the Virginia state government that helped the 
Sons purchase the land.
20
 The understanding between the two 
entities was that after the purchase the Sons of Confederate 
Veterans would pay for the upkeep of the park.
21
 The original 
purpose of the purchase was the creation of a Confederate 
memorial park on the grounds. Once the land was purchased 
in 1923, it was named the Manassas Battlefield Confederate 
Park and those involved determined that it would be used for 
educational purposes concerning the history and memory of 
all Confederate soldiers.
 22
 However, the organization soon 
found itself in financial straits that hindered the organization 
                                                        
19
 As observed by Gettysburg Semester student, Dawn 
Winkler-Pembridge in Cresson, Pennsylvania at Admiral 
Peary Monument Park on November 28, 2010. 
20
 “Confederate News,” Confederate Veteran, no. 28, (October 
1920): 397, as noted in Joan M. Zenzen, Battling for 
Manassas: The Fifty- Year Preservation Struggle at Manassas 
National Battlefield Park (University Park, Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 217. 
21
 Zenzen, 15-6. 
22
 “Confederate News,” as footnoted in Zenzen, 217. 
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from the barest upkeep of Henry Hill, let alone the erection of 
monuments across the property. Instead of selling the land, the 
Sons discussed the possibility of donating the land to the 
federal government. After much debate and compromise, the 
Sons voted to confer the land to the National Park Service, 
demanding that the Park Service maintain a fair interpretation 
of the battlefield once it passed into Federal hands. The deed 
for the land passed into federal hands in March 1938, and once 
the federal government shuffled, signed, and filed the proper 
paperwork, the Manassas Battlefield Confederate Park became 
the Manassas National Battlefield Park on May 10, 1940.
23
  
 The land did come with the stipulation that an 
appropriate monument would occupy Henry Hill, and as a 
result, the placement of the monument became a matter for the 
National Park Service to decide. The Regional Director of the 
Park Service insisted that the placement of the monument be 
decided before selecting a location for the Museum-
Administration building.
24
 As a result, various Park officers 
held a conference on April 27, 1940, to reconnoiter Henry Hill 
for possible locations. They decided to erect the monument on 
the hill in the location believed to have been held by Jackson 
and his men on July 21, 1861. Those involved thereupon 
decided that the Museum-Administration building would the 
be constructed “in such relation to the monument that the 
monument would become the focal point from the 
observation-terrace.”25 This decision indicated a tremendous 
shift in the memory and interpretation of the war. In the years 
immediately following the war, Union veterans flatly denied 
the requests of Confederate veterans to erect monuments upon 
the fields on which they fought. At Gettysburg, for instance, 
                                                        
23
 Zenzen, 24.  
24
 Memorandum for the Director, “Attention: Branch of Plans 
and Design,” 5 April 1940, Stonewall Jackson Monument 
Dedication Folder, Historians Files, Manassas National 
Battlefield Park. 
25
 A.J. Ewald to Files, “Report on Conference Regarding 
Location of Jackson Equestrian Statue,” 27 April 1940, 
Stonewall Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian‟s 
Files, Manassas National Battlefield Park.  
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the War Commission forced Confederate veterans to place 
their memorials at their initial line of battle rather than at the 
location of their military engagement with Federal troops.
26
 
That the National Park Service would allow a Confederate 
memorial to stand on the field, but more importantly become 
the focal point of the visitors center spoke to the reconciliatory 
trend that marked war memory in the 1930s. In addition, the 
use of the monument as a focal point marked its subject as the 
key to the interpretation of the battle. This manner of exalting 
Jackson by a federal body reflected the growing tendency of 
the nation to accept Confederate symbols as national ones. As 
the American people drew parallels between their own failures 
of the 1930s and the failures of the defeated South, figures like 
Jackson came to embody an American need for validation and 
justification. 
 However, the circumstances surrounding the 
placement of Confederate monuments on Henry Hill also 
revealed the selective remembrance of the 1930s. In May of 
1939, a year before the slated arrival of the Jackson 
monument, a local chapter of the United Daughters of the 
Confederacy raised one thousand dollars for the construction 
of a memorial to General Barnard Bee on Henry Hill. The 
memorial seemed fitting, dedicated to the man who gave 
General Jackson his iconic moniker shortly before his own 
death on the Manassas field. Like any other suggestion made 
for the decoration of Henry Hill, the proposal caused 
controversy. Assistant Research Technician for the Park, 
Joseph Hanson, wrote to Superintendent Branch Spalding 
complaining about the proposed Bee monument. He argued 
that the location of the Bee monument, a mere one hundred 
feet to the south of the Jackson monument, would crowd the 
memorials.
27
 Despite Hanson‟s irritation with the prospect of 
                                                        
26John P. Nicholson to The Secretary of War, “Monument 
Location at Gettysburg,” Document 73, Box 13, Collections at 
Gettysburg National Military Park.  
27
 Memorandum from Joseph Hanson to Coordinating 
Superintendent Spalding: “Concerning Jackson Monument 
and Proposed Bee Monument,” 8 May 1939, Stonewall 
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two monuments on the hill, the United Daughters of the 
Confederacy presented the small obelisk dedicated to Bee on 
the field on July 21, 1939.
28
 That no fanfare accompanied the 
presentation illustrated that while the Herculean Jackson 
would capture all attention with a large dedication ceremony, 
Bee would be effectively overshadowed by the grandeur of the 
man he had a hand in creating. Just as few individuals read 
into the possible sarcasm of Bee‟s famous words of “There 
stands Jackson like a stonewall,” few would notice the smaller 
monument in his honor.  
 Once the placement of the monument was decided, 
the park embarked on the selective task of sending invitations 
to those who would take part in the dedication ceremonies. 
The Park designated a committee to organize the ceremonies 
and all aspects related to the dedication. This committee made 
the decisions concerning who would and would not merit an 
invitation. While the dedication itself was open to the general 
public, the committee awarded special groups throughout the 
community individual invitations as a sign of respect. For 
instance, the United Daughters of the Confederacy received a 
private invitation to the unveiling ceremonies. The 
organization of Confederate Veterans received an invitation as 
well.
29
 In addition, several individual Confederate veterans 
were invited as guests of honor: John Shaw, the oldest 
Virginian Confederate veteran who had served as J.E.B 
Stuart‟s runner during the war; John B. Cushing; J.A. Spicer; 
and Colonel John W. Blizzard, who had served as General 
                                                                                                 
Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian Files, 
Manassas National Battlefield Park.  
28
 Observed by the author on visit to the park on November 
10, 2010. 
29
 Letter from Judge Walter L. Hopkins of Sons of 
Confederate Veterans to Brach Spalding, Superintendent of 
Battle Field Parks of Virginia, Fredericksburg, Virginia, “Lack 
of Dedication Invitation,” 26 August 1940, Stonewall Jackson 
Monument Dedication Folder, Historian Files, Manassas 
National Battlefield Park. 
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Jackson‟s runner during the war.30 Blizzard‟s invitation was of 
particular interest, as he had criticized the statue shortly after 
the Commission awarded Pollia the contract for the 
memorial.
31
 The committee seemingly wanted to make peace 
with the veterans who had expressed a dislike of the 
monument while simultaneously honoring them for their 
service. That the monument barely resembled the General 
under whom the men had fought did not seem to concern the 
committee. Their presence would symbolically provide the 
connection to the past so desperately sought by Americans of 
the Great Depression era. In a way, the presence of 
Confederate veterans would validate the distortion of history 
embodied in the Jackson statue. The choice of invitations 
reflected the psychological needs of the committee and the 
community as they sought to assure themselves of the parallels 
between their own desperate economic situations and the 
failed, but purportedly righteous, Confederacy.  
 On the other hand, organizations that did not receive 
dedication invitations present an equally insightful look into 
the values of the committee and the national mindset. Only 
five days before the ceremony on August 31, 1940, 
Superintendent Spalding received a terse letter from Judge 
Walter L. Hopkins of the Sons of Confederate Veterans 
demanding to know why the United Daughters of the 
Confederacy and Confederate Veterans organizations received 
invitations to the dedication while the Sons received nothing. 
Hopkins sharply reminded Spalding that the Sons had bought 
and donated the Henry Hill property to the United States 
government, while the United Daughters had not “given one 
cent” to the purchase of the property.32 Spalding replied, 
assuring Hopkins the lack of invitation indicated a mere 
                                                        
30
 “2,000 See Jackson Statue Unveiled at Manassas Park,” 
Richmond Times Dispatch, Sunday, September 1, 1940, as 
contained in the Stonewall Jackson Folder, Historian‟s Files, 
Manassas National Battlefield Park. 
31
 Miami News. 
32
 Letter from Judge Walter L. Hopkins Hopkins of Sons of 
Confederate Veterans to Brach Spalding, Superintendent of 
Battle Field Parks of Virginia, Fredericksburg, Virginia. 
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oversight on the part of the committee. This alleged oversight 
points to the tendency of Americans to forget the precise 
events of the past while boldly forging a new future. By 
forgetting to invite the very organization that provided the 
funds for the land upon which the monument would stand, the 
arrangement committee acted out the process of American 
forgetfulness that in some ways created the very monument 
being dedicated. The distortion of the Jackson image also 
represented a forgetfulness of the details surrounding the new 
national hero.  
 Other arrangements for the dedication included the 
types of decorations allowed at the ceremony. Most 
importantly, the committee requested permission to use the 
Confederate flag as a drapery on the base of the statue during 
the unveiling ceremonies. They argued that in other instances 
the flag was employed as a decorative device and would be 
appropriate at the Jackson monument dedication. Without 
hesitation, the Park granted its permission.
33
 This assent led to 
the wide use of the Confederate flag throughout the 
ceremonies. Not only did the flag drape the statue‟s base, but 
also the front of the speaker‟s podium. Multiple Confederate 
flags decorated the rest of the stage, while two small American 
flags waved atop the stage‟s portico.34 This blatant use of the 
Confederate flag in a federally sponsored dedication ceremony 
reflects the approval of Confederate symbolism within 1930s 
society. The federal demand that all Confederate symbolism, 
from regimental flags to buttons on uniforms, be relinquished 
or blackened in the years immediately following the war faded 
to be replaced by a societal acceptance of the symbols. Not 
only were the symbols accepted, they were embraced in the 
fervor to create meaningful and tangible connections to the 
past. In 1865, a New York Times headline cried “The 
                                                        
33
 Memorandum to the Director, “Use of Confederate Flag at 
Dedication,” 8 August 1940, Stonewall Jackson Monument 
Dedication Folder, Historian‟s File, Manassas National 
Battlefield Park. 
34
 Photograph of Dedication Ceremony, Photographic 
Stonewall Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian‟s 
File, Manassas National Battlefield Park. 
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Confederate Flag Disappears from the Continent,” following 
Kirby Smith‟s surrender.35 Only seventy-five years later, the 
Stars and Bars served as the centerpiece for a federally 
approved memorial honoring a fallen Confederate general. 
That the Confederate flag flew alongside that of America adds 
to the understanding of 20
th
 century American society. By the 
1930s, the Lost Cause worked its way into the national 
memory of the war, creating a society that embraced the valor 
of both sides and the righteousness of both Northern and 
Southern convictions. The results of that societal shift 
converged in 1940 at the dedication of the Manassas Jackson 
monument as clearly seen through the simultaneous use of 
Confederate and American flags. 
 After nearly three years of planning and fundraising, 
the dedication ceremony took place on August 31, 1940, at 
two in the afternoon, boasting nearly two thousand 
observers.
36
 The program for the ceremony included the 
unveiling of the monument by Miss Julia Preston, the great-
granddaughter of General Jackson, and Miss Ann Rust, the 
daughter of Senator John A. Rust who sponsored the bill for 
the Jackson statue. In addition, the Quantico Marine Band 
played a rendition of “America”, while the Washington 
Quartet and Band provided music as well. Famed historian, 
Dr. Douglas Southall Freeman gave the keynote address of the 
day.
37
 Each aspect of the program represented the cementation 
of bonds between the past and the present, and the continued 
distortion of Civil War history through Lost Cause memory. 
 The committee in charge of dedication arrangements 
planned to honor the Jackson family by inviting Julia Preston 
to unveil the statue of her great-grandfather during the 
ceremonies. Fifty-three year old Preston provided a link 
between the Confederate general and the 1930s American 
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public.
38
 Her presence symbolized a continuation of the ideals 
of the Confederacy. Bloodlines tracing directly to the 
Confederacy remained a point of pride throughout the South in 
the years following the war, and became a point of interest 
throughout the rest of the country during the Great 
Depression. In some ways, the physical manifestations of 
these bloodlines served to remind the nation that while the 
Confederacy may have disappeared in 1865, its values and 
ideologies persisted well into the 20
th
 century. The existence 
of descendants like Preston indicated that the past still 
influenced and held meaning decades after the war.  
While the role of Preston in the unveiling was self-
explanatory given her relationship to Jackson, the choice of 
Ann Rust was slightly odd. Of course, her father, former State 
Senator John A. Rust ensured that the statue would receive 
state funding.
39
 However, other options existed in selecting the 
second individual to unveil the monument. As previously 
noted, four Confederate veterans attended the ceremonies, one 
of whom served as a Jackson‟s runner. The participation of 
one of these men would have illustrated a closer connection to 
Jackson than Rust. Their participation would have fully forged 
the bonds between the actual Confederacy‟s past in the form 
of a veteran who had had with personal contact with Jackson, 
and the idealized future of the Confederacy in the form of 
Preston. By not selecting Blizzard to unveil the monument 
with Preston, the committee further revealed the distortion of 
history taking place within American society. Obviously, this 
was not a monument for the veterans of the war as the 
Commission dismissed their opinions during the creation of 
the statue. Similarly, the ceremony did not seek to honor the 
living veterans of the war. Jackson was no longer remembered 
as a general who had traitorously fought against the federal 
government; rather he was honored as a faithful soldier, 
dedicated to the righteousness of his cause whose character 
should be emulated by the current generation of American 
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youth. By failing to offer Confederate veterans a role in the 
dedication ceremony, the committee illustrated that while 
Americans sought vindication and strength in the memory of 
the Civil War‟s Confederate figures, they did not seek to tie 
themselves to the facts of the war, but rather to the distorted 
memory of the war. The veterans brought the crowd a little too 
close to history, and while the desire to maintain a connection 
to the past represents a key aspect of American society, so too 
does the desire to separate oneself from the direct implications 
of that history. Perhaps subconsciously, the committee 
planning the dedication chose to keep the Confederate 
veterans as mere spectators at the ceremony in order to avoid a 
possible collision of perceptions concerning the realities of the 
war.  
 In addition, the Quantico Marine Band played as part 
of the dedication ceremony.
40
 The choice of this band in 
particular indicated an accepted connection between the 
federal government and the Confederate memory of the Civil 
War. The band, created by legislation in 1918 to participate in 
various events, “to improve morale, inspire, motivate, and 
instill in the audiences, a sense of pride and patriotism, and to 
re-affirm our core values, customs, and traditions, and best 
represent the United States Marine Corps.”41 That a band 
dedicated to promoting patriotism and American values would 
play at a Confederate dedication is indicative of the meshing 
of American and Confederate symbolism and values during 
the 1930s. Their presence at the dedication revealed that 
honoring the memory of Confederate generals served to 
enforce dedication to the American nation, something the 
Confederacy sought to destroy in 1861. Ironically, the band 
played a rendition of “America,” a song that proudly 
proclaims that America is a nation of freedom for all, a 
freedom Confederates staunchly denied their African 
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American slaves, a freedom granted by the North in the midst 
of the war, and a freedom denounced by the ex-Confederates 
following the war.
42
 That Jackson, a corps commander of the 
Confederate army, would have been in favor of this display of 
American patriotism seems unlikely.  
 The most anticipated moment of the program, aside 
from the unveiling of the monument itself, came in the form of 
historian Douglas Southall Freeman‟s keynote address at the 
end of the ceremony. Freeman, president of the Southern 
Historical Society, won renown as a Confederate historian in 
1934 with the release of his four-volume book, R.E. Lee.
43
 The 
historian carried a personal connection to the war. His father, 
Walker Freeman, fought for the Confederacy in the Piedmont 
Artillery and was present at Appomattox Court House on the 
day of Lee‟s surrender.44 This connection to the war no doubt 
influenced Freeman‟s views concerning the acts of both the 
Confederacy and its generals. Steeped in the Lost Cause 
tradition, Freeman created a widely endorsed view of the war 
supported by scholarly research that seemed to validate the 
Lost Cause, and the public‟s connection to the Civil War 
South. By selecting Freeman as keynote speaker, the 
committee further created a ceremony that would rely on the 
distorted memory of the Civil War while maintaining a direct 
connection to the war through Freeman‟s relationship to a 
Confederate veteran.  
 Freeman did not disappoint. His address focused on 
the growing fears of impending war as the United States 
warily watched the increasingly ferocious fighting between the 
British and the Germans. He offered a call to arms, relying 
upon the image of Jackson as a national hero to admire and 
emulate within the ranks of the armed forces as they prepared 
for a potential war overseas. He emphasized the need for 
Jackson‟s leadership style within the army, dependant on 
“hard and stern discipline”. He praised Jackson as “one of the 
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greatest soldiers of the Anglo-Saxon race,” who fought for 
freedom and highly valued ideals throughout the great 
American Civil War.
45
 Such praise of Jackson emphasizes his 
status not as a traitor to the United States, but rather as a hero 
dedicated to its traditions and highest morals.  
 Freeman went on to urge the American people to take 
strength in the prayer of past Americans embattled by war: “ 
„let God defend the right.‟”46 The words seem out of place at a 
memorial service devoted to those who lost their struggle, and 
in the antebellum tradition, lacked the righteous cause. 
However, Freeman was working from within a philosophical 
construct resulting from the South‟s loss of the Civil War. 
Following the war, the Lost Cause provided vindication for 
the South as they comforted themselves with the belief that 
sometimes righteous causes face defeat not because of an 
inherent wrong in the cause itself, but because at times God 
chooses to test the faithful and just through defeat. Thus, ex-
Confederates warmed themselves from the biting winds of 
defeat by wrapping the mantle of Job around themselves and 
their loss. With the crash of the stock market in 1929 and the 
following Depression, Americans searched for a reason for the 
suffering of morally upstanding individuals, finding their 
answer preconceived in the Lost Cause ideology.
47
 Freeman, 
aware of the shifting notions concerning the Confederacy, 
encouraged the direction of Civil War interpretation 
illustrating to Americans that Confederate ideals need not only 
serve in times of economic strain, but in times of war as well. 
Freeman promised that Americans could find fortification and 
succor in the examples of valor and devotion “so beautifully 
exemplified in the life and service of Stonewall Jackson.”48  A 
few days after his address, Assisting Park Directory, A.E. 
Demaray, wrote to Freeman praising his address as being, 
“replete with meaning and significance for the American 
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people at this time.”49 The dedication ceremony as a whole, 
and specifically Freeman‟s address, reflected the state of the 
American historical worldview as the 1940s opened.  
 However, not all agreed with the entirety of the 
monument following its dedication celebration. An editorial 
piece in a local journal condemned the monument for its 
plaque containing the names of the various politicians who 
sponsored the Jackson monument legislation. The writer 
insisted that Jackson, as a “hero of the past” deserved a 
memorial of his own without added political weight.
50
 The 
incensed writer reveals more than merely his own belief in the 
proper memorialization of Jackson. He illustrates the 
emotional devotion Americans adopted toward Confederate 
figures throughout the course of the Great Depression. As 
Thomas Connelly notes in his study of the image of Robert E. 
Lee, Americans developed strong attachments to figures like 
Robert E. Lee who appeared to embody enviable dignity in the 
face of humiliating loss.
51
 While Jackson did not reach the 
same pinnacle of hero memorialization as Lee in the years of 
the Great Depression, his memory gained a new life during the 
decade. The erection of the Jackson monument on Henry Hill 
and the emotions surrounding its creation stand as a testament 
to that distorted revitalization of the Confederate general. 
 Every era looks to those that came before for 
guidance. As time progresses the memories of the actions of 
previous generations reshape to take on new meaning to fit the 
situational needs of the current generation. For Americans, 
this phenomenon holds a particular truth in the case of the 
Civil War. The meanings of the war changed during the war 
itself, and in each subsequent generation. At times the reunion 
of a nation seemed at stake, while at others a national identity 
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arose from the ashes of Richmond. The 1930s heralded yet 
another new interpretation of the war. That generation relied 
on the romantic, larger than life heroism of the war memory in 
order to fill the nation with assurance of righteousness and 
brighter days ahead. The Jackson monument stands as a 
culmination of that reliance. Jackson himself illustrates a 
connection to various aspects of American cultural life, 
making him a relevant figure to that moment in time. His 
attempt to change the workings of the federal government by 
revolting outside of its institutions paralleled the escapades of 
Bonnie and Clyde; his image as a superhuman hero to rise 
above the common man and protect the country connected to 
the introduction of new superheroes like Superman; the 
romance of the war and men like Jackson played itself out in 
the popularity of Gone with the Wind. The monument and its 
dedication at Manassas provided a look not at Civil War 
society, but Great Depression society. Those involved in its 
creation and dedication illustrated their commitment to a 
distorted historical memory in a myriad of ways. The Jackson 
of Manassas stands not as a monument to the man, but to the 
generation that clung to his image for reassurance in times of 
national uncertainty. 
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Loose Party Times: The Political Crisis of the 1850s in 
Westchester County, New York 
Zachary Baum 
 
On November 7, 1848 William H. Robertson rose 
early and rushed to the post office in Bedford, a town in 
Westchester County, New York.  The young lawyer was 
brimming with excitement because two weeks earlier, the 
Whigs in the county‟s northern section had nominated him as 
their candidate for the New York State Assembly.  Only 
twenty-four years old and a rising legal star, Robertson hoped 
that holding political office would launch his nascent career. 
After casting his ballot at the Bedford Post Office, Robertson 
paid a visit to Sheriff James M. Bates, his political manager, to 
await the election results.  Robertson‟s intelligence, collected 
a week before Election Day, that “news from every part of the 
district is favorable,” proved accurate.  The Whig attorney 
heard later that evening that he had defeated his Democratic 
opponent, with 57% of the vote.  To celebrate, Robertson and 
Bates feasted on “chickens, turkeys, oysters, and Champaign” 
before retiring around midnight at Philer Betts‟ Hotel.  The 
following afternoon, they boarded the 3:00 PM train from 
Bedford to the county seat of White Plains, seventeen miles 
south.  There, the two triumphant Whigs gossiped and caught 
up with their counterparts from Westchester‟s usually 
Democratic southern section.  Hearing of their friends‟ 
overwhelming victories surprised Robertson, leading him to 
exclaim, “The Whigs have carried almost everything!”  
Indeed, the Whigs had swept every elective office in 
Westchester County.
52
 
The demise of Robertson‟s party a few years later 
marked the end of America‟s Second Party System, 
characterized by Whig-Democratic competition between 1824 
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and 1860.  Scholars have extensively chronicled how and why 
this system rose and fell.  Yet historians have overlooked one 
important area of the American political landscape: the suburb. 
Despite the recent popularity of suburbs as a subject of 
twentieth century history, few historians have studied politics 
in nineteenth century American suburbs.  The most complete 
scholarly account of the county‟s history, a 1982 Ph.D 
dissertation, is a genealogical study that includes only scant 
analysis of voting behavior, political ideology, and party 
formation.  One political scientist‟s observation, over eighty 
years ago, that Westchester County was “the unexplored…area 
of American politics,” remains true to this day.  Mapping the 
collapse of the Second Party System in what is perhaps the 
most famous suburb in America sheds light on how the 
development of new communities in 1850s New York 
enflamed political controversies and why the parties of Andrew 
Jackson‟s era became extinct.53   
Historians continue to debate the causes of this 
political realignment. One prominent thesis is that the 
Democrats and Whigs disintegrated because the slavery 
extension issue fractured the American electorate along 
sectional instead of party lines. Another group of historians 
defend the so-called ethno-cultural interpretation, which posits 
that nativism, temperance, and religious conflict were the 
primary culprits in the death of the Second Party System. 
Though Westchesterites, like most other Americans, cared 
about slavery extension, it was primarily local ethno-cultural 
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issues that motivated voters to abandon their old parties in 
response to the political crises of the early 1850s.  But as the 
Third Party System took form in the late 1850s, it was slavery 
that gave the Democrats and Republicans shape and 
substance.
54
 
Westchester is a revealing case study of the Second 
Party System because the county enjoyed robust commercial 
ties to New York City, the financial capital of the United States 
and a central political battleground during the transition to the 
Third Party System. The journey from the county seat of White 
Plains to the southern tip of Manhattan, the largest market in 
the U.S., was only thirty-five miles.  With the exception of 
New York and Kings Counties, Westchester had the largest 
merchant population in the state in the 1850s. As a county that 
was only beginning to transition from rural to suburban, 
however, the most common occupation for Westchesterites at 
the start of that decade remained farming.  Though the county 
contained only an average population of farmers, the aggregate 
value of Westchester‟s farmland in 1850 was the sixth highest 
of any county in the United States, and exceeded that of six 
entire states.  By the end of the decade, Westchester‟s farmland 
had appreciated to become the third most valuable of any 
county nationally.  As the 1850s dawned, the county was a 
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commercial and agricultural powerhouse in both state and 
nation.
55
 
These developments turned the county into an 
appealing place to call home.  Westchester‟s population grew 
by 70% during the 1850s, raising it from the forty-third most 
populous county in the United States in 1850 to twenty-first 
most populous in 1860.  Much of this growth was concentrated 
in the three towns adjacent to New York City in what is today 
the Bronx.  One satisfied commuter from Morrisania observed 
that by 1850, southern Westchester was a desirable “location as 
a place of residence, for persons doing business in the city, 
being so easy of access” to midtown and lower Manhattan.  
Even twenty miles to the north, a White Plains editor 
complained in 1853 that as a result of Westchester‟s 
attractiveness to disgruntled New Yorkers, “the city is pouring 
out an unbroken tide of population into our midst.”56 
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Political parties struggled to adapt to Westchester‟s 
changing demography over the course of the 1850s.  Local 
Whigs and Democrats were largely unable to address the new 
issues that arose during this turbulent decade. The new 
suburbanites were typically affluent Protestants who brought 
their anti-Catholic and pro-temperance proclivities with them, 
which inextricably altered Westchester‟s political landscape.  
Though the Democratic Party remained dominant in 
Westchester throughout the 1850s, this new constituency gave 
rise to political conflicts that determined election results, 
destroyed the Whig Party, divided the Democrats, gave rise to 
third parties, and reflected national sentiment on a variety of 
salient issues.  The major parties‟ failure to address important 
policy issues of the early 1850s led the editor of Westchester‟s 
most popular Democratic newspaper, the Eastern State 
Journal, to observe that “we are indeed upon „loose party 
times.‟”  But that same editor correctly predicted three years 
later, “out of this chaos, [new] parties will take form and 
shape.”  This chaos engulfed Westchester County, creating 
unusual political coalitions and realignments at all levels of 
government.
57
 
Perhaps the most notable theme that permeated 
Westchester‟s politics during the early 1850s was antipartyism.  
This sentiment flourished across the county, but was especially 
strong in the southern section that had absorbed most of the 
well-to-do migrants from New York City. Cogswell and Hyde 
refused to endorse a party ticket during the 1850 national and 
state contests, instead instructing southern Westchesterites to 
vote “without distinction of party” for a “Union Ticket” 
consisting mostly of Democrats and a few Whigs.
  
Even ten 
years prior to the Civil War, suburbanites generally felt a 
stronger allegiance to country than to party and expressed a 
willingness to shed their party ties for the sake of Union.  In the 
aftermath of the 1850 elections, predicted these editors, “new 
parties will be formed, or…the two great parties of this day will 
be reorganized.”  In the new villages adjacent to the City, 
“party spirit has not yet been allowed to interfere with local 
affairs…it is no matter whether a Judge, assessor, tax-gatherer, 
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Constable, &c. be Whig or Democrat,” declared the Gazette’s 
editors, in 1851.  In advance of the April local elections, 
Cogswell and Hyde supported candidates “without reference 
to…party politics” and encouraged their readers to “break loose 
from party trammels, and act an independent party.”  The 
electoral districts that bordered the City supported a so-called 
“Regular Dem. Whig” ticket that included a Democrat as town 
supervisor of West Farms and a Whig as town supervisor of 
Westchester. Though these two candidates were of different 
parties, they both won handily in nearly identical districts with 
similar constituencies. The electorate‟s weariness of party 
labels revealed that the new residents of Westchester County 
had weak local political allegiances years before the slavery-
extension crisis challenged the major national parties.
 58
 
Divisions within the parties posed just as much a 
threat to the Second Party System as did antipartyism.  At the 
1850 New York convention in Syracuse, for example, state and 
county Whigs divided into two groups: the Silver Grays and the 
Sewardites.  Silver Grays represented the party‟s conservative 
members, also known as Cotton Whigs, who bolted when the 
convention delegates incorporated into their platform William 
H. Seward‟s anti-slavery policies. This faction derived its name 
from the silver-white hair of Frances Granger, one of the 
leaders of the bolting faction.  Also led by Millard Fillmore, 
Silver Grays favored a conciliatory approach to southern 
slaveholders, strong temperance laws, and restricting 
immigrants and Catholics from civic life.
 
 Sewardites, known 
pejoratively as “Woolly Heads,” were “Conscience Whigs” 
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who opposed the Compromise of 1850, favored restricting the 
spread of slavery, and were generally indifferent toward 
foreign influence in domestic politics. This faction derived its 
name from a prevalent racial slur against blacks because of the 
faction‟s anti-slavery political views.  Though Sewardites 
dominated statewide, the county was evenly split between them 
and Silver Grays: each Whig faction had a paper in the county 
and half of Westchester‟s delegates joined Granger‟s protest.59   
These factions developed in the county along sectional 
lines. The Whiggish northern area contained commercial 
farmers, businessmen, and industrial interests who embraced 
the political views of Seward, Horace Greeley, and Thurlow 
Weed.  The southern section contained ex-New Yorkers who 
hated Catholics, enjoyed commercial relationships with 
southern planters, and were generally evangelicals.  In addition, 
clusters of French Huguenot refugees had long inhabited the 
southern Westchester communities of Pelham and New 
Rochelle, forming another crucible in which anti-Catholic 
sentiment flourished.  Though the Silver Grays and Sewardites 
were ideologically opposed on slavery, when it came to local 
affairs, said a Democratic editor, they “lovingly embrace each 
other, and…make no distinctions between their own candidates 
of whatever faction.” In the early 1850s, faction leaders horse-
traded by splitting local nominations.  But as nativism and 
slavery destroyed their national and state parties, Westchester 
Whigs followed their factional leaders into new political parties 
that upended the local and national party systems.
60
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Divisions within the Democratic Party also influenced 
party realignments, though these factional disputes were fueled 
by slavery and financial policy.  The more radical faction, 
called the Barnburners, favored the Wilmot Proviso to exclude 
slavery from all new western territories and opposed expanding 
the public debt to finance the Erie Canal. This faction derived 
its name from a farmer who burned down his barn to drive out 
rats. In New York, Barnburners were willing to destroy public 
works and the banks that funded them to root out waste and 
fraud. Led by Martin Van Buren, the Barnburners bolted from 
the Democratic Party in the 1848 presidential election to 
support the Free Soil Party—a coalition of Barnburner 
Democrats, abolitionists, and supporters of Henry Clay who 
fled the Whigs after they nominated Zachary Taylor for 
President.  The conservatives, known as Hunkers, opposed the 
Wilmot Proviso, supported reconciliation with their southern 
slaveholding counterparts, and supported the Whig policy of 
borrowing money to pay for canal improvements. Members of 
this faction were loyal to William L. Marcy, an ex-governor, 
senator, and cabinet secretary, and derived their name by 
“hunkering” after the spoils of office. Westchester sent a 
Hunker, Benjamin Brandreth, to Albany as state senator while 
the Democratic Party was split in two.
61
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Mixed reaction to the Compromise of 1850 within and 
between the major parties foreshadowed party fragmentation 
and realignment.  The parties were in the midst of such a crisis 
that a month after the Compromise passed, the Democratic 
press predicted, in November 1850, that “the two old 
parties…will entirely break up before the next Presidential 
election” in 1852.  Sutherland‟s prediction was incorrect, but 
his forecast had some convincing evidence: a Silver Gray Whig 
President had signed the legislation, which passed Congress 
with the support of Democrats whose views aligned with the 
Hunkers; Sewardite Whigs and Free Soil Democrats opposed 
the bills.  The unusual coalitions that supported and opposed 
the Compromise nationally also existed in Westchester.  The 
Silver Gray and Hunker presses predictably observed that “all 
party feelings and party politics seemed merged” after a 
meeting of pro-Compromise Westchesterites passed a set of 
bipartisan resolutions supporting the controversial Fugitive 
Slave Law but repudiating secession. The Sewardites, of 
course, decried the Law as “inhuman and revolting,” criticizing 
the Compromise for “forcing us back into bondage and 
servitude.”  Westchester‟s leading Barnburner editor, of course, 
also considered this piece of the Omnibus Bill “a most gross 
usurpation of power by Congress; a plan, palpable violation of 
the Constitution.”  Party affiliation, then, was not a reliable 
indicator of a voter‟s views on slavery: Hunker Democrats and 
Silver Gray Whigs favored compromise with the South, 
whereas Barnburner Democrats and Woolly Head Whigs 
sought to restrict slavery‟s spread.  The evaporation of 
differences between local parties when it came to national 
policy had grave consequences for the Second American Party 
system.  “Consensus, not conflict,” according to one historian, 
destroyed the Jacksonian parties.  Without clear differences 
between Whig and Democratic policies, voters shed their old 
political affiliations.
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The other major source of disagreement between the 
Barnburner and Hunker Democrats, and Silver Grays and 
Sewardite Whigs, concerned how to finance Erie Canal 
improvements.  In the age of Andrew Jackson, the parties split 
cleanly on this issue: Democrats resisted government 
sponsorship of internal improvements, whereas Whigs favored 
them.  But according to one historian, in the 1850 and 1851 
statewide contests the canal question surpassed even slavery as 
a divisive force in the extant party system. The unusual 
alignment of the parties on this question, with the conservative 
factions proposing to use projected toll revenues as collateral 
for a loan and the radical factions proposing a direct tax on 
canal shipments, confirmed Sutherland‟s view that “the Canal 
question is…above party.”  Westchester became embroiled in 
this controversy when its state senator, Hunker Benjamin 
Brandreth, broke with the state party over canal funding.  After 
Whigs forced a vote on a bill to borrow $9 million to finance 
improvements, twelve Democratic senators walked out of the 
chamber.  The state senate became paralyzed as it lacked the 
necessary three-fifths attendance required for a quorum. 
Though Brandreth did not support the bill, he was one of two 
Democratic senators who remained in the chamber to vote nay.  
“It appeared to me contrary to the spirit of Republicanism,” 
Brandreth observed in October 1851, to block a vote.  Few 
Westchester Democrats supported Brandreth‟s decision, or 
shared his fear that the bolters would further weaken their 
already divided party at the polls.
63
   
This clash between Brandreth and his party leadership 
reflected how local concerns accelerated the crumbling of the 
Second Party System.  Westchester‟s Barnburner press, which 
opposed Brandreth because he was a Hunker, “wanted no new 
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issue….the party would probably be better off if the contending 
leaders of both the late sections of the party were overthrown.”  
The Hunker press, which generally supported the senator, 
endorsed the bolting senators and correctly pointed out that 
“the Democracy do not appear to be united in this 
movement…with such disunion in the Democratic ranks,” there 
was no such thing as a “majority opinion of the Democracy of 
this county.” Brandreth‟s decision to buck the state party 
reveals that even the most prominent Westchester politician 
shared his constituents‟ antiparty sentiment.  Brandreth paid a 
steep cost for contravening his leadership: the party denied him 
re-nomination in 1851, and he was trounced at the polls 
running as an independent candidate.  The near unanimous 
condemnation of the bolting Democrats, coupled with editors‟ 
rhetorical support for ousting party leaders, would remain a 
driving force behind the demise of the Second Party System in 
Westchester.
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If political affiliation did not reflect voters‟ views on 
extending slavery and expanding the Erie Canal, party ties were 
an even more unlikely indicator of Westchester politicians‟ 
views on temperance.  Former Whigs in Cortlandt, a town on 
the county‟s northern border, believed that curtailing 
drunkenness represented “a crisis in which the principles of the 
two leading parties are not involved.”  These temperance 
advocates encouraged fellow Westchesterites, during the local 
elections in spring 1851, to support an independent slate of 
anti-liquor politicians “without reference to creed or party.”  
The temperance ticket posed such a threat to the major parties 
that Thomas A. Whitney, the Democratic candidate for 
Cortlandt Town Supervisor, withdrew two weeks before the 
race and supported his Whig opponent.  Most of these local 
contests in the twenty-two municipalities across the county, 
according to Sutherland, were “waged on other than party 
grounds…the issue was rum or no rum.”  The orientation of 
Westchester‟s electorate as either pro-temperance or anti-
temperance, instead of Democratic or Whig, indicated that the 
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process of party realignment was not solely connected to 
national debates about slavery.  Rather, the breaking up of the 
Second Party System was deeply rooted in local affairs that 
affected daily life, and was catalyzed when the two major 
parties failed to address ethno-cultural issues plaguing northern 
communities. According to a Hunker editor, Westchester voted 
“without regard to strict party lines” in 1851.65 
In the southern section of the county as well, the 
prevalence of ethno-cultural issues led commuters to drift from 
their old parties.  During the 1852 election, hundreds of West 
Farms Protestants coalesced around an antiparty prohibitionist 
ticket.  Though this slate was narrowly defeated, the Eastern 
State Journal observed, “the contest was not a party one; it was 
between the…Maine Liquor Law [Temperance] advocates on 
the one side and the opponents of the Law on the other.”  Many 
of these commuters, like their northern counterparts, held 
stronger allegiances to the temperance movement than they did 
to political parties.  “It is a glorious thing that party ties begin 
to hang loosely on the people, and that considerations other 
than party interests are beginning to…call out the votes of our 
citizens,” reported an anonymous temperance advocate in the 
Peekskill Republican.  He wanted elected officials to close 
taverns on Sundays, create strict requirements for obtaining a 
liquor license, and require any establishment that served 
alcohol to also provide housing.  Neither the Democrats nor the 
Whigs incorporated these demands into their platforms, causing 
many voters to flee from their ranks, weakening their own 
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electoral strength, and foreshadowing the rise of new parties 
that did address issues about which commuters cared.
66
 
The salience of the temperance issue, and the Whigs‟ 
inability to address it, accelerated the party‟s disintegration. In 
the 1852 election, the Westchester County Temperance 
Alliance held a convention to nominate candidates for 
statewide office.  The first ballot for state assemblyman of the 
county‟s northern district was evenly divided between John 
Collett, a Whig, and George Mason, a Democrat.  Collett 
ultimately won the Alliance nomination and spoiled the 
election for the Whig candidate: though the Whigs typically 
won this seat comfortably, they lost to the Democrats by 39 
votes out of 4,266. “If the Whigs had nominated a Maine Law 
Candidate in this District…he would have been elected,” 
lamented J.J. Chambers, the Sewardite editor of the Peekskill 
Republican, a few days after the election.  Comparing the split 
between the Whig and Temperance Parties to “a big Railroad 
accident,” a Silver Gray likewise observed in the Hudson River 
Chronicle that Whigs who defected to the Alliance “find 
themselves and the Temperance cause crushed…[Collett] will 
feel that he has injured his own party.”  By 1852, temperance 
movements had siphoned thousands of voters from the Whig 
Party, which was well on its way to extinction.
67
 
The debate over temperance intensified in the spring 
of 1853 when Democratic Governor Horatio Seymour vetoed a 
prohibitory liquor law.  In response, the antiparty County 
Temperance Alliance passed resolutions to consider 
nominating any Democrat or Whig for state office who 
supported the Maine Law. Though Horace Greeley was the 
group‟s choice for state senate, he declined the nomination.  
The convention instead selected William Robertson, the Whig 
attorney from Bedford, as their candidate.  Robertson‟s original 
party was still reeling from its 1852 defeat, and so to avoid past 
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mistakes, the Whigs also nominated him.  Perhaps party leaders 
were swayed to support the temperance candidate upon hearing 
Samuel Wood, a powerful Alliance organizer, declare that “it 
were better…that existing political parties were annihilated, 
than that the evils [of liquor] we complain of should be 
perpetuated.” County Whigs had no choice but to take Wood 
seriously and cooperate with his anti-liquor party.  This 
marriage proved fruitful: on Election Day, the fusion ticket 
picked up both a state senate seat and an assembly seat from 
the Democrats.  Reflecting on the temperance organization‟s 
recent victory, one of Wood‟s colleagues, D.D. McLaughlin, 
boasted that they “held the balance of power, and could thus by 
firm and united action control any election.”  Westchester 
Whigs‟ experience with the temperance movement was a 
microcosm of a national trend that intensified in 1853 and left 
their party feeble and fragmented.  Across the north and mid-
Atlantic, voters expressed anti-liquor sentiment not through 
their traditional parties, but through state and local temperance 
organizations. By contributing to the destruction of the Whig 
Party, the Maine Law movement turned the 1850s into an era 
of realignment.
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Westchester‟s Democratic Party pounced on the 
fusion of Whigs and the Temperance Alliance in a desperate 
attempt to woo anti-liquor Democrats back into the party‟s 
fold.  Attrition from the Democrats began in 1852 when 
temperance forces came close to installing one of their own as 
Democratic candidate for state assembly in Westchester‟s 
northern district.  With the prohibitionist threat to Democratic 
Party strength fresh in mind, the Eastern State Journal noted 
the “divided and confused condition of the Democratic party on 
the one side, and the rotten, crumbling state of the Whig party 
on the other, together with the „loose party times‟ prevalent in 
every quarter” of the county.  These three phenomena, 
continued the editorial, “gave to the Maine Law organization, 
or „Alliance,‟ a potency and effectiveness at the [1853] election 
just passed, which no clear-sighted sagacious politician could 
have failed to foresee.”  The county‟s other Democratic paper, 
the Westchester Herald, endorsed the Maine Law a month 
before that election.  Ambivalent Democrats now had political 
cover to vote the Temperance ticket, confirming the Eastern 
State Journal’s fears.  By providing a political vehicle for anti-
liquor advocates, the temperance party enticed voters to 
abandon the Democrats, and, of course, the Whigs.  Flight from 
the major parties, in turn, led to the unraveling of the 
institutions that sustained the Second Party System.
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As the relative stability ushered in by the Compromise 
of 1850 gave way to turbulence by the end of the 1853, yet 
another split emerged in the Democratic Party that facilitated 
political realignment.  Many Barnburners found themselves 
without a major party affiliation after the disappearance of the 
anti-slavery Free Soil Party in 1849.  Westchester Hunkers, 
however, needed Barnburner votes in advance of the 1852 
Presidential contest.  But many Hunkers believed so strongly in 
supporting Southern slavery policy that they refused to 
reconcile their differences with the Barnburners.  This dispute 
cut a deep divide within the Hunker camp between Softs, who 
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would welcome Barnburner bolters back into the party, and the 
Hards, who would penalize them.  In 1853, Westchester 
Democrats generally supported the Hards because Softs in 
Albany had temporarily fused with the Whigs in support of 
temperance candidates.  A week after this unusual coalition of 
Softs and Whigs won a few state and local offices, the county‟s 
Hard press decried “these traitors to the cause of Democracy,” 
who “have led off a portion of the honest masses from us, and 
defeated our candidates.”  Stung losing by an important state 
senate seat, Westchester‟s leading Barnburner, Edmund 
Sutherland, attributed his party‟s 1853 statewide defeat to “the 
Temperance Alliance…but Free Soil treachery and bolting did 
more.”  The division between the Hards and Softs continued to 
plague Westchester Democrats throughout the mid-1850s, 
ultimately contributing to the party‟s only two electoral losses 
in the county during that decade.
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The tumult of 1853 intensified the following year 
when Stephen Douglas‟s Kansas-Nebraska Act pushed slavery 
to the forefront of national, state, and local politics.  In 
Westchester, both Democrats and Whigs sought to exploit anti-
Nebraska sentiment to win elections.  The Sewardite press 
made the most vocal appeal to anti-slavery advocates by 
decrying the bill‟s passage as “the darkest day in the Senate” 
and promising “political death to every man who lifted his hand 
or voice in favor of slavery.”  The largest of many anti-
Nebraska meetings in the county took place at the White Plains 
Courthouse in August 1854, and featured speeches by 
politicians from both parties.  The county‟s Barnburner organ, 
the Eastern State Journal, also commended Westchester‟s 
Democratic Congressman, Jared V. Peck, for voting against the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act.  Sewardites and Barnburners united in 
opposition.  Westchester‟s Hards, however, split.  Most 
prominent among them, State Senator Benjamin Brandreth 
encouraged his supporters to remain “true to [their] northern 
instincts and experience” by opposing the Kansas-Nebraska 
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Act.  But Caleb Roscoe, the editor of the Westchester Herald, 
supported Douglas‟s bill because it established the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, or local referenda on whether or not to 
permit slavery in the territories.  Despite this minor division 
within an already factionalized Democratic Party, anti-slavery 
sentiment generally united Westchesterites.  Whereas reaction 
to the Compromise of 1850 was mixed, reaction to the Kansas-
Nebraska Act was nearly unanimous.  So although slavery 
became a salient national issue, fault lines between the local 
parties formed based on ethno-cultural distinctions.  In the 
1854 contest, nativism and temperance did more than slavery to 
upend Westchester‟s party system.71 
Across the North, voters expressed nativist sentiment 
through a third party called the Know-Nothings.  The rank-and-
file often belonged to secret fraternal lodges affiliated with the 
Order of United Americans (O.U.A.) or the Order of the Star 
Spangled Banner (O.S.S.B).  According to a county Know-
Nothing, these lodges consisted mostly of former Hunkers and 
Silver Grays, who coalesced around a conservative political 
agenda of prohibiting alcohol, creating tough naturalization 
laws, and limiting Catholic influence in public institutions.  In 
the southern towns of West Farms, Pelham, and Westchester, 
anti-Catholic, anti-liquor, and antiparty sentiment had 
flourished since at least 1850, providing a rich pool of voters 
for the Know-Nothings. “They seem, down in the lower part of 
the County, to deal in Native Americanism,” charged a 
Peekskill Whig who lived on Westchester‟s northern border. 
This sentiment was, in reality, ubiquitous in the anti-Catholic 
and temperance enclaves along Westchester‟s New York City 
border.  Commuters who fled the City, in part to avoid Irish 
immigrants, found a home in the Know-Nothing Party.  
Likewise, the Huguenot Protestants, who fled persecution from 
a French Catholic monarchy to settle in Pelham and New 
                                                        
71
 Peekskill Republican, Mar. 7, 1854 (first quotation); Eastern 
State Journal, Aug. 11, 1854 (second quotation). Address of 
Benjamin Brandreth” in Peekskill Republican, Mar. 7, Oct. 3, 
1854; Westchester Herald, Feb. 14, 1854; Michael Kirn, Jr., 
“Voters, Parties, and Legislative Politics in New York State, 
1846-1876,” (Ph.D diss., University of Virginia, 2003), 488. 
44  
 
Rochelle, also flocked to the Know-Nothings.  Many voters in 
West Farms, according to a Peekskill Republican correspondent 
feared the “foreign and antagonistic population” a few miles 
south, whose “noisy and riotous proceedings” disturbed 
otherwise tranquil country lives.  By providing a vehicle to 
elevate the ethno-cultural issues that neither the Democrats nor 
the Whigs adequately addressed, the Know-Nothings weakened 
these two factionalized parties and dominated Westchester 
politics in 1854 and 1855.
72
 
Though Know-Nothingism thrived in Westchester, 
some lodges suffered from factional rivalries.  These divisions 
stemmed primarily from previous party affiliations and 
prevented the Order from establishing itself as a potent political 
force as the Third Party System took form. “I have tried for the 
last six or eight meetings to procure an acceptance and 
indorsement of this ticket,” complained an Ossining Know-
Nothing to party leader and 1854 gubernatorial candidate 
Daniel Ullmann.  A week before the election, Know-Nothing 
cohesion appeared to be unraveling in that town because “two 
thirds of this council will vote directly for Seymour, and the 
Whig members insist that a State nomination by our Order is 
intended to entice the Whig members to throw away their votes 
on our nominee.”  This worst-case scenario became a reality 
when Ullmann was routed in Ossining, with the Soft candidate 
and the Whig candidate receiving a combined 80% of the vote.  
An Ossining Democrat mocked this lodge, in an Eastern State 
Journal column, as being “led by a set of old party hacks and 
broken down politicians who have managed to crawl into their 
Order.”  Alexander H. Wells, the leader of O.S.S.B Chapter 
#72 in Ossining, conceded that his fellow nativists would most 
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likely vote “with their previous party predilections.”  Though 
his concern proved valid for his lodge, most others around the 
county supported Ullmann.
 
 O.S.S B members shed their old 
party ties and united with previous political rivals to vote the 
Know-Nothing ticket in the fall of 1854.  J.P. Sanders, a 
Peekskill Know-Nothing who assured Ullmann that 
“everything is smooth in this section,” better measured the 
Westchester electorate‟s pulse than did his Ossining 
counterpart.
73
 
Both parties feared the Order as the 1854 elections 
approached. “Every vote given to Ullmann [Know-Nothing] 
will be taken from Clark [Whig] and practically given to 
Seymour [Democrat], the Rum candidate and advocate of 
slavery propagandism. Why then should any Whig or 
Temperance man…worse than waste his vote, by casting it for 
this altogether useless nomination?” inquired the county‟s 
Whig organ in advance of the gubernatorial election.  Though 
Clark narrowly edged Seymour to capture the governorship, 
Ullmann likely siphoned hundreds of Westchester voters from 
his Whig opponent, almost leading to a Democratic victory.
74
  
But the Democrats surprisingly had more to fear from the rise 
of the nativist party. As the election returns demonstrate, from 
1853 to 1854, Democrats‟ share of the vote was slashed by 
25%, whereas the Whig share of the vote declined by 13%, 
which equaled the Know-Nothings‟ 38%.  “From the number 
of Know Nothings, it will be a task of much difficulty to elect a 
Democrat from Westchester to Congress,” Eastern State 
Journal editor Edmund Sutherland predicted, after observing 
large defections from his party.  His fears were valid.  At the 
1854 canvass, the Know-Nothing ticket polled pluralities in a 
majority of Westchester municipalities.  Westchester‟s 
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Congressman, Bayard Clarke, was now a loyal member of the 
Order, as were most countywide officials.
75
 
By 1854, party lines had become dismantled and 
traditional political apparatuses were rendered impotent. “A 
perfect whirlwind seems to have passed over the county, 
rooting up and tearing down all previous political calculations, 
electing those in many instances least expecting to be elected,” 
wrote Sutherland.  This editor astutely observed that “from out 
of the political chaos” of divided Whigs and Democrats, “the 
Nativist element, with its secret and close organization called 
„Know Nothing,‟ sprung up, absorbing materials of every 
description of opinion and character.”  Westchester Whigs 
boasted that the Democratic Party had become “a house 
divided against itself” because temperance and slavery 
overshadowed party lines.  Adding the secret political 
organization of Know-Nothings into this political stew even 
further clouded the electoral landscape. The large number of 
parties, and the myriad of diverse issues at stake, represented 
that the stability created by two-party competition during the 
Second Party System had given way to chaos by the mid-
1850s.  After the 1854 election, yet another threat to the 
Jacksonian political system emerged in the form of a new 
party.
76
  
As anti-slavery sentiment intensified, it cleaved 
existing fissures in the Whig Party and led to its complete 
disintegration.  The major turning point came in May 1854, 
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when Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act along 
sectional, instead of party, lines.  Sewardites, Barnburners, and 
a few Softs who also opposed the act, joined with anti-liquor 
politicos to found the Westchester Republican Party in 1855.  
“Let all party differences be thrown to the winds,” proclaimed 
a Whig-turned-Republican editor, who welcomed anyone 
“whether hitherto known as a Democrat or Whig.”  Meeting at 
the spot in White Plains where the Provincial Congress of New 
York had received the Declaration of Independence, the men at 
the first County Republican Convention “disregarded their 
former party associations by uniting” on a platform dominated 
by anti-slavery policy. Specifically, Westchester Republicans 
repudiated the influence of the Slave Power, opposed repeal of 
the Missouri Compromise, and decried the fighting between 
pro- and anti-slavery forces in the Kansas territory.  Like the 
handful of other northern suburban counties around New York 
City, Boston, and Philadelphia, Westchester embraced a 
moderate brand of Republicanism.  The federal government 
lacked the authority to meddle in states‟ affairs, the 
Westchester platform contended, and thus could not abolish 
slavery in the states where it already existed.  Rather, the 
institution should die gradually by excluding slavery from 
western territories and rejecting admission of additional slave 
states.  The local 1855 platform almost exactly mirrored the 
first national Republican one in 1856, which one historian 
considers the handiwork of the party‟s moderate wing.77   
Though free labor dominated Republican ideology, 
the party in Westchester also organized to counter Know-
Nothingism.  The county platform contained a unique plank 
explicitly “repudiat[ing] the order of Know-Nothings.”  Party 
leaders considered Know-Nothings more threatening than 
Democrats.  In the first election the local Republicans 
contested, they joined with Democrats to create an Anti-Know-
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Nothing Union County ticket “in opposition to the apostates 
and renegades from all parties who have banded themselves 
together in an oath-bound secret conspiracy.” Though New 
Yorkers could choose from four statewide tickets in 1855, the 
Hard Westchester Herald analyzed, “the local contest lies 
between the secret unprincipled, and prospective order of 
Know Nothings, and the PEOPLE without distinction as to the 
former party ties.”  The anti-Know-Nothing state senate 
candidate, Benjamin Brandreth, published an editorial in 
several Westchester papers declaring that, “the contest in this 
campaign is not between Democrats and Republicans, but 
between patriots and Know-Nothings.”  Brandreth‟s appeal to 
patriotic principles, in addition to his anti-slavery credentials, 
mollified reluctant Republicans loath to support Democrats.  
Opposing Know-Nothingism superseded party lines in 
Westchester.  According to the Eastern State Journal, “the 
Whigs are ready to sustain Dr. Brandreth in this contest—not 
because he is a Whig, for he is not…but to defeat the Know-
Nothing[s].”78 
  Though Westchester Know-Nothings consisted 
primarily of ex-Democrats, they nonetheless enthusiastically 
supported an ex-Whig for state senator.  Their nominee, John 
W. Ferdon, typified northern Know-Nothingism by supporting 
the Maine Law and opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  But 
Ferdon appealed to ex-Democrats primarily because he 
opposed William H. Seward.  As state senator in the 1840s, 
Ferdon had supported Ogden Hoffman, a Democrat-turned-
Whig, over Seward for U.S. Senate because the nativist 
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opposed Seward‟s plan to create publicly funded schools for 
Catholic children.  Schooling again played a critical role in the 
1855 election, and was perhaps the clearest policy distinction 
between Ferdon and Brandreth.  The Democrat had long 
supported Seward‟s policy.  Brandreth‟s status as an English 
immigrant, moreover, enraged county Know-Nothings who 
favored extending the naturalization period to twenty-one 
years.  Such a policy would have forced Brandreth to wait one 
more year before earning citizenship, precluding him from 
even running for office.  Because both candidates opposed the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, national issues were minimized in the 
1855 contest.  Ethno-cultural issues figured most prominently.  
On the one side, an ex-Whig Know-Nothing supported 
embraced nativism and temperance.  On the other, an ex-
Democrat “Unionist” rejected them.79 
This strategy had mixed results. In the state senate 
race, Brandreth narrowly carried Westchester, but in the 
district, which also comprised Putnam and Rockland counties, 
Ferdon, the Know-Nothing, won by a mere 62 votes out of 
11,116 cast.  Nevertheless, the anti-Know Nothing ticket won 
both assembly seats and a host of local offices.  The impressive 
Republican showing indicated that the new party united the 
political forces that had paralyzed Westchester Whigs.  The 
opportunity to converge with anti-slavery and temperance men 
in a new political party opposed to Democrats and Know-
Nothings proved attractive to Sewardite Whigs, who shed their 
old party label.
80
  This temporary coalition of Republicans, ex-
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Whigs, and Democrats sufficiently routed Know-Nothings in 
local contests for coroner, surrogate, superintendent of the 
poor, and county treasurer, among others.  Joel T. Headley, 
who headed the American ticket as nominee for secretary of 
state, polled a plurality in Westchester, and the Know-Nothing 
ticket polled pluralities statewide.  Still hopelessly divided into 
Softs and Hards, the Democratic Party was too crippled to 
seriously contend for elective office.  In Westchester, the party 
system that dominated since Jackson‟s presidency was now 
dead.
81
 
The Democrats remained factionalized heading into 
the 1856 presidential elections. The party‟s leading organ 
attacked party leaders.  “Setting aside both factitious 
organizations now existing…which divide the ranks and break 
down the energies of the party,” Sutherland suggested that the 
decades-old organization “start anew.”  Such antiparty 
expressions a few months prior to the presidential election 
seemed to foreshadow a weak performance at the polls.  Fierce 
inter-party competition in the immediate wake of the Second 
Party System‟s collapse also complicated Democratic efforts 
on two fronts: dissolving the 1855 fusion with Republicans and 
defeating Know-Nothingism.  Engulfed by antipartyism, 
nativism, and slavery, Westchester became a bloody 
battleground during the 1856 presidential campaign.
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Westchester Know-Nothings met with mixed 
emotions Millard Fillmore‟s 1856 nomination for president on 
the American Party ticket.  “There is a strong feeling here 
favorable to the American candidates,” Alexander Wells and 
Abram Hyatt, prominent Ossining Know-Nothings, wrote 
Daniel Ullmann.  “We have plenty of votes.”  Wells and Hyatt 
supported Fillmore because they shared Whig antecedents.  But 
among Democrats who dabbled in Know-Nothingism, 
Fillmore‟s nomination was not acceptable.  “What Democrat, 
who wishes well to his country, can vote for Fillmore?” asked a 
Hard who sympathized with the Know-Nothings.  “None 
surely,” he answered, because a victorious Fillmore would dole 
out patronage only to former Whigs.  Paralyzed by internal 
disputes between ex-Democrats and ex-Whigs, Know-Nothings 
became crippled and would never again seriously contend for 
elective office.
83
  
If even Westchester Know-Nothings could not fully 
shed their old party affiliations, then the American Party lacked 
the cohesion required to wage a winning national campaign for 
the presidency.  Fillmore‟s candidacy confronted ex-Whigs 
with a dilemma regarding slavery.  As President he had signed 
the controversial Compromise of 1850, which precipitated the 
New York Whigs‟ split into Sewardites and Silver Grays.  
Fillmore had led the conservative faction and still favored 
conciliation with southern slave interests, a position which, by 
1856, had become anathema to northern voters. Violent 
conflicts over whether to allow slavery in the Kansas territory, 
which came to a head in the months prior to the campaign, 
persuaded anti-slavery Know-Nothings to cast their lot with the 
Republican candidate, John Fremont, who ran on a free labor 
platform.  The election results indeed suggest that voters who 
bolted from the Know-Nothings after 1855 migrated almost 
entirely into the Republican fold.  These mass defections 
occurred because nativism was “made secondary to the 
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question of Slavery,” analyzed an American Party voter.  
Amidst this confusion among anti-slavery forces, the 
Democratic candidate, James Buchanan, squeezed out a close 
victory in county and a landslide in country.
84
   
Little did Buchanan know that Westchesterites 
ironically elected a Congressman who would become a sharp 
thorn in his side.  In 1856, New York‟s Ninth Electoral District, 
comprised of Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland counties, 
sent Democrat John B. Haskin to Washington.  Born in 1821 
into a family of New York shipping magnates, Haskin was 
raised in Fordham on an estate that is now part of Woodlawn 
Cemetery in the Bronx.  After studying law, Haskin became 
involved in Democratic politics when the political crisis of the 
1850s commenced.  As a conservative Hunker Democrat, he 
resisted agitating the slavery question by refusing to take a 
position on the Compromise on 1850 and by supporting the 
Baltimore Platform of 1852, which affirmed the local character 
of that divisive issue.  He also staunchly opposed the Maine 
Law and was elected to four consecutive terms as Town 
Supervisor of West Farms, beginning in 1850, before the influx 
of Protestant immigrants from New York City turned the 
southern towns into prohibitionist enclaves.  When it came to 
state politics, Haskin opposed the $9 million bill to finance Erie 
Canal improvements and considered his fellow Democrat, 
Benjamin Brandreth, a foe for refusing to bolt the Assembly in 
protest.  By 1854, national events forced Haskin to take a stand 
regarding slavery, so he supported Stephen Douglas‟ Kansas-
Nebraska Bill repealing the Missouri Compromise and 
endorsing popular sovereignty.  Now in Congress, Haskin was 
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well positioned to take a pre-eminent role in the national 
debates regarding the extension of slavery.
85
 
Though slavery consumed national politics after the 
election of 1856, in Westchester ethno-cultural issues remained 
pre-eminent.  Fillmore‟s poor showing made it clear that 
Know-Nothings would soon cease to exist.  And with local 
elections in April and November 1857 quickly approaching, 
Republicans sought to envelop the key swing voting bloc—
American Party voters.  First, leaders re-nominated John 
Ferdon, the Know-Nothing incumbent, for state senate, even 
though the Republican rank-and-file had opposed his candidacy 
in 1855.  Second, the Republican-controlled state legislature 
passed the Metropolitan Police Bill, which unified the police 
departments of the City and several downstate counties, 
including Westchester.  In West Farms, Westchester, Pelham, 
and Morrisania, Know-Nothings and Republicans alike 
supported the bill based on their preference for law and order. 
These areas‟ proximity to the City “exposed [them] to the 
attacks of unscrupulous marauders,” most of whom, Rowe 
charged, were immigrants. “We have come to resemble the city 
in our moral as well as our physical character,” he decried.  As 
early as 1853, Edward Wells, the county District Attorney, 
acknowledged that these southern towns along the Harlem 
Railroad were disproportionately plagued by crime committed 
by New Yorkers.  Ferdon‟s vote in favor of the bill as state 
senator encouraged Republicans to believe that nativists would 
consider ethno-cultural issues at the ballot box and migrate into 
their camp.
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Democrats, in response, waged a vicious campaign 
against Republican positions on the Police Bill, slavery, and 
nativism.  They vilified Ferdon for voting with the Republicans 
to consolidate downstate police forces, which, they warned, 
would result in Westchester‟s occupation—similar to the 
British occupation of the colonies.  To make matters worse, 
county taxes would increase.  Describing the “Black 
Republican Party” as the refuge of aristocratic elites, the 
Eastern State Journal charged that, according to party creed, 
the government was “the omnipotent source of power, above 
the people, instituted to control and manage them.”  The 
Democratic editor applied this philosophy to both slavery and 
temperance.  Denying Kansas popular sovereignty would turn 
territorial residents into subjects of a monarchy in Washington, 
while legislating morality turned government into a guardian 
authority.  Westchesterites, according to the Sutherland, could 
either support Brandreth who thought “poor white people are as 
good as Niggers,” or support Ferdon who was allegedly in 
favor of black suffrage.  As Know-Nothingism waned, the 
Democrats and Republicans took opposing positions on a host 
of national and local issues.  If consensus destroyed the Second 
Party System, conflict was fast constructing the Third.
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In the battle for the remnants of Westchester‟s 
American Party, the Democrats bested the Republicans.  Little 
consensus exists on what caused this peculiar realignment.  A 
Republican blamed his party‟s 1857 defeat on “the general 
combination of the American with the Democratic Party.”  Low 
turnout because of the off-year election compounded the 
Republicans‟ woes.  Sutherland correctly pointed out that 
Democrats who had become Americans would switch back in 
1857. Both Sutherland and contemporary historians have 
pointed out that these voters had become fed up with the 
nativists‟ impasse over slavery.  Other historians have stressed 
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opposition to the Police Bill as the major 1857 election 
determinant.  The results for state senate seem to support this 
conclusion.  Though Ferdon polled better than the Republican 
Party generally, he lost even in municipalities bordering New 
York City that had the most vested interests in the Police Bill.  
By 1857, most residents in these southern towns were migrants 
from the City who still held strong allegiances to the 
Democratic machine at Tammany Hall, which opposed ceding 
control of the police force.  Whereas most historians agree that 
northern Know-Nothings generally migrated into the 
Republican camp, in Westchester it appears that local issues 
pushed them in droves towards the Democratic Party.
88
 
Know-Nothings who flocked there would soon 
discover that factional divisions regarding slavery once again 
plagued their party.  After disputes between pro-slavery and 
anti-slavery settlers in Kansas erupted in violence, the official 
territorial legislature met at Lecompton in 1857.  There, they 
passed a constitution allowing slavery and put the document to 
the territorial inhabitants for an up-or-down vote, which anti-
slavery forces boycotted.  Amid this uproar, President 
Buchanan endorsed the Lecompton Constitution. Democrats 
splintered about whether to follow his lead.  Senator Stephen 
A. Douglas of Illinois led a faction in opposition to the 
administration.  They criticized the Lecompton Constitution 
because the circumstances surrounding its passage seemed to 
contravene the principle of popular sovereignty.  Westchester‟s 
Congressman, John Haskin, was one of twelve House 
Democrats to cast his lot with Douglas, and against Buchanan.   
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On a stifling evening in June 1858, Haskin rose to 
address a crowd of 250 supporters, who had assembled to re-
nominate him for Congress.  The Lecompton Constitution, he 
said “would have entailed upon that virgin territory [of Kansas] 
the curse of Slavery.”  Turning the election of 1858 into a 
referendum on this issue alone, Haskin accused Buchanan, his 
fellow Democrat, of abandoning the platform upon which he 
was elected.  Taking cues from Douglas, Haskin argued that the 
Administration‟s policy of supporting a fraudulent constitution 
denied Kansans the right to exercise democratic control over 
local issues.  Prominent Westchester Democrats, ex-Whigs, 
Republicans, and Know-Nothings agreed with Haskin.  
According to Robert H. Coles, an ex-Barnburner Democrat 
from New Rochelle who attended the meeting, Haskin 
“exposed one of the most…shameful swindles that was ever 
perpetuated upon the Government.” Should his opponents 
“succeed in disturbing and dividing our party, a wound will be 
opened that will bleed more profusely than the wounds of 
bleeding Kansas.”89  
The partisan Democratic press not only opened these 
wounds, they also poured salt into them.  “We are perfectly 
willing that the Republicans should take [Haskin] up and adopt 
him as their own,” said Fenelon Hasbrouck, a Peekskill 
Democratic editor who called for his fellow Democrat‟s 
resignation from Congress.  In White Plains, the Second 
Assembly District convention adopted a resolution condemning 
Haskin for his “adulterous communion with unscrupulous 
Black Republicans, or Bastard Know-Nothings.”  In the first 
and third assembly districts as well, Democrats met to condemn 
Haskin for breaking with the national administration at a time 
when the major parties were still in flux.  In April 1858, 
Sutherland observed that Haskin was “languishing in the loving 
embraces of Black Republicanism…he has excited disgust in 
the minds of a large proportion of his constituents, who feel 
that he has enacted the part of a betrayer of his party.”  These 
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vitriolic editorials continued throughout the summer and drove 
a wedge through the county Democratic Party.
90
 
What particularly incensed Westchester‟s Democratic 
establishment was Republican support for Haskin.  “I only 
mean to make sure that Haskin shall be returned,” Horace 
Greeley confided to a friend in the summer of 1858.  The 
Bedford resident publicly declared his support at the 
Republican Congressional Convention, where the Committee 
on Resolutions, which he chaired, reported that “Haskin 
notably resisted every inducement to give his voice and vote 
for the enslavement of Kansas….By thus discharging his 
imperative duty as the representative of a free labor 
constituency,” he had become an ideological ally with 
Republicans, who published his name at the top of their ticket.  
“We have only to choose between Mr. Haskin and a full blown 
Lecompton Democrat. The election of a Republican is an 
impossibility,” the Yonkers Examiner conceded before also 
endorsing Haskin. Westchester Republicans had ample political 
cover to support a Democrat, for Haskin was now “independent 
of administrative requirements and party trammels.”  Though 
Westchester Republican leaders, especially Greeley, were 
motivated by policy considerations to endorse Haskin, electoral 
strategy also factored into this momentous decision.  
Supporting anti-Administration Democrats, they hoped, would 
divide the party and pave the way for a Republican victory in 
the 1860 Presidential contest.
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Consistent with their embrace of anti-Lecompton 
Democrats, Republican leaders and editors now refused to 
compromise with members of the fledging American Party.  
“No fusion should take place whereby the Republican Party 
shall sacrifice…its central principle of opposition to slavery,” 
Rowe declared, though the local party welcomed nativists who 
shared the free labor ideology.  Westchester Republicans did 
not incorporate into their platform nativist or temperance 
policies.  After American and Republican Party leaders failed 
to unite on strong anti-slavery language at the statewide 
nominating conventions, Rowe rationalized that his party stood 
“better today because we have not incumbered ourselves with 
unsympathizing comrades.”  Sutherland, of course, spun this 
impasse as a victory for his party.  County Know-Nothings, he 
editorialized, “regard any sort of connection with Black 
Republicanism as political prostitution, and are fast arranging 
themselves on the side of the National [pro-Buchanan] 
Democracy.”  An August declaration by Know-Nothing 
Council #32 in Peekskill repudiating Haskin‟s stance on 
Lecompton seemed to confirm Sutherland‟s analysis.  Though 
most Democratic candidates won in the 1858 contest, the local 
electorate was sufficiently anti-Lecompton to reward Haskin‟s 
independence with a second term in Congress.
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As Democrats and Republicans took their seats in the 
Thirty-Sixth Congress, in the summer and fall of 1859, 
sectional discord hurtled towards climax over the slavery 
extension issue.  Abolitionist John Brown sought to stir up a 
slave revolt by raiding a federal garrison in Harper‟s Ferry, 
Virginia.  Horace Greeley distributed Hinton Helper‟s The 
Impending Crisis of the South, in which a southern farmer 
argued that slavery blocked economic growth in his section. 
And Haskin continued opposing Buchanan‟s Lecompton 
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policy, proclaiming that he would “sooner co-operate with that 
[Republican] party than with those who have…endeavored to 
force a slave State into the Union.”  These three events helped 
re-orient the parties as sectional organizations, convinced the 
South that the North would stop at nothing to destroy slavery, 
and, according to Westchester Democrats, threatened the 
Union, which they feared “cannot hold together under the 
pressure of…Helper and John Brown.”93 
The stakes for the 1860 Presidential election had been 
set.  Edmund Sutherland, editor of the most widely circulated 
county paper, astutely predicted that the contest  “will reduce 
the political elements of the district and County into two 
parties.”  On the one side, the Democratic Party was paralyzed 
regarding slavery: though the Westchester party opposed 
extending slavery to the territories, southerners who wanted to 
secure those rights dominated the national organization. Fed up 
with decades of infighting in county, state, and nation, the 
Highland Democrat lamented, “party strife has…assailed the 
most sacred compacts of our Union.”  On the other side, the 
Republican Party stood in favor of abolishing slavery in 
western territories and in favor of free labor, which included 
Whiggish economic policies such as a protective tariff and 
internal improvements.  Choosing a new President was, 
according to one editor, “the most important crisis through 
which the country has been allowed to pass.”  At risk was “the 
perpetuity of the Union of these States.”94  
No campaign typified Democratic infighting better 
than that of 1860.  New York Democrats failed to coalesce 
around a single candidate for the highest office in the entire 
country.  In July, the party assembled at Schenectady, about 
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twenty miles west of Albany, to nominate a so-called People‟s 
Union Ticket of presidential electors pledged against Abraham 
Lincoln.  They hoped that a composite ticket of electors for 
Douglas, Breckinridge, and John Bell, the Constitutional Union 
candidate, would prevent Lincoln from securing New York‟s 
crucial thirty-five electoral votes.  Indeed, had Lincoln lost the 
entire South and the Empire State, he would have been left with 
145 pledged electors—just seven shy of victory.  The election 
would then be thrown to the House of Representatives where a 
Democrat could have won.  Which Democrat was unimportant, 
contended Sutherland, for “the defeat of Lincoln is the great 
object to be effected.”95 
The campaign quickly became ugly, even by 
nineteenth-century standards.  Westchester Democrats lobbed 
racist volleys against Lincoln by suggesting that a Republican 
victory would usher in black equality, “dragging [whites] down 
to his low and bestial capacity.”  Talk of “Black 
Republicanism” became commonplace.  When it came to 
slavery policy, Westchester Democrats ignored the issue and 
focused on developing industry, preserving nebulous 
“economic rights,” and building a railroad to the Pacific.  But 
each of these issues was wrapped up in sectional controversy.  
Would the transcontinental railroad, for example, pass through 
free or slave territory?  The Schenectady platform avoided this 
key question.
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Republicans adopted a platform demonstrating that 
by the end of the 1850s, the ethno-cultural issues that had 
broken up the Second Party System had faded into the 
background.  Though the Yonkers Examiner had supported 
New Yorker William H. Seward for the 1860 nomination, the 
editor touted Lincoln‟s compelling life story and anti-slavery 
credentials after the Illinoisan secured the nomination.  Rowe 
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rejected black equality but argued that extending slavery to the 
territories placed hard-working whites at an economic 
disadvantage.  Popular sovereignty was not an acceptable 
alternative because it was “destructive to law and order” by 
frequently degenerating into deadly conflicts brought on by 
outside agitators.  In fact, Rowe‟s views more closely 
paralleled the moderate Lincoln‟s than the radical Seward‟s.  
Though his party had never won a major election in 
Westchester, Rowe clearly drew the battle lines for the 
Presidential contest.
97
 
Lincoln swept the northern states on his way to a 
landslide victory.  But in Westchester, the 
Democratic/Constitutional Union slate bested that of the 
Republicans by about 10% of the vote.  This rejection of 
Republicanism took no Westchesterite by surprise; after all, the 
county Democratic Party had won the previous four elections.  
Nevertheless, Republicans rejoiced and Democrats sulked.  
Westchester Democrats regretted the result, “not so much on 
party grounds, as for the continued peace and prosperity of the 
country.”  The most important question confronting 
Westchesterites—and all Americans—in the wake of the first 
Republican presidential victory was whether Lincoln should 
“attempt by force of arms to coerce [the South] back, and thus 
plunge the country into all the horrors of a civil war.”  Though 
Sutherland hated Lincoln, he nonetheless concluded that the 
Union, “which cost our fathers so much toil and sacrifices and 
blood to establish,” was worth preserving.  On this much, both 
parties agreed.
98
 
 Yet during the loose party times of the 1850s, the 
Democratic Party dominated Westchester County‟s politics.  
The candidate at the top of their ticket lost only two elections 
during the decade—both to a third party that did not survive 
past 1858.  Although the Republican Party emerged out of the 
chaos of the 1850s as the northern sectional party, Westchester 
remained an anomalous bastion of anti-Lincoln voters.  
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Proximity to New York City accounted for much of this 
sentiment.  As Westchester transitioned from rural to 
suburban, the county was pulled into the City‟s political orbit.  
And City-dwellers, just like their neighbors to the north, 
overwhelmingly favored the Democrats.   
The local transition from the Second to Third Party 
Systems, moreover, produced unique political alignments.  
Perhaps no other northern county saw Republicans fuse with 
Democrats to counter the Know-Nothings.  Three years later, 
Westchester Republicans again endorsed an anti-slavery 
Democrat for Congress rather than nominate one of their own.  
These two fusions demonstrated that Westchesterites voted for 
people who shared their ideology instead of consistently 
supporting a particular political party.  The county‟s 
experience with Know-Nothingism also illustrated this 
peculiar trend.  Whereas most historians view the nativist 
party as a stepping-stone from the Whigs to the Republicans, 
Westchester Know-Nothings primarily held Democratic 
antecedents.  When the Know-Nothings disintegrated after the 
1858 elections, its supporters, who most ardently embraced 
the party‟s ideology, migrated almost entirely back into the 
Democratic fold. Fluid party affiliation weakened political 
organizations, facilitating the massive realignment of the 
1850s. 
Ethno-cultural issues bear primary responsibility for 
realigning Westchester‟s electorate.  Examining issues 
affecting everyday life, such as nativism and temperance, 
reveals that the Whig Party began unraveling well before the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act passed in 1854.  The Democratic Party, 
too, suffered from fissures generated not by slavery, but by 
Erie Canal financing, the Maine Law, and antiparty sentiment.  
Slavery may have led to the ultimate extinction of the Second 
Party System on the national level, but state and local 
campaigns in off-year elections, such as the unusual 1855 
contest, profoundly influenced political realignments.  Know-
Nothings elevated ethno-cultural issues to thrive in 
Westchester during two non-Presidential elections.  This party, 
in turn, siphoned voters from the Whigs and Democrats, 
challenged the nascent Republican Party, and led to the 
Second Party System‟s mortality.  It is impossible to tell the 
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story of how these four nationally competitive political parties 
divided, disintegrated, or formed without considering forces 
operating on the county and town levels.  Most voters had 
closer ties with elected officials at home than with those in 
Washington, and thus ethno-cultural and financial issues—the 
stuff of local politics—induced voters to flee from the Whig 
Party and to change the complexion of the Democratic Party. 
Towards the end of the 1850s, however, ethno-
cultural issues had lost salience.  By 1856, slavery consumed 
political affairs at all levels of government, filled the editorial 
pages of Westchester‟s partisan press, and strengthened the 
Republican Party pledged to preserve the principle of free 
labor.  John Jay, grandson of the first Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, was one of the first Westchesterites to join the 
local party.  On the eve of the 1860 election, Jay addressed a 
meeting of county Republicans in Bedford, down the block 
from the Post Office where William Robertson had cast his 
ballot in 1848.  “It will be wise for the slaveholders, instead of 
harping on dissolution, to prepare for the abolition of slavery,” 
he suggested, “not by the action of the Republican party, but 
by the operation of natural laws, that neither individuals nor 
parties can restrain.”  Although Jay‟s appeal did not sway his 
fellow Westchesterites to support Lincoln in 1860, the “natural 
laws” he cited ultimately triumphed over party and sectional 
divisions during the Civil War, culminating in emancipation 
and Union war victory.  During the 1850s, Westchesterites 
transcended, blurred, and erased party lines regarding dozens 
of issues—most prominently on nativism, temperance, and 
slavery.  After these ten years of loose party times, they again 
subordinated partisanship to principle.  When the south 
seceded, Westchesterites finally found a universal rallying 
point: saving the very Union that gave birth to their political 
parties.
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Westchester County Newspapers: Parties and 
Editors 
 
Newspaper Party Editor 
Eastern State Journal Democratic (Barnburner, Hard) Edmund G. Sutherland 
Highland Democrat Democratic Fenelon Hasbrouck 
Hudson River Chronicle Whig (Silver Gray)/American William Howe 
Peekskill Republican Whig (Sewardite)/Republican J.J. Chambers 
Westchester Herald Democratic (Hunker, Hard) Caleb Roscoe 
Westchester Gazette Nonpartisan/Temperance Eugene Hyde; John Cogswell 
Yonkers Examiner Republican M.F. Rowe 
 
Table 2. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 1853-
1854 
  Whig Soft Dem. Hard Dem. Know-Nothing 
1853 (Sec. of State) 39.5 21.7 39.8 -- 
1854 (Governor) 25.8 30.9 5.7 37.6 
 
Table 3. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 1854-
1855 
  Whig Soft Dem. Hard Dem. Know-Nothing Republican 
1854 (Governor) 25.8 30.9 5.7 37.6 -- 
1855 (Sec. of State) -- 7 32.0 38.7 22.3 
 
 
Table 4. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 1855-
1856 
 
  Republican Soft Dem. Hard Dem. Know-Nothing 
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1855 (Sec. of State) 22.3 7.0 32.0 38.7 
1856 (President) 35.3 36.4 28.3 
 
Table 5. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 1856-
1857 
 
 Republican Democratic Know-Nothing 
1856 (President) 35.3 36.4 28.3 
1857 (Sec. of State) 27.5 52.6 19.9 
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“All May Visit the Big Camp”: Race and the Lessons of 
the Civil War at the 1913 Gettysburg Reunion  
Evan Preston 
Shaping historical memory means extracting lessons 
from the past. Those lessons frame the debate about the nature 
of the present. Just months after the inauguration of Woodrow 
Wilson, the attention of most of the nation focused on the 
events scheduled to commemorate the semi-centennial of what 
was by then increasingly viewed as “the turning point” of the 
Civil War.
100
 The reunion at Gettysburg in 1913 constituted 
the contemporary public exegesis of the status of American 
memory of the Civil War. In this respect, the reunion in 
Gettysburg reflected the erasure of the legacy of emancipation 
and the unfulfilled promise of equality for African-Americans. 
Yet, almost all the public discourse at Gettysburg reflected no 
sense of disappointment; rather, the battle now represented a 
triumph of the American spirit. The presence of African-
American veterans would have complicated the message of 
white reconciliation at the reunion. Reckoning with the 
honorable service of black troops was not something 
mainstream American society felt comfortable with in 1913. 
Whether or not black veterans attended the fiftieth anniversary 
of Gettysburg is a small detail which illuminates a profoundly 
broader pair of subjects: the meaning of the Civil War and the 
nature of American race relations in 1913. In answering this 
question of black veterans at the Gettysburg reunion, the 
broader context of the organization and execution of the 
reunion, the lessons drawn from the ceremonies in Gettysburg, 
explicit discussions of race at the reunion and contemporary 
African-American perspectives must all be explored. 
                                                        
100
 Gettysburg Compiler July 9, 1913. 
67  
 
 Carol Reardon is the most eminent modern historian 
to embrace the idea that black veterans were both invited to 
and attended the 1913 reunion at Gettysburg. Reardon claims 
the organizers of the reunion in Gettysburg invited black 
veterans to participate fully in the celebrations, and a few 
went, but in Jim Crow America, they were housed on their 
own separate street in the tent camp.”101 Reardon further notes 
that white veterans enjoyed the behavior of the African-
Americans in the camp. Reardon‟s only apparent source for 
this assertion is Civil War veteran Walter Blake‟s account of 
his journey to Gettysburg, Hand Grips. Reardon is not the 
only prominent historian to recently address the question of 
black veterans in 1913 Gettysburg. In his analysis of race in 
the memory of the American Civil War, David Blight 
propounds a conclusion contradictory to Reardon‟s claim. 
Blight argues that while according to the main organizers, the 
Pennsylvania Commission, black veterans were implicitly 
eligible to attend the reunion, “research has turned up no 
evidence that any [black veterans] did attend.”102 Writing on 
earlier reunions at Gettysburg along with 1913, James Weeks 
writes that “first-person accounts describe black veterans 
attending the spectacle” of reunions in Gettysburg.103 Weeks is 
unclear as to whether he believes the accounts but he also 
observes “the ceremonies and official pronouncements 
disregarded racial matters altogether.”  In fact, Weeks never 
directly cites a primary source concerning the 1913 reunion at 
Gettysburg. Instead, Weeks appears to cite only other works 
by David Blight in reference to the 1913 reunion in particular. 
In spite of his reliance on Blight‟s work, Weeks conveys a 
subtly different message than Blight by being less declarative 
about the lack of reliable evidence to substantiate claims of 
black veterans‟ attendance in 1913. At the core of this 
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historiographical debate is the single contemporary account 
involving black veterans at the reunion.  
Walter Herbert Blake was a Union veteran of the 
Civil War from New Jersey. In 1913, he and other veterans 
embarked on an expedition to the Gettysburg reunion. Blake 
wrote a travel narrative of his group‟s experiences on during 
the expedition. To assess the credibility of Blake‟s claims it is 
helpful to examine his entire account. Blake is illustrative of 
the spirit of the reunion, believing the “wonderful conclave” 
of veterans in Gettysburg would allow the North and the South 
to “understand each other as they never did before”.104 
Veterans of each side remembered acts of kindness during the 
war, though the Southerners remained decidedly unapologetic 
about their actions. Initially, the Confederate veterans of 
General George Pickett‟s Virginians concerned some of 
Blake‟s Northern comrades since the Confederates wore an 
emblem with the phrase “SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS”, which 
many Union veterans associated most with John Wilkes 
Booth‟s declaration after assassinating Abraham Lincoln.105 
Blake condescendingly observed that “those better informed 
realized there was no connection” between the Southerners 
attire and the assassination of President Lincoln since the 
phrase in question was merely Virginia‟s state motto, existing 
on Virginia‟s State Seal generations before Booth‟s actions in 
1865. Blake noted that the United Confederate Veterans 
declared the lesson of the war to be a validation of “the utter 
impossibility of the dismemberment of the Union”.106  
Only three pages of Blake‟s 203-page narrative 
mentioned African-Americans. In the first half of the 
narrative, the perceived conduct of the organizers angered 
Blake because they planned “only for negroes from the Union 
side, forgetful of the fact that there were many faithful slaves 
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who fought against their own interest in their intense loyalty to 
their Southern masters”.107 Blake noted there were black 
people in both groups of veterans. In this assertion Blake 
voiced the well-established trope of the mythic legion of 
“loyal slaves” but Blake ventured further than the traditional 
narrative about loyal slaves in his alleged observations of 
Southerners in the camp. The idea of substantial numbers of 
African-Americans serving as soldiers for the Confederacy 
has been thoroughly refuted in recent historiography; Blake‟s 
desire to claim this myth is not unusual for his era though this 
point illustrates the ways in which Blake‟s account must be 
used cautiously when attempting to establish facts about the 
reunion based upon his word.
108
  
Blake‟s perspective appears limited in more than one 
instance and his writing on African Americans raises 
questions about how well he understood the status of race 
relations from the perspective of blacks in the age of 
American apartheid.  Blake claimed “some colored boys from 
the Southland” found their way into the camp of veterans and 
were promptly sheltered by “the big-hearted Tennessee 
delegation”, giving the black men “a special tent” of their 
own.
109
 Blake included a second major act of Southern 
beneficence toward blacks in his account. Developing the 
story in an almost stream-of-consciousness transition, it seems 
writing about the “colored comrades” reminded Blake of other 
black people in the camp. Blake recalled Confederates 
walking down near his tent when they encountered “an old 
negro, Samuel Thompson.” Immediately, Thompson saluted 
the Confederates and the Confederates responded in a manner 
Blake construed as friendly. The Confederates assured 
Thompson they were “glad” to meet him and told him “we-all 
want to shake hands with you, nigger, an‟ to say as we have 
some niggers at home just as big as you”.110 Blake portrayed 
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the black man‟s response as amicable, emphasizing that 
“EVERY ONE of the Southerners” shook hands with the man 
identified as Thompson.
111
 In the interaction between blacks 
and white Southerners, as with his other descriptions of Union 
veterans meeting Confederate veterans, the hand shake 
represented the ultimate sign of complete reconciliation for 
Blake, the motif and attestation of friendliness. The mere idea 
the Confederates could extend a hand to “their dark-skinned 
brother” was proof to Blake that there was “no color line 
here”.112 On this point however, Blake later contradicted 
himself. Blake identified a single street of the tent camp for 
veterans “devoted entirely to negro soldiers”.113 These black 
men encountered no discrimination and “they were treated just 
like the others and had the time of their lives”, according to 
Blake.
114
 Such men proved entertaining as the “great 
attraction” to their area of the camp since they regularly 
played “old plantation melodies”.115 This paragraph emerged 
as an interjection in Blake‟s narrative of the commemoration 
of the action of July third 1863. Blake did not introduce the 
lines with any fuller context nor did he dwell on the subject. 
The possibility that the black men were some of the many 
laborers in the camp never appears in Blake‟s writing.  
Blake‟s observations deserve some context in the 
geography of Gettysburg. Most of the African-American 
residents of Gettysburg lived in the southwestern district of the 
town, the Third Ward, proximate to the edge of the veterans‟ 
camp. When this fact is considered alongside the well 
documented evidence of blacks working in the camp during 
the reunion, a clear possibility emerges to suggest the black 
men Blake observed were not invited veterans attending the 
reunion but simply black people who happened to be in or 
near the camp as workers or local residents. Moreover, the 
pictures published with Blake‟s book show black cooks and 
camp laborers, though Blake never acknowledged the role of 
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these blacks. The pictures in Blake‟s account serve as a 
narrative unto themselves, sometimes providing a divergent 
message from Blake‟s words. In an ostensibly unintentional 
reflection on the vital role of the labor of African-Americans 
in American society, Blake‟s publisher included a poem below 
the photograph of the black cooks which read: “We can live 
without friends, We can live without books, But civilized man 
cannot live without cooks”.116 Clearly, Blake‟s travel journal 
contained stunning stories, but how many of his most colorful 
assertions could be corroborated outside his book? Who was 
invited to Gettysburg? 
Organization of the semi-centennial reunion was a 
joint venture between the Federal government and each 
individual state government, though the vast majority of 
responsibility was split between the Federal government and 
Pennsylvania. The Federal government appropriated money to 
provide tents and supplies for an estimated 40,000 veterans. In 
an April, 3, 1912 Concurrent Resolution of Congress, the 
government planned to provide “material support and 
accommodation of veterans, including sewage, water, hospital 
services and policing”.117 A “big camp” with centralized 
latrines and medical care would house the veterans during 
their stay. Nowhere in the War Department‟s report are 
African-Americans mentioned and no trace of a “separate 
street” for black veterans remains on the maps detailing the 
layout of the tent camp.
118
 Instead, veterans were organized by 
state or territory. The Pennsylvania Commission nominally 
invited and offered to pay transportation fees inside 
Pennsylvania of “all honorably discharged soldiers . . . sailors 
and marines”, of either side of the war that enlisted in 
Pennsylvania, or for those living in Pennsylvania in 1913. The 
stated purpose of the Pennsylvania commission was to 
organize “a general reunion of the veterans of the Union and 
Confederate Armies,” for “the first time since the close of the 
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Civil War.”119 The Field Secretary of the Gettysburg 
Battlefield Memorial Association, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis 
Beitler, disseminated this list of qualifications and benefits to 
local and national papers.
120
 Pennsylvania and New York 
spent the most on the reunion, appropriating $450,000 and 
$150,000 respectively.
121
 Pennsylvania spent over $140,000 
on transporting veterans alone.
122
 All told, the States 
appropriated “about $1,000,000”, including $150,000 of 
Federal funding.
123
 Pennsylvania estimated 54,928 veterans 
attended the ceremonies. The Pennsylvania Commission 
proudly included in its report the invitation issued by General 
C. Irvine Walker, Lieutenant General Commanding the United 
Confederate Veterans (U.C.V.), which encouraged Southern 
attendance since “all surviving soldiers of the war of the South 
and of the North will be invited guests”.124 Pennsylvania and 
Vermont remained open to veterans who had not served at 
Gettysburg, and New York gave preference to veterans of the 
battle, followed by veterans with the longest service 
records.
125
 Though the initial intention of the gathering was to 
include all veterans of the Civil War wishing to attend, many 
states ultimately supported only veterans of the Battle of 
Gettysburg. The Indiana Commission specifically invited 
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individual units.
126
 By choosing to invite only those veterans 
who fought at Gettysburg, Indiana passed directly over the 
28
th
 Regiment Indiana Infantry who became the 28
th
 United 
States Colored Troops.
127
 By choosing to invite only veterans 
of Gettysburg, Indiana and other states made it unnecessary to 
disinvite black veterans. This decision was made despite the 
fact the bill authorizing the federal government to organize a 
reunion at Gettysburg encouraged “each State [to] send to 
Pennsylvania all surviving Veterans of the Civil War resident 
within such states”.128 Cost doubtlessly influenced the decision 
of states choosing to invite only Gettysburg veterans. Thus it 
is very difficult to argue race was the fundamental reason 
some states decided to send only Gettysburg veterans. 
Logistics and funding would have been a rather substantial 
obstacle to the inclusion of all living and willing Civil War 
veterans. Even if it was not the specific intention of state 
legislatures, the consequence of this decision seems to have 
been an effective exclusion of many black veterans since they 
would now have to pay their way to the reunion if they wished 
to attend. States limiting the eligibility for official support of 
attendance to Gettysburg veterans would have had to 
explicitly invite black veterans to the reunion. Neither the 
New York report nor the Indiana report contained any such 
invitations and the Pennsylvania report never explicitly invited 
African-American veterans. While there is no clear evidence 
of an invitation of black veterans, there is equally no clear 
evidence in the state commission reports of an explicit 
prohibition of African-Americans attending the ceremonies in 
Gettysburg. It is difficult to absolutely prove the negative 
point that blacks were not invited, lacking a positive statement 
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of their prohibition. As a result, events, tone and message of 
the reunion are important pieces of circumstantial evidence 
about the question of an invitation as they are fundamental 
direct evidence for determining if blacks attended.  
The theme of reconciliation animated the public 
actions at the reunion. Some began to refer to the event as the 
“great peace reunion”. With the possible exception of a 
drunken stabbing in a bar, the reunion was peaceful.
129
 UCV 
leader Gen. Walker welcomed “the hand of peace” offered by 
Union veterans in inviting the Confederates to come en 
masse.
130
 William E. Mickle, Adjutant General and Chief of 
Staff of the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.), joined 
Walker in calling for all those of his organization who were 
capable to attend the reunion to do so.
131
 The G.A.R. and the 
U.C.V. worked together to, in the words of G.A.R. 
Commander-in-Chief H.M. Trimble, erase “forever any 
lingering prejudices and bitterness that may have survived” 
from the War.
132
 More than one local reporter wrote of the 
story also mentioned by Walter Blake of one Union veteran 
and one Confederate veteran meeting at the reunion, buying a 
hatchet in Gettysburg and literally “burying the hatchet” on 
the battlefield.
133
 The potent imagery of this story gained 
national attention. Another local paper exhorted any veteran 
still with “bitterness in his heart” to “bury it on the battlefield 
where the ashes of brave men have found sepulchre”.134 
Northern reporters seemed eager to obtain the opinions of 
former Confederates, finding subjects sincerely interested in 
reconciliation. One former Confederate confessed he and his 
comrades “love our country not because of the great war but 
because of what has happened since the war.” Crucially, the 
veteran referred to the United States, rather than the South or 
                                                        
129
 Gettysburg Times, July 3, 1913. 
130
 “Pennsylvania Commission,” 9. 
131
 “Pennsylvania Commission,” 10. 
132
 Ibid, 16. 
133
 “Bury the Hatchet,” Gettysburg Times, July 3, 1913.  
134
 “G.A.R. Encampment,” Gettysburg Star and Sentinel July 
2, 1913.  
75  
 
his state, when he spoke of “our country”.135 Here, the former 
Rebel stated perhaps more than he meant. “What” had 
occurred since the war was nothing less than an easing of 
sectional tension at the expense of black rights by means of a 
political retreat from Radical Reconstruction‟s promise of 
greater racial equality and a legal evisceration of the most 
egalitarian legislation from the post-war period by the 
Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Southerners had not forgotten 
the threat of racial equality and many Northerners felt 
compelled to admit their former policies were misguided at 
best. The Lieutenant Governor of Rhode Island, Roswell B. 
Burchard, actually issued an encomium to the South because it 
did not remain bitter about “the errors of reconstruction, where 
they were committed more than the North”.136 Though 
Burchard declared that “brothers cannot forget the death of 
brothers”, he also argued that it is the shared recognition of 
loss on each side that allows for reconciliation.
137
  
Mutual recognition of strenuous loyalty to principles, 
shared loss and manly gallantry constituted this 
reconciliationist “soldier‟s faith” which overwhelmed the 
ideological legacy of the War.
138
 Margaret Creighton 
explained this cultural shift to mean that “Gettysburg‟s 
importance…was not that it helped deliver a death blow to 
slavery; rather, it helped tighten white blood ties”.139 The 
“bloody shirt” rhetoric, urging remembrance of the war dead 
along with the reasons for war and the fault of Southerners for 
bringing the carnage of battle, had largely passed out of use by 
1913, with the exception prominent African-Americans. At 
Gettysburg, strands of the rhetoric of loss were woven into a 
new fabric of nationalism as the “bloody shirt” became the 
family tablecloth in a feast of reunion. Virginia Governor 
William Hodges Mann articulated a new desire for 
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cooperation and a new belief in the national spirit. The North 
and South could now work together in war, as they had in 
1898. Mann confidently proclaimed that “if we have to call for 
troops to repel a foreign enemy” he was sure “that our sons 
will meet them at the gate”.140 White supremacy formed the 
bedrock of that nationalism. One local publication ventured so 
far as to quote famed abolitionist Henry Ward Beecher‟s 
wartime explanation of the difficulty of conquering the South; 
speaking to a British audience, Beecher was quoted as 
explaining that “Northern armies had to fight men of their own 
race”, a fight of equals.141 This was not an entirely accurate 
assessment of Beecher‟s views on race; he may have been 
referring to a “national” race of “Americans”. Even so, the 
local paper wanted to read Beecher out of context to make its 
point. 
National press coverage reflected the sentiments of 
nationalism expressed in Gettysburg.  Helen Longstreet, 
widow of Confederate General James Longstreet, delineated 
an interpretation of the Civil War which expanded from 
Beecher‟s supposed elucidation of white supremacy to include 
a celebration of white nationalism without ever even 
addressing the subject of African-Americans. Mrs. Longstreet 
argued that the meaning of Gettysburg ought to inspire all true 
“white” Americans because at Gettysburg the white race again 
proved its worth. In the context of giving an account of the 
commemoration of Pickett‟s Charge, which Helen claimed for 
her late husband, Mrs. Longstreet argued that “the mettle that 
wrestled and triumphed here is the mettle that for twelve 
centuries has kept the hope of the Anglo-Saxon undimmed”.142 
Gettysburg was glorious and important because there fought 
“Anglo-Saxon against Anglo-Saxon” and proved each side‟s 
continued commitment to “the cause of human liberty”.  
Longstreet proffered a strong argument for white nationalism 
but it was not wholly original. Edward Linenthal, historian of 
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battlefields and memory, notes that the Gettysburg Compiler 
argued as early as 1903 that the field should be preserved as a 
reminder of “immortal Anglo-Saxon bravery”.143 Even G.A.R. 
chief, Alfred B. Beers argued the war was a “conflict waged 
by men of the same race”, but Beers spoke no words about 
African-American soldiers in this statement.
144
 The Outlook 
echoed the nationalism of Governor Mann‟s speech but 
appeared moderate in comparison with the widow Longstreet. 
Outlook boasted Teddy Roosevelt as contributing editor, still 
promoting his “New Nationalism” after an electoral defeat in 
1912. Outlook‟s editorial board embodied the reconciliationist 
interpretation of the Civil War. Outlook editors cited the most 
succinct declaration of the meaning of the reunion in the 
statement of one Union veteran that the reunion was his last 
chance to do something “for the Union”.145 The same veteran 
remembered the battle of Gettysburg as “the time the Union 
was saved”.146 Outlook editors, either out of ignorance or 
purposeful omission, noted the importance of veterans 
decorating the graves at the National Cemetery but failed to 
mention the fact this was an entirely one-sided endeavor as the 
Confederate dead were not buried there. In a later edition, 
Herbert Francis Sherwood reported that the true lesson of the 
reunion lay in the speech by Secretary of War Lindley 
Garrison who said “the field of enmity has become the field of 
amity”.147 Sherwood remarked how veterans could tease one 
another about shooting each other and literally bury the 
hatchet, in one case; he viewed this as the greatest “proof that 
the war is over”.148 Even someone identified as a “citizen of 
Richmond” testified that “we are one people now”.149 Neither 
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the correspondent nor the Southerner ever broached the topic 
of African-Americans, much less African-American veterans; 
the “people” now united did not refer to the experience of 
blacks during the war or in 1913. Woodrow Wilson felt no 
need to mention the racial legacy of the Civil War. Wilson‟s 
speech in Gettysburg unified the themes of nationalism and 
American progress while still ignoring any concept of racial 
tensions. Wilson extolled the triumph of America in a new age 
in which “there is no one within its borders, there is no power 
among the nations of the earth, to make it afraid”.150 Yet, 
Wilson mixed his triumphalism with a challenge to America to 
live up to “its own great standards”, a bitterly ironic comment 
given Wilson‟s record on race. 
 Though the themes of nationalism and reconciliation 
dominated the national narrative the white press coverage was 
not completely unanimous. Though Wilson shared some 
elements of liberalism with the editors of The Independent, 
they drew distinctly different lessons from the reunion in 
Gettysburg. The Independent continued, to some degree, the 
legacy of its Civil War era editor, Henry Ward Beecher. The 
Independent offered a more complicated reflection on the 
reunion at Gettysburg than most national press coverage. 
Independent editors chose to open their publication for the 
week of July 3, 1913 with a reprinting of their editorial from 
July 9, 1863. Written by Henry Ward Beecher‟s successor at 
The Independent Theodore Tilton, the 1863 piece offered a 
rousing partisan celebration of the defeat of the Confederates. 
Tilton explained that the Union army had blocked Lee and the 
South on their “triumphal way to the establishment of the 
Slave Power”.151 In republishing this editorial, the 1913 
editors of The Independent did not shrink from Tilton‟s 
position. Rather, the paper affirmed Beecher‟s fight for 
“justice and freedom for the slave”.152 Thus the editors 
reaffirmed not only the ending of slavery, something not 
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mentioned by Outlook, but also the promise of justice for 
former slaves. The editors of The Independent agreed that the 
reunion at Gettysburg was a “very happy” occasion.153 
Independent editors credited “the God of armies” for 
bestowing the twin blessings of “union of all the states, and 
liberty for all the people”. In this statement however, the 
editors overestimated the degree to which “liberty” had been 
realized by blacks in America; their declaration evoked 
accomplishment but not continued struggle. Still, The 
Independent stood out for its courage as a non-black paper 
addressing the emancipationist legacy of the war in 1913. 
Moreover, The Independent re-introduced the concept of race 
while mentioning African-Americans, with at least some 
agency, in the discussion of the meaning of the Civil War. 
Racial identification, racial hierarchy and racial pride 
all found expression in Gettysburg. The racial dynamics of the 
reunion comprise perhaps the most powerful circumstantial 
evidence to support the position that black veterans were at 
least indirectly disinvited to the reunion. Blacks visited 
Gettysburg regularly, usually in September around the 
anniversary of the issuance of the Preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation.
154
 Thousands of blacks rode into Gettysburg on 
trains at least once a year. These “colored excursions” were 
not palatable to many white Gettysburg residents. In 1913, 
local papers warned residents that “part of Baltimore‟s 
innumerable colored population” would be “dumped” on the 
town.
155
 The arrival of black tourists invariably corresponded 
with a rash of news covering any and all, or more than actually 
existed, of their debauchery. The excursion of 1910 proved 
especially heinous to the white locals. The Adams County 
News patronizingly praised some black tourists for their “far 
and passable” behavior only to highlight a black man acting 
like “a four-legged animal” and as a “half-clad” black woman 
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slatternly flaunted herself in the town square.
156
 The same 
paper was sure to record every member of the tourist 
contingent indulging in alcohol. Considering the climate of 
suspicion about any black visitors to Gettysburg, it seems 
highly probable that if there had been any noticeable number 
of black veterans in attendance at the 1913 reunion, at least 
one of the local papers would have warned the population. 
While there were many events occurring during the reunion 
which hypothetically could have distracted local reporters, the 
Gettysburg Times managed to notice the single Native-
American veteran in attendance. “Chief Dwan-O-Guah”, or 
David Warrior of the 1
st
 New York Light Artillery, received 
enough attention to merit a small but separate article. If the 
Times noticed one Indian veteran, would the paper not also, in 
all likelihood, have noticed the multiple black veterans 
mentioned by Blake? It is possible the papers simply 
purposefully neglected to report the presence of black troops. 
Certainly most of the coverage of the reunion ignored the 
blacks working at the camp, despite the pictures proving the 
efforts of African-Americans during the massive spectacle.
157
 
Nowhere in the reporting on the thousands of food workers or 
tent builders are African-Americans identified in print as the 
laborers.
158
  
Northerners, in general, had not always ignored 
African-Americans. Immediately after the Civil War, white 
Union veterans “routinely collaborated with African-
Americans in honoring the war dead”.159 However, by 1900, 
“there were just three monuments to black soldiers in the 
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northern United States and none in Pennsylvania”. 160 While 
the North tried to forget African-American “service” in the 
war, attempting to forget even their very existence after 
Reconstruction, the South expanded its active remembrances 
of a type of African-American. Monuments to “loyal slaves” 
were built by Southerners reconstructing their history.
161
  
In Lumberton, North Carolina, merely weeks after 
Gettysburg‟s commemoration in 1913, locals organized “a 
sumptuous dinner” to be served in honor of “former 
servants”.162 In the reporting of this event, local journalists 
used the terms “slave” and “servant” interchangeably, 
suggesting their opinion of the degree of new liberty for 
African-Americans. The North Carolinians agreed with Walter 
Blake and lamented the fact “hitherto no public recognition 
has been given to the loyalty and devotion of the slaves, the 
„colored veterans‟ whose number is rapidly diminishing”.163 
Southerners at Gettysburg fought to spread a similar 
understanding about the true legacy of the war and its 
implications for race relations in 1913. In an address published 
by the Pennsylvania Commission another North Carolinian 
and Confederate veteran, Sergeant John C. Scarborough, 
conceded that during the Civil War Southerners had been 
“afraid that the negroes would rise behind us”.164 Scarborough 
assured the Gettysburg audience that “our fears were all 
misplaced because the negro was quiet and as safe and 
thoroughly imbued with the idea of the principle that was 
involved and was loyal to the South as he was to his master 
and mistress”.165 Scarborough articulated a version of the 
“white man‟s burden” but his imagery painfully invoked the 
physical memory of slavery; he argued that whites must take 
the lesson of the Civil War to be the greatness and 
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indissolubility of White America. Using their renewed 
strength, white Americans must uplift blacks and “show to 
[the negro] that we are his friends and tie him to us with hooks 
of steel [emphasis added] and he will reward us for what we 
do for him”.166  
Scarborough‟s message would have doubtless 
seemed repugnant to the African-Americans of Gettysburg. 
Gettysburg contained black veterans, including John Watts, 
Lloyd Watts and Randolph Johnston.
167
The service of black 
men was not always ignored. In fact, “during the war, the 
borough‟s Democratic paper had devoted considerable column 
space to these men”. Yet even during the war this attention 
was degrading. Black troops were depicted as quick to “turn 
tail and run” at Petersburg and elsewhere; though, being a 
Democratic paper it possessed some potential incentive in 
addition to racism to attack the Union war effort.
168
 Black 
residents of Gettysburg faced severe dangers on the home-
front as well. In a compendium of oral histories of Civil War 
battles, some interviews of African-Americans from 
Gettysburg survived. The accounts were published in 1915 but 
the oral histories were conducted near the time of the reunion 
in 1913. While the lack of proper names in the accounts is 
disconcerting, the details of the accounts do not on the surface 
appear ridiculous. In fact the compiler, Clifton Johnson, 
demonstrated noteworthy tact for his time by seeking to probe 
“the comments of the blacks on the whites and those of the 
whites on the blacks, though sometimes uncharitable and 
unjust”.169 In one account, a black man identified merely as 
“the colored farm hand” recalled his surety during July of 
1863 that “if the Rebels had happened to come through they‟d 
have took [horses] and me, too”.170 For other local blacks, the 
potential positive or negative consequences of the war seemed 
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an almost absent concept in remembering the battle. A black 
woman identified as “the colored servantmaid [sic]” offered 
only one paragraph of reflection on the war beyond her vivid 
account of some of the violence of the battle; she repeated that 
the war years were “rough times” and that “if they ever fight 
again in this country I don‟t want to be around”.171  In 1866, 
black veterans from Gettysburg formed a fraternal society 
called the “Sons of Good Will” but by 1913, no record of any 
fraternal organization of black veterans appeared in local 
papers in connection with the reunion activities.
172
 This 
decline in black organization was met with an increase of 
white organization when the Ku Klux Klan established itself 
in Gettysburg in the 1920s.
173
 
Instead of focusing on Gettysburg, many black 
Americans turned their attention to the events in Boston in late 
July. While Gettysburg and most of white America celebrated 
the reunion at Gettysburg, an African-American paper, the 
Chicago Defender, dedicated its weekly issue to the 
persecution of boxing champion Jack Johnson. The headline 
of the July fifth edition read “JACK JOHNSON IS 
CRUCIFIED FOR HIS RACE”, referring to Johnson‟s 
conviction for traveling across state lines with a “prostitute” 
who was actually his white girlfriend.
174
 The events of July 18, 
1863, the battle of Fort Wagner, concerned the black 
community represented by the Defender much more than the 
events of Gettysburg in 1913. In this action the famed 54
th
 
Massachusetts led an ill-fated but tremendously courageous 
assault on a coastal defense bastion at Charleston. In Boston, a 
proud celebration of the service of African-Americans 
presented reflections on the current state of affairs in the 
nation. The Defender noted that although the rest of the nation 
focused on the “elaborate celebrations” at Gettysburg and 
Vicksburg, the memory of Fort Wagner was equally important 
because it was “an equally pivotal battle”.  Whether this 
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assertion is true in the narrow military sense was and is 
perhaps debatable but the significance of acknowledging black 
heroism in the War was evident. The most important duty of 
people at that time was, for the black writers at the Defender, 
the need to remember “the cause these soldiers represented”. 
This cause was not that both sides of the Civil War fought 
gallantly and for equally valid principles but rather that the 
Union cause represented “freedom and equality in all things 
for the class of Americans whose liberty and equality were 
won by that war and are now being abridged”. Unlike the 
speeches and press coverage at Gettysburg, the Defender 
emphasized “both races” commemorated the memory of the 
black and white soldiers of the 54
th
 Massachusetts, their leader 
Colonel Robert Gould Shaw, and Governor John A. Andrew 
who commissioned the unit. The celebrants laid wreaths at 
Andrew‟s statue and at Shaw‟s memorial while singing hymns 
such as “The Battle Hymn of the Republic” and “John 
Brown‟s Body”. Even in this celebration, the reporter included 
an acknowledgement of the tension in Andrew‟s begrudging 
acceptance of “men who were sometimes rough and not 
cultivated” into the black regiment. Still, the Defender 
assessed the legacy of Fort Wagner to be proving “to the 
world that the American Negro soldiers had the valor, 
patriotism and courage of other American soldiers”.175  
If black veterans had attended the Gettysburg reunion 
in an organized way or in any substantial numbers, a 
publication such as the Defender ought to have written about 
it. There are simply too many reasons why Walter Blake might 
have grossly misunderstood what he may or may not have 
seen to base an entire argument about black veterans solely on 
Hand Grips as Carol Reardon has done. The lack of 
documented evidence of explicit invitations of black veterans, 
the growing sense of nationalism among white Americans 
embedded as it so often was with the vicious qualifying notion 
of white nationalism, race relations in Gettysburg before, 
during and after the reunion all strongly suggest the 
improbability of the notion black veterans were either 
explicitly invited to the reunion or attended on the assumption 
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of an implicit invitation. Gettysburg in 1913 never truly 
wrestled with the “negro problem”. The character of the 
reunion would have been dramatically different with a few 
thousand black veterans in attendance, as Carl Eeman 
speculates.
176
 Nonetheless, this was not the case. If blacks 
were present it is extremely challenging to explain the 
possibility of a large amount moving about the camp without 
attracting notice from someone other than Walter Blake. 
Edward Linenthal‟s reflection on reunions captured the true 
spirit of 1913 as it was remembered by most of its attendees. 
Linenthal observed how “patriotic rhetoric on numerous 
ceremonial occasions, and monument building” allowed 
Northerners and Southerners “to celebrate Gettysburg as an 
„American‟ victory”.177 The gallantry of each side could be 
acknowledged and celebrated because it signified “a uniquely 
American form of commitment to heartfelt principle” but also 
because being a true and full American meant being “white”, 
as that term had been defined by 1913.
 178
  To praise American 
courage was not necessarily to imply African-Americans were 
capable of real courage because courage requires agency. The 
effects of reconciliation confirmed Frederick Douglass‟ 
trepidation about what would happen when whites clasped 
“hands across the bloody chasm”.179  This was the slogan of 
the reconciliationist Horace Greely in his presidential 
campaign of 1872. Fort Wagner, and Boston by extension, 
was the locus of black pride in the summer of 1913, not 
Gettysburg.  Certainly by 1913, it seemed most white 
Americans planned to write African-Americans out of 
American history or only include them in a subservient status 
deprived of any rational agency. In response, black people and 
their relatively few white allies would become active builders 
of their own historical memory, a memory which struggled for 
decades to enter the mainstream of American culture.  
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The Richmond Bread Riot of 1863: Class, Race, and 
Gender in the Urban Confederacy 
MIDN 1/C Katherine R. Titus 
 
This morning early a few hundred women and boys 
met as by concert in the Capitol Square, saying they 
were hungry, and must have food. The number 
continued to swell until there were more than a 
thousand. But few men were among them, and these 
were mostly foreign residents, with exemptions in 
their pockets. About nine A.M. the mob emerged 
from the western gates of the square proceeded down 
Ninth Street, passing the War Department, and 
crossing Main Street, increasing in magnitude at 
every step, but preserving silence and (so far) good 
order. Not knowing the meaning of such a 
procession, I asked a pale boy where they were 
going. A young woman, seemingly emaciated, but 
yet with a smile, answered that they were going to 
find something to eat.
180
 
 
Confederate war clerk, J.B. Jones‟s description of the 
Richmond Bread Riot of 1863, clearly highlights the suffering 
which permeated the urban centers of the Confederacy by the 
midpoint of the Civil War. The production and transportation 
of goods became increasingly difficult in the war torn nation. 
Inflation undermined the value of Confederate currency and 
made it difficult for those on fixed wages to provide for 
themselves and their families. The influx of thousands of 
refugees into Richmond created a deficit of housing in the city 
and raised the already inflated prices of goods. By 1863, most 
citizens remarked that they found it almost impossible to feed 
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themselves. As Emory M. Thomas has observed, “a nation of 
farmers could indeed go hungry.”181 
Although the Confederates ended 1862 militarily on a 
high note with the victory at Fredericksburg in December, the 
staggering casualties at Antietam and the ensuing 
Emancipation Proclamation combined to create undercurrents 
of doubt in the fledgling nation.
182
  The military‟s 
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The victory prompted a significant boost in confidence on the 
home front and within the army itself. Furthermore, the Union 
was encountering severe leadership problems.  
 The Confederates were unable to take advantage of the 
Union‟s disorganization following Second Manassas. 
Furthermore, the Battle of Antietam did not end well for the 
Army of Northern Virginia. Although the battle ended 
indecisively, the South suffered a severe blow to morale 
because of the high casualties and the army‟s ensuing retreat 
back into Virginia. The Union pounced on the opportunity to 
claim a Union victory and President Lincoln issued the 
Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862, a mere 
five days after the battle. This only intensified the feelings of 
hatred between the two sections. J.B. Jones wrote on 
September 30, 1862, “Lincoln‟s proclamation was the subject 
of discussion in the Senate yesterday. Some of the gravest of 
our senators favor the raising of the black flag, asking and 
giving no quarter hereafter,” J.B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk’s 
Diary, 159.   
 The Confederates made their comeback at the Battle of 
Fredericksburg, December 11-15, 1862. The Confederate 
troops managed to inflict massive casualties on the assaulting 
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performance, however vital to the Confederacy‟s hope for 
survival, did not affect the lives of the citizens on the home 
front to the extent that the government‟s domestic policies 
did.
183
 In fact, much of the Confederacy‟s legislation, passed 
in the opening months of 1863, only accentuated whatever 
feelings of resentment existed at the end of the previous year. 
In pursuit of success on the battlefield, the Confederacy 
abandoned many of the principles on which the nation had 
been founded. The Richmond Bread Riot demonstrated that 
Confederate domestic legislation and treasury policies 
combined to create a level of discontent on the home front 
which spurred people to step outside traditional notions 
regarding gender roles and social norms.   
 
Class, Race, and Gender: The Trinity of Southern Society 
 In order to understand the consequences and 
implications of the actions taken by the women who 
participated in the Richmond Bread Riot, a certain 
understanding of antebellum social norms is needed. Southern 
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individuals determined their role and position in society 
according to race, gender, and class. Drew Gilpin Faust, one 
of the foremost scholars of women in the Confederacy, notes:  
White men and women of the antebellum South had 
defined and understood themselves in relation to a 
number of categories: race, which marked the 
difference between bound and free, superior and 
inferior; gender, which was designed to distinguish 
independent from dependent, patriarch from 
subordinate; and class, more subtle and hidden in a 
society that rested within a democratizing America 
but present nonetheless in distinctions of wealth, 
power, education, and refinement, in claims to honor 
and gentility.
184
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importance. As the nineteenth-century women‟s voices that 
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which women of the South‟s slaveholding classes consciously 
identified themselves. The intertwined features of race, class, 
and gender were the defining characteristics of ladyhood; 
these were also assumptions directly assaulted by the social 
and cultural forces unleashed by the Civil War” (see page 
260). My research confirms her assumptions. The diaries 
written by Richmond ladies regularly used the language of 
class, race, and gender in their entries. Moreover, the 
Richmond Bread Riot supports Faust‟s assertion that the Civil 
War undermined traditional notions about these categories. 
The poor women leapt outside of the antebellum norms 
regarding acceptable female behavior by participating in a 
violent uprising and challenged the longstanding norms about 
female propriety.  
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Each of the three categories was intimately connected to the 
other two. An assault on one category fundamentally 
challenged the others as well. Thus, when the Civil War 
mobilized the population and took men away from their 
families, it undermined the entire Southern social system.  
The War noticeably affected gender roles in Southern 
society.  In the antebellum era, strict notions with respect to 
gender permeated Southern culture; men and women had 
explicitly defined roles. Ladies were to remain uninvolved in 
politics and business.
185
 They were also expected to be 
educated, refined, and genteel. Daniel Hundley attempted to 
detail the delicate dynamics of the Southern social system. He 
used terms of the utmost admiration for the Southern woman 
when he wrote,  
Ah! thou true-hearted daughter of the sunny South, 
simple and unaffected in their manners, pure in 
speech as thou art in soul, and ever blessed with an 
inborn grace and gentleness of spirit lovely to look 
upon, fitly art thou named: 
 
“A perfect woman, nobly planned, 
To warm, to comfort, and 
command;  
And yet a spirit still, and bright 
With something of angelic light.”186 
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Thus, Hundley, in the manner of most men, attributed to the 
women of the South a certain divine quality and mission. This 
purpose involved the support of the nation and the spiritual 
development of its citizens. Hundley postulated: 
When the Apostle commanded that women should 
not be suffered to speak in public, but on the contrary 
to content themselves with their humble household 
duties, he not only spoke as the inspired servant of 
God, but also as a man possessed of uncommon 
common-sense. For since to the family belongs the 
education and gradual elevation of the race, it is most 
important that mothers should be pure, peaceable, 
gentle, long-suffering and godly—which they never 
can be, if permitted or inclined to enter the lists and 
compete with selfish and lustful man for the prizes of 
place and public emolument.
187
 
 
Both the men and women of the South accepted these 
assertions. The War‟s manpower requirements, however, 
undermined these norms. In the absence of men who were 
consistently serving on the front, women assumed 
unprecedented positions of leadership and responsibility.  
 In antebellum Richmond, strict notions of class also 
existed. As in many of the long-established cities of the South, 
the elite circle allowed for very little social mobility. 
Richmonders themselves recognized the division of their 
society along these class lines and the language of class 
abounded in the literature, editorials, and diaries from the 
antebellum period. Hundley attempted to depict the social 
structure of the South in his 1860 work, Social Relations in 
Our Southern States. He concluded that eight categories 
existed in the South: the Southern gentleman, the middle 
classes, the Southern Yankee, cotton snobs, the Southern 
yeoman, the Southern bully, poor white trash, and the negro 
slave. Hundley came from an elite background because of his 
birth into a landholding and slave owning family in Alabama 
and, consequently, he glorified the qualities of the Southern 
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gentleman, while demeaning the middle classes, the yeomen, 
and the poor whites.
 188
 This represented a typical upper class 
perspective on other tiers of society.  
 Richmond possessed a unique social structure 
because of its position as an industrial and manufacturing 
center. Richmond was, in fact, the nation‟s largest 
manufacturer of tobacco and the second largest miller of 
flour.
189
 According to historian Virginius Dabney, “Richmond 
was the industrial center of the South and the region‟s 
wealthiest city, based on per capita property valuation.”190 
Further, the city was an important junction of many rail lines. 
This urban and industrial character contributed to the 
development of a distinctly urban class system.  
Whereas in the rural environment class was based on 
slave and land ownership, in Richmond membership in the 
upper class was based on birth.
191
 According to T. C. DeLeon, 
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upper class in the rural South while neglecting the influence of 
dominant stereotypes. He also seeks to “elicit larger patterns 
of political, ideological, economic, and demographic 
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diversity within the slaveholding class” (see page ix). The 
Ruling Race remains the authoritative work on the upper class 
in the antebellum and wartime era of the South 
In reference to the rural class structure, he writes, “In 
1860 perhaps a third of all southern whites owned little more 
than the clothing they wore, while fewer than four percent of 
the adult white males owned the majority of black 
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“In the country districts habit and condescension often 
overrode class barriers, but in the city, where class sometimes 
jostled privilege, the line of demarcation was so strongly 
drawn that its overstepping was dangerous.”192 DeLeon also 
believed that class determination was based almost solely on 
familial standing, rather than entrepreneurial endeavors. He 
wrote, 
Trade, progressive spirit and self-made personality 
were excluded from the plane of the elect, as though 
germiniferous. The “sacred soil” and the sacred 
social circle were paralleled in the minds of their 
possessors.
193
 
 
Hundley also observed the rigidity of the Southern class 
structure. With regard to the members of the upper class, he 
concluded, “Indeed, to state the matter fairly, he comes 
usually of aristocratic parentage; for family pride prevails to a 
greater extent in the South than in the North.”194  
This elite, urban class prided itself on its refinement 
and high standards, which hailed back to the earliest days of 
Southern settlement. Hundley described the Southern 
                                                                                                 
slaves…The majority of slaves were held by the one-fifth of 
slaveholders who owned twenty or more bondsmen” (see page 
36). Thus, the South possessed a distinct class of people who 
appeared to be much better off than the majority of citizens. 
This class system dominated not only social interactions, but 
politics and occupations as well. In this rural setting, the class 
system was not entirely insurmountable. Social standing was 
based on possession of land and slaves and, thus, anyone with 
an entrepreneurial spirit could buy their way into the upper 
class. Oakes writes that most Southerners in the west and in 
rural settings expected to own slaves and land, even if they 
arrived with little or no property.  That expectation was 
feasible (see page 41). Conversely, rich planters could sink 
into poverty if they mismanaged their estates. 
192
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gentleman as a man of the highest education, manners, and 
generosity. These individuals were articulate and maintained 
an active interest in world affairs and their communities.
195
 
The rigidity of the class structure was such that even Mrs. 
Jefferson Davis, the first lady of the Confederacy, was never 
fully accepted into Richmond‟s elite circle. Mary Boykin 
Chesnut, one of the best known ladies of the Southern upper 
class, commented that “Mrs. Davis and Jeff Davis proved 
themselves anything but <well-bred by their talk>.”196 Mary 
Chesnut was herself not a Richmond native. She and her 
husband moved from South Carolina to the capital after her 
husband became an aide to President Jefferson Davis.
197
 Mrs. 
Chesnut was accepted into the Richmond elite only because 
she was a prominent member of the South Carolina upper 
class. The elite of well-established eastern cities were more 
acceptable in Richmond than those individuals from the West. 
Mississippi, Texas, and the rural areas of Louisiana were still 
considered, in many cases, the frontier regions. Thus, the long 
established elite of Richmond considered even the wealthy or 
landed elite from the west unequal. 
Conceptions of class also carried into the physical 
division of Richmond. Richmond was a city of several hills: 
Union, Church, Oregon, Council Chamber, Shockoe, 
Gamble‟s, and Navy.198 The upper class lived in certain areas 
of the city, specifically on Marshall, Cary, Franklin, and Grace 
Streets. Mary Wingfield Scott wrote, “By 1850 Grace and 
Franklin were already the handsomest streets in Richmond and 
certainly the most sought after by wealth and fashion.”199 The 
lower classes tended to live near Union, Church, and Shockoe 
Hills. Location had much to do with the class composition of 
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the neighborhoods. Scott noted that the Tredegar Ironworks, 
located near Oregon Hill, had a distinct interest in maintaining 
housing near the factory. She asserted, “So far as we know, 
the Tredegar Iron Works had no actual financial part in the 
development of Oregon Hill. But it needed workmen‟s homes 
within walking distance.”200 Thus, Richmond was not only 
divided by class in terms of society, but also along physical 
location. 
 This traditional class system worked with 
surprisingly few episodes of lower class discontent in the 
antebellum era. Whereas in the North, class based riots 
erupted fairly frequently, no riots of this kind surfaced in the 
South.
201
 In his analysis of American riots in the antebellum 
era, historian David Grimstead concludes that different 
patterns of riots existed in the North and South. Many riots 
and mobs did erupt in the South; however, they were often 
based on racial fears. Grimstead writes, “Of the 403 Southern 
riots, about 66 percent fall into three distinctively Southern 
categories: mob punishment of alleged criminals (68); 
insurrection scare mobs (35); and mobs against those labeled 
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abolitionist, although usually there was no evidence of 
abolition activity (162).”202 Thus, although Southerners 
incorrectly asserted that their society did not experience any 
episodes of violent outburst, they accurately noted that few 
instances of class-based insurrections erupted in the seemingly 
harmonious antebellum era.  
Many scholars argue that the contentedness of the 
lower classes revolved around the third category of the 
Southern social system: race.  The existence of black slaves 
meant that those individuals occupied the lowest class of 
society. This automatically elevated the social position of even 
the poorest of whites in the South. Scholars dub this concept 
Herrenvolk Democracy.
203
 Although Hundley was not familiar 
with the term, he described the lower classes‟ support for 
slavery in almost identical language:  
Were you situated as the Southern Yeomen are—
humble in worldly position, patient delvers in the 
soil, daily earning your bread by the toilsome sweat 
of your own brows—would you be pleased to see 
four millions of inferior blacks suddenly raised from 
a position of equality with yourselves?
204
 
 
The lower class whites were relatively content with their 
position because, regardless of whether they were poor or 
yeomen, they were never considered the dregs of society. That 
classification was reserved for blacks alone. Consequently, the 
elite of the South were an aristocracy based fundamentally on 
race. 
 Richmond‟s antebellum conceptions of class, race, 
and gender proved unable to stand the stresses of war. War 
magnified the disparity between the upper and lower classes 
because it undermined the three fundamental components of 
the seemingly harmonious society and required women to step 
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into roles which previously had been unacceptable. In the face 
of starvation and the loss of loved ones on the battlefield, the 
poor, able in the antebellum years to accept their lower status, 
refused to tolerate the privileges that the upper class seemed to 
enjoy. They demonstrated their willingness to defy convention 
by taking drastic action in the Richmond Bread Riot. 
 
Confederate Domestic Legislation: 1861-1863 
 The Confederate government, overwhelmingly 
composed of elite members (see Table 1), produced legislation 
which accentuated the feelings of lower class resentment. The 
first signs of discontent emerged as a result of the first 
Confederate Conscription Act, passed on April 16, 1862. The 
loss of every major battle in the West, combined with the loss 
of the major southern port city, New Orleans, served to 
convince the Confederate Congress of the necessity of a 
slightly more drastic solution. From the first days of secession, 
the South had been at a serious disadvantage in terms of 
manpower, and although Southerners voluntarily enlisted in 
impressive numbers, by 1862, the number of soldiers fit for 
duty did not meet the required criteria. The government‟s 
solution, the Conscription Act, mandated “all persons residing 
within the Confederate States, between the ages of 18 and 35 
years, and rightfully subject to military duty, shall be held to 
be in the military service of the Confederate states…”205 In 
September, Congress expanded the act to the ages of 18 to 45.  
The drafts served mostly to arouse fear of military 
despotism in the South. Many citizens believed the draft 
conflicted “with the individualistic instincts of Southerners 
and with their conceptions of genuine manhood.”206 Voluntary 
enlistment, they contended, was the height of fulfilling one‟s 
duty to country. Hence, the draft conveyed to many a sense of 
cowardice. Loyal citizens held that the government‟s 
utilization of a draft only proved its lack of faith in the honor 
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of its people.  Furthermore, several prominent men believed 
that the act violated the Confederate Constitution. Vice 
President Alexander Stephens and Governor Joseph Brown of 
Georgia were among the most prominent dissidents. They 
protested that the act violated the rights of the states. Although 
the drafts evoked significant resentment, the ensuing 
amendments prompted harsher accusations of class bias. 
The policy of substitution, approved by the 
Conscription Act, allowed anyone to purchase a substitute to 
serve in place of one drafted to serve. The availability of this 
option gave the distinct impression of government favoritism. 
Although the Confederate government‟s intention was “to 
utilize the potentialities of men along industrial lines,”207 most 
Southern citizens could not afford to procure a substitute and 
were, therefore, obligated to serve when conscripted. 
Substitutes were often offered over $4,000, a sum which, in 
the war torn south, only the wealthiest citizens could pay.
208
 
The government‟s refusal to regulate or alter the policy of 
substitution only fueled the claim that the war had evolved 
into “a rich man‟s war and a poor man‟s fight.”209 
The first amendment to the draft, the “class 
exemption” system, also generated significant resentment 
among the people. This amendment allowed men of certain 
occupations to evade the draft. These occupations included 
“national and state officers, railroad employees, druggists, 
professors, schoolteachers, miners, ministers, pilots, nurses, 
and iron-furnace and foundry laborers.”210 Many citizens who 
could not escape the draft and were unable to procure an 
exemption believed that the amendment served only to shield 
those too cowardly to enter the service. Historian Stephen 
Ambrose believed that the exemption acts actually 
undermined the Confederate war effort because they 
highlighted the inequality within the legislation. He wrote, 
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The „Scarsity [sic] of Men‟ was indeed a major 
problem for the yeomen. Men were needed to raise 
crops, protect the families, from unfair governmental 
levies, and to ward off roving raiders from both 
armies. But although the Confederate Congress was 
willing to exempt large numbers from conscription, 
small farmers were not among the privileged 
group.
211
 
 
Congress‟s approval of these exemptions fueled the discontent 
which emerged as a result of conscription and the perception 
of an unequal burden of service became more prevalent among 
the lower classes. 
By far the most hated amendment was the “Twenty 
Negro Act,” passed in October of 1862, which exempted 
“owners or overseers of twenty or more slaves.”212 The act 
exhibited blatant class favoritism because in the rural South, 
ownership of twenty or more slaves constituted planter status. 
The majority of Southerners did not own twenty slaves; many 
did not own any slaves at all. Although Congress passed the 
exemption in hopes of stimulating food and crop production, it 
served mainly to aggravate the class resentment which had 
been growing slowly. The outcry of the poor grew louder 
against the perceived inequality of sacrifice.  
Also augmenting the poor‟s disapproval of class 
based legislation were the currency issues which plagued the 
Confederacy throughout its existence. Eventually, the shock of 
the Federal blockade of the Southern coasts contributed to a 
notable reduction in the supply of goods which were produced 
outside the South.
213
 Eugene Lerner asserts, “The blockade 
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was felt in every corner of the southern economy.”214 Many of 
the luxury items which citizens were used to enjoying on a 
regular basis became almost impossible to find. Likewise, 
necessities such as coffee, salt, and paper became difficult to 
procure.  
Southern exports also declined significantly because 
of the blockade. Lerner writes, “As the war continued, the 
invading Union armies, the northern blockade, and the 
reallocation of southern labor tended to reduce output.”215 The 
war effort became the primary focus of the fledgling nation 
and it mobilized all of its forces for the pursuant military 
effort. This made it extremely difficult to maintain the pre-war 
levels of production, and therefore, profit decreased.  
The Confederacy‟s own financial mismanagement 
compounded the nation‟s problems with supply. Generally, 
Southerners and nineteenth century Americans abhorred 
taxation. Any tax mandated at the national level directly 
contradicted the policy of state rights and impinged upon 
individuals rights. Although the Confederate Secretary of the 
Treasury, Christopher G. Memminger, promoted taxation as 
the most effective means of raising money for the war effort, 
he never managed to convince either the people or President 
Jefferson Davis of its necessity. He did, however, persuade 
Congress to pass a tax law in April of 1863. This law  
Levied a license tax on just about every form of 
occupation or business, a graduated income tax 
whose scale varied from 1 percent of incomes less 
than $500 to 15 percent of incomes over $10,000, and 
a tax-in-kind tithe on agricultural produce and 
livestock: 10 percent of everything grown or 
slaughtered in 1863.
216
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The Tax-in-Kind affected almost the entire Southern 
population, but its enforcement varied significantly from 
region to region; the collectors often abused their 
responsibilities and took more than the law mandated. Many 
citizens believed the Confederate government had far out-
stepped its bounds. Taxation, they contended, was under the 
jurisdiction of the states. That Congress passed a national act 
of such scope convinced many Southerners that the 
government had, by 1863, abandoned many of the principles 
that had originally justified secession. 
Because of this dedication to state rights and 
individual liberties, the Confederacy funded its war effort 
primarily by issuing treasury notes and loans. Often, the 
government did not collect on its loans, and the Treasury 
Department flooded the economy with empty treasury notes. 
Confederate currency became valueless. After conducting 
extensive statistical research, one scholar has concluded that 
“for thirty-one consecutive months, from October, 1861, to 
March, 1864, the general price index of the Confederacy rose 
at an almost constant rate of 10 per cent a month.”217 Yet, 
while inflation increased rapidly, the issue of treasury notes 
did not cease. Instead, the government continued to produce 
the valueless notes. The Confederacy based these notes on the 
anticipated money to be made by selling cotton to Europe. 
Emory Thomas postulates, “Beyond the limited amount of 
specie, estimated at $27 million, and the uncertain potential of 
cotton, the Confederacy had little in the way of economic 
resources, hence its reliance on fiat money and popular faith in 
its domestic economy.”218 As the war progressed, that faith 
decreased drastically.  
A notable aspect of Southern inflation is the fact the 
wages increased disproportionately to inflation. After studying 
wage quotations and account books from large Southern firms, 
one economist concluded, “the average wage increased 
approximately ten times during the four years of the war, or at 
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a rate of 4.6 per cent a month.”219 This increase was less than 
half of the price index (percentage) increase. Citizens on fixed 
wages felt the brunt of this reality. T.C. DeLeon noted the 
disparity in his journal: 
The pinch began to be felt by many who had never 
known it before; and almost every one, who had any 
surplus portables, was willing to turn them into 
money. In this way, those who had anything to sell, 
for the time managed to live. But the unfortunates 
who had only what they needed absolutely, or who 
were forced to live upon a fixed stipend, that did not 
increase in any ratio to the decrease of money, 
suffered terribly.
220
 
 
An analysis of one of the major firms in Richmond, the 
Tredegar Iron Works, also displays the inadequate increase in 
fixed wages. Historian Charles Dew, the authority on 
Tredegar, writes: 
The Tredegar provided a small increase to $4.50 in 
January 1863. These advances did not begin to cover 
the rise in the cost of living in the Confederate 
capital, however. By the beginning of 1863, Tredegar 
wages were up only 80 per cent over antebellum 
levels while the general price index for the eastern 
Confederacy had risen to seven times the level of the 
first four months of 1861.
221
 
 
These low wage workers in Richmond were unable to provide 
for themselves or their families. Their suffering contributed to 
the growing cynicism about the Confederate government‟s 
inability to adequately support its citizens. 
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The presence of citizens willing to take advantage of 
the financial chaos only added to the people‟s frustration with 
the Confederacy‟s deteriorating fiscal situation. Many citizens 
saw the potential for profit in the economic uncertainty of the 
South. These people, deemed speculators, bought goods and 
hoarded them. They took merchandise off of the market and 
drove prices still higher. Many Southerners used the 
speculators as scapegoats and blamed all of the Confederacy‟s 
economic problems on these “wicked” individuals. The 
Richmond Dispatch attributed the price increase specifically to 
the speculators, whom the paper referred to as “those pests of 
society.”222 One article laid out two tables comparing prices 
for basic items in 1860 to the cost of the same items in 1863 
(see Table 2). It read, “So much we owe the speculators, who 
have staid [sic] at home to prey upon the necessities of their 
fellow citizens.”223 Despite the animosity toward speculators 
which permeated all of Southern society, their activities did 
not contribute to the financial problems to the extent that 
inflation did.  
Impressment also aroused a great deal of discontent 
in the Confederacy. On March 26, 1863, Congress approved 
an “act to regulate impressments.” The act stated: 
“impressments of forage or other property authorized, when 
necessary for the army. Value thereof to be determined by 
appraisement.”224 The War Department created a standard 
price for common items; these prices, however, were often 
well below the market price. The act even allowed for the 
impressment of slaves. Because slaves fell into the category of 
“other property,” they could be seized at any time in the name 
of military necessity. This irked many citizens, especially 
because many of these Southerners had supported secession 
on the basis of the sanctity of private property. Thus, many 
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farmers and merchants came to fear an encounter with a 
government impressment agent as much or more than Union 
invasion.  
The Impressment Act also required that merchants 
possessed a passport to either enter or leave the cities. These 
passports were often difficult to attain. The Richmond 
Enquirer reported:  
The owners of a number of country carts that used to 
bring supplies to this market have of late ceased to 
come, though the markets are destitute of vegetables 
common to the season. As many carts as formerly 
start for the city, but many now stop before reaching 
their destination, haul up at some convenient place by 
the roadside, sell their goods and put for home 
instantly. The market men allege, with show of 
justice, we presume, that when they come into the 
city, they are bothered half out of their wits to get out 
again. When applying for a passport, they have to 
produce somebody who knows them, as a voucher, a 
thing not easy to do. Then, again they say they are 
stopped on every corner of the street and subjected to 
cross questioning by the military guard whose 
importunities are not always to be resisted.”225 
 
Thus, the Confederacy‟s problem, in some instances, was not 
a deficiency of supply, but a paucity of policy. The continued 
enforcement of offensive legislation sustained public criticism 
of the government. Moreover, a large proportion of the 
population wondered why the government refused to amend 
policies which so obviously added to the suffering in crowded 
urban centers. Many reached the conclusion that the 
government had abandoned its responsibilities, especially to 
those least able to provide for themselves. Essentially, the 
Confederacy abdicated its duty to the home front in pursuit of 
military success. 
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Richmond: Spring, 1863 
The city of Richmond itself changed significantly 
because of wartime stresses. The rapid increase in the 
population compounded the problems of food supply, housing, 
and inflation. The city had a population of approximately 
38,000 in 1860.
226
 However, after Richmond‟s selection as 
capital of the Confederacy, it attracted an abundance of 
visitors and new residents and the population of Richmond 
doubled only a year after secession: by 1863, the population 
had reached 100,000 inhabitants.
227
 Midori Takagi believes 
that the bulk of the population was due to the influx of 
Confederate soldiers; at least ten to fifteen thousand troops 
traveled to Richmond rapidly after its designation as the 
Confederate capital.
228
 The swollen population, however, did 
not return to normal after the departure of the troops. Refugees 
moved to Richmond from everywhere in the South 
(specifically from Maryland and rural areas of Virginia) due to 
the city‟s abundance of both government and industrial 
employment opportunities. In addition, Richmond‟s 
designation as one of the prominent social centers attracted 
foreigners and job seekers. Thus, historian Mary Elizabeth 
Massey contends that Richmond remained the most crowded 
city in the South for the duration of the war.
229
 
The availability of housing did not increase at a rate 
which corresponded to the population increase. As early as 
1862, residents noted the dearth of space for newcomers. 
Judith McGuire, a refugee searching for lodgings in 
Richmond, found it almost impossible to find a place to stay in 
February, 1862. She remarked, “The city is overrun with 
members of Congress, Government officers, office-seekers, 
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and strangers generally. Main Street is as crowded as 
Broadway, New York; it is said that every boarding house is 
full.”230 The next day she wrote, “I do not believe there is a 
vacant spot in the city.”231 McGuire‟s statements were not an 
exaggeration: housing was extremely scarce and demand was 
high. Prices for boarding soared to extreme levels. The City 
Council echoed McGuire‟s sentiments. It noted in February, 
1863, that rent had quadrupled in the years since the war 
erupted.
232
 Many worried they would not be able to continue 
to pay the required fees. Margaret Brown Wight expressed her 
relief at receiving a letter containing money from her husband 
who was in the army: 
A letter came from John enclosing $15 which was 
handed him by a gentleman, saying it was money put 
in his hands for me, that John must ask no questions 
about it, he could only tell him it was for me…It is 
certainly respectable for we have not enough to pay 
for our own board much less supply ourselves with 
necessary clothing.
233
 
 
Wight‟s appreciation for such a small sum shows that 
previously well-established citizens, like Margaret Wight and 
Judith McGuire, worried that they could no longer support 
themselves or their families. By early 1863, many urban 
Southerners concurred with J. B. Jones‟s assertion: “How we, 
„the people,‟ are to live is a thought of serious concern.”234 
Other notable problems also arose as a result of the 
population increase. Crime rates skyrocketed; gambling, gang 
activity, prostitution, thievery, and murder all permeated the 
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Confederate capital. Women moved into the work force in 
unprecedented numbers. The war and its effects overturned 
both antebellum standards of behavior and the accepted social 
order.  
One example of this change was the evolution of 
prostitution in Richmond. In the antebellum era, prostitutes 
kept to themselves and practiced their trade discreetly in order 
to avoid severe social stricture and prosecution. One scholar 
writes, “On the eve of the Civil War…Richmond prostitution 
could be characterized as a relatively invisible occupation.”235 
The prevalence of soldiers, isolated from their families and 
looking for female companionship, changed that “invisible 
occupation” into a commonplace career in wartime Richmond.  
Historian Catherine Clinton notes, “The Civil War created the 
largest increase in the sex trade in nineteenth-century 
America, perhaps the largest growth spurt in the nation‟s 
history.”236 As the war progressed, these women, secure in 
their numbers, ventured unashamedly into unfamiliar territory, 
and alarmed many of the more conventional citizens. The 
Richmond Daily Dispatch noted the unprecedented behavior 
and complained,  
It has been well known for some time past that 
cyprians, resident and accumulated since the removal 
of the seat of Government to this place, as well as 
loose males of the most abandoned character from 
other parts of the Confederacy, have been disporting 
themselves extensively on the sidewalks and in 
hacks, open carriages, &c., in the streets of 
Richmond, to the amazement of sober-sided citizens 
compelled to smell the odors which they exude, and 
witness the impudence and familiar vulgarity of 
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many of the stime [sic] faced of the prostitutes of 
both sexes.”237  
 
The distinction between “respectable” ladies of Richmond and 
the “unmentionables” blurred as wartime stresses necessitated 
the drastic increase in working women. 
Children‟s gangs also presented a significant 
challenge to the local and state governments. The gangs had 
existed prior to the outbreak of the war, and as one local  
noted, “There never was such a place as Richmond for 
fighting among small boys…the boys of particular localities 
associated in fighting bands…there were the Shockoe Hill 
Cats, the Church Hill Cats, the Basin Cats, the Oregon Hill 
Cats, the Navy Hill Cats, etc.”238  The absence of active 
parental figures produced predictable results: the frequency of 
violence increased. Attempts to quell this gang activity had 
little effect. Even President Jefferson Davis had an 
unsuccessful encounter with the “Hill Cats” and the “Butcher 
Cats.” The Davis‟s young black servant boy was beaten while 
attempting to negotiate with the children of the gangs. The 
President, upset about the violence, tried to reprimand the 
gang members. His speech had no effect, and the hostility 
continued. These gangs and their complete lack of respect for 
authority showed the extent to which crime had permeated the 
wartime city of Richmond. 
The weather in the winter and spring of 1863 only 
compounded the problem of morale in the city. The weather 
cut supply to the city off almost entirely. Throughout 
February, March, and April, Virginia sustained heavy storms 
of both snow and rain. Almost every diarist noted the severe 
weather. One Richmonder, Herbert Augustine Claiborne, as 
did many other diarists during the Civil War, dutifully 
recorded the temperature and weather conditions for every day 
of 1863.  According to his notes, over half of the days in 
March and February brought heavy rain or snow. The snow 
was over eight inches deep on March 21.  The warm weather 
in the opening days of April melted the snow rapidly.  
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Although at the outset, the warmth may have seemed a 
welcome relief, in fact, it created vast problems for supply.
239
 
 The unusually wet, spring weather had already 
saturated the dirt roads leading to Richmond. The rain, in 
conjunction with the preponderance of melting snow, made 
the roads an impassable mud trap for those attempting to 
deliver supplies into the city. Margaret Wight mused about the 
effects of the weather and wrote about her fears of starvation. 
She concluded that the spring of 1863 brought “The gloomiest 
state of weather I ever saw.”240 Robert Garlick Hill Kean, head 
of the Confederate Bureau of War, made similar observations. 
He noted, “High water and deep mud will be the consequences 
which will postpone military operations until in April.”241 The 
unusual weather was also a common subject in the 
newspapers. The Richmond Dispatch reported, “The supply of 
vegetables, poultry, fish, and butchers' meat, have all been cut 
short by the difficulty experienced in making headway against 
the acres of mud and slush encountered in the attempt to get to 
Richmond.” These sources all display the serious concern 
evoked by the further decrease in supply due to the dreadful 
weather conditions. The price of necessary items in 
Richmond, already remarkably high on account of inflation, 
speculation, and impressment, rose dramatically. 
 An explosion in one of the Confederate Ordnance 
Department‟s laboratories added to the unrest among the 
working class in the capital throughout the spring of 1863. On 
March 13, over 69 women and children were killed or injured 
in an explosion at the laboratory on Brown‟s Island, in the 
James River, at Richmond.  According to the Chief of the 
Ordnance Department, Josiah Gorgas, “The accident was 
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caused by the ignition of a friction primer. The primer stuck 
on the varnishing board and [Mary Ryan] struck the board 
three times very hard on the table to drive out the primer.”242 
The first explosion caused a chain of explosions due to the 
presence of an excess of combustible material. Initially, over 
40 people died, but the numbers rose significantly each day as 
the injured expired from serious burns. Gorgas had few words 
of condolence for the casualties, focusing instead on his 
admiration for his wife: “Mamma has been untiring,” he 
wrote, “in aiding visiting & relieving these poor sufferers, & 
has fatigued herself very much. She has done an infinite deal 
of good to these poor people.”243 
  Local resentment increased as a result of the 
government‟s failure to provide safe conditions for these 
women and children. The casualties were consistently referred 
to in terms reminiscent of female helplessness. The Richmond 
Daily Dispatch called the victims, “poor creatures,” and J.B. 
Jones accurately dubbed them “little indigent girls.” These 
women and children made only meager wages, which “varied 
from $1.50 to 2.40”244 per day. The over 300 women and 
children whom the laboratory employed continued to work 
although their salary was insufficient to provide them with the 
means to procure food for their families. Yet, these workers 
could not hope for better paying jobs because they were 
largely illiterate.  
 Contrast the experience of the Ordnance Department 
workers with that of the women who worked for the 
Confederate Treasury Department. The so-called “Treasury 
Girls” signed thousands of worthless Confederate treasury 
notes and bonds each day and they earned as much as $65 a 
month for their work.  The applications for the relatively few 
positions arrived at the department in astounding numbers. 
Consequently, the positions were extremely competitive. 
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Literacy was an obvious requirement, and it automatically 
precluded many poor women from the office. Similarly, 
employment depended upon social standing. Many members 
of the lower strata of society viewed the distinction with 
disdain. One woman wrote,  
Why is it that … poor women engaged in a perilous 
and hazardous occupation … are denied a living 
compensation for their labour, when so many of the 
departments are filled with young ladies (not 
dependent on their pay) with nothing to do, at salaries 
equal to and in some cases better than the best male 
clerks in the different departments?
245
 
 
 The explosion at Brown‟s Island only highlighted the 
dangers associated with many lower class professions.  It 
illuminated the inequalities related to employment 
opportunities and hazards. Consequently, many citizens 
believed their needs and safety were not a significant concern 
to their employers or to the Confederate government. 
The Richmond Bread Riot 
On the evening of April 1, 1863, a group of women 
met at Belvidere Hill Baptist Church in Richmond. The church 
was located on Church Street in Oregon Hill, a notably 
working class section of the city.
246
  The women resolved to 
gather the next morning in order to demand food at 
government prices from Virginia Governor John Letcher. Mrs. 
Burton Harrison, a Richmond resident, described the mob as 
comprised mostly by “women and children of the poorer 
class.”247 As evidence of the working class nature of the 
participants, one of the leaders, Mary Jackson, was employed 
as a huckster and another participant, Barbara Idoll, made 
tents for a living. Additionally, although most women came 
from the neighborhoods of Oregon Hill, Sydney and 
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Penitentiary Bottom, and Sheep Hill, some women traveled 
from the outskirts of the city in order to attend the meeting.
248
 
 The next morning, April 2, 1863, these frustrated 
women gathered as planned in Capitol Square, near the 
Governor‟s mansion. They demanded to speak to Governor 
Letcher.  Instead, they were met by Colonel S. Bassett French, 
a member of the Governor‟s staff. He seemed reluctant to 
speak to the women, and informed them that the Governor had 
already left for work at the Capitol. Many of the leaders 
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immediately approached the Capitol building. As the crowd 
increased in both magnitude and riotous intention, the 
Governor eventually appeared in Capitol Square and 
addressed them.  He informed the women that it was 
impossible for him to mandate that goods be sold at 
government prices. Angered by Governor Letcher‟s words, the 
women rushed out of Capitol Square and toward the business 
district. The group rapidly transformed into an angry mob of 
rioters. Most carried weapons, which ranged from clubs and 
axes to knives and pistols. They began looting stores on both 
Main and Cary Streets, and seized as many goods as they 
could manage to carry on their person or load into the carts 
they stole along the way.
249
  
As the rioters proceeded down Main and Cary 
Streets, spectators joined in the looting and many who heard 
the disturbance went out into the streets to investigate. Local 
thoroughfares became so crowded, it was impossible to 
determine the actual number of rioters; hence, conflicting 
reports about the size of the mob emerged. William Walter 
Cleary estimated that the crowd numbered “7 or 800 women 
aided by a few men.”250 Catherine Ann Devereux wrote she 
heard “that the riot in Richmond was more serious than we 
supposed, 20,000 persons assembled in the streets.”251 It is 
possible that 20,000 people were present in the streets at the 
time of the riots. The population increase in Richmond had 
crowded the city with more inhabitants than it could contain. 
The average estimate, however, and the most likely 
approximation, neared 5500 participants.
252
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As rioting continued on Main Street, city officials 
took decisive action. Richmond‟s mayor, Joseph Mayo, 
addressed the crowd on Cary Street and read the Riot Act. His 
words had little effect, and the rioting persisted on both Main 
and Cary Streets. As the mob grew, the violence increased. 
According to historian Michael Chesson, the women 
targeted both supposed speculators and government agencies: 
“Some of the looters continued down Cary, breaking into a 
Confederate commissary and into another government 
warehouse.”253 Other stores looted included bakeries, shoe 
stores, grocery stores, and jewelry stores. Many Richmond 
citizens believed that a significant number of the city 
merchants had procured draft exemptions out of cowardice 
and in order to make profits.  Business was indeed profitable 
for those who remained in operation throughout the War.  
Richmond citizens also targeted foreigners and Jews. 
The city had a tradition of blatant anti-Semitism. Once the 
War erupted, many Richmond citizens openly blamed the 
Jews and foreigners in the city for speculation and charged 
them with disloyalty.
254
 Sallie A. Putnam, for instance, 
believed that the Jews in Richmond profited from the war. She 
exhorted, “They were not found, as the more interested of the 
people, without the means to purchase food when the 
Confederate money became useless to us from the failure of 
our cause.”255 Major John W. Daniel contended that local 
stereotypes allowed the rioters to target Richmond Jews.  
After the War, he reminisced, “certain people down there were 
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credited with great wealth. It was said that they had made 
barrels of money out of the Confederacy, and the female 
Communists went at them without a qualm of conscience.”256 
According to the Richmond City Council minutes, 
the rioters actually did significant damage to several 
businesses they targeted. On April 13, the council noted, 
“Accounts for the property taken by the late rioters in this 
City, one in the name of J. T. Hicks amounting to the sum of 
$13,530.00 and one in the name of Tyler & Son amounting to 
the sum of $6,467.55, were laid before the Council and 
referred to the Committee on Claims.”257 Several instances of 
violence also occurred. Eyewitness Hal Tutwiler wrote,  
One woman knocked out a pane of glass out of a 
shop window, of which the door was fastened, & put 
her arm in to steal something, but the shopman cut all 
four of her fingers off. I was right in the middle of the 
row all the time, it was the most horrible sight I ever 
saw…258 
 
The New York Herald also reported a bloody 
encounter between the women and those attempting to pacify 
them. In its April 11
th
 report, the Herald read, “A few 
individuals attempted to resist the women, but without 
success. One man who struck a female was wounded in the 
shoulder by a shot from a revolver, and the threatening attitude 
of those armed with hatchets, &c. intimidated others from 
attempting force.”259 For the most part, however, the women 
damaged property, but harmed few individuals. 
 Government officials‟ attempts to put a stop to the 
riot continued. After the Mayor appeared, the next public 
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official to approach the rioters was Governor John Letcher. 
Most primary accounts attribute Letcher to calling out the 
Richmond Public Guard. According to Chesson, the primary 
responsibility of the Public Guard was the defense of 
important institutions in Richmond, notably the “Capitol and 
Capitol Square and the state (now Confederate) armory and 
penitentiary in the western part of the city.”260 Although 
Lieutenant Edward Scott Gay was the commander in charge at 
the time of the riot, the Public Guard ultimately reported to the 
Virginia Governor. According to many accounts, the Governor 
ordered the women to disperse. When they refused to comply, 
he threatened to order the Public Guard to shoot into the 
crowd. War clerk J.B. Jones recorded,  
Thus the work of spoliation went on, until the 
military appeared upon the scene, summoned by Gov. 
Letcher, whose term of service is near its close. He 
had the Riot Act read (by the mayor), and then 
threatened to fire on the mob. He gave them five 
minutes‟ time to disperse in, threatening to use 
military force (the city battalion being present) if they 
did not comply with the demand.
261
 
 
Other eyewitnesses, including Judith McGuire, Sallie Putnam, 
Sara A. Pryor, Hal Tutwiler, and Ernest Taylor Walthall all 
gave the credit to the Governor.  
Letcher‟s aide at the time, Colonel French, believed 
that his former employer was not only influential, but solely 
responsible for taking drastic action in order to save the city. 
In 1878, in response to renewed attention on the Bread Riot, 
he wrote to Letcher, “If Mr. Davis attempted to quell the mob 
I was not witness to it, nor did I over hear of it, until I read it 
in the paper you sent me; that you did quell it by decisive 
measures you threatened is beyond dispute.”262 As Governor, 
it is logical that Letcher called out the Public Guard and had 
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the authority to issue the five minute ultimatum; however, 
many eyewitnesses credited Confederate President Jefferson 
Davis with calling out the Public Guard.  
 Most scholars believe Jefferson Davis also addressed 
the mob. While some accounts seem to depict Letcher as 
primarily responsible for dispersing the crowd, others, notably 
Varina Davis‟s biography of her husband, actually portray the 
President as primarily responsible for the dissolution of the 
riot. Varina Davis wrote: 
He concluded by saying: “You say you are hungry 
and have no money. Here is all I have; it is not much, 
but take it.” He then, emptying his pockets, threw all 
the money they contained among the mob, after 
which he took out his watch and said: “We do not 
desire to injure anyone, but this lawlessness must 
stop. I will give you five minutes to disperse, 
otherwise you will be fired on.”263 
 
Her account, however, is unique in its crediting Davis. Most 
journals and letters portray Davis giving a compassionate 
speech to the rioters, rather than taking a definitive military 
stance. Sara Pryor‟s friend, “Agnes,” wrote Sara a letter which 
depicted the president as sympathetic and deeply moving in 
his speech. “The President then appeared,” Agnes recalled, 
“ascended a dray, and addressed them. It is said he was 
received at first with hisses from the boys, but after he had 
spoken some little time with great kindness and sympathy, the 
women quietly moved on, taking their food with them.”264  
 Other officials of lesser importance also appeared on 
the scene and took measures to end the riot. According to his 
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wife, Colonel John B. Baldwin, a Confederate congressman, 
was actually responsible for suppressing the mob. In her 
account, Colonel Baldwin rushed toward the riot and “made 
another ernest [sic] appeal to them promising to do all in his 
power to aid those who were in want.”265 According to this 
portrayal, by the time the Mayor and Governor addressed the 
crowd, Baldwin had already dispersed the rioters.  
There is no doubt that several government officials 
addressed the crowd at different points during the Richmond 
Bread Riot. The mob was so extensive that different 
individuals may have subdued the crowds in different 
locations. Mrs. Burton Harrison believed that “President 
Davis, Governor Letcher, General Elzey, and General Winder, 
with Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War” all appeared on the scene 
and spoke to the rioters.
 266
 Similarly, the Richmond City 
Council counted all officials equally responsible for 
dissipating the mob. During the special session on April 2, 
called in response to the bread riot, the Council resolved,  
that the Council do tender their thanks and gratitude 
to President Davis, Governor Letcher, Mayor Mayo, 
and Honorable John B. Baldwin, for their timely and 
appropriate addresses and exertions during the 
continuance of this disgraceful affair, and by which 
the Council believe it was more speedily quieted.
267
 
 
The different accounts make it impossible to 
determine which individual was primarily responsible for the 
ultimate quelling of the riot. The common denominator 
throughout the evidence is that many public officials found 
their appeals to the crowd unsuccessful and hence, they were 
forced to resort to threats of violence in order to subdue the 
masses. The riot destroyed the façade of class harmony, and 
the elite found their influence over the poor significantly 
reduced.  
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After the crowd finally dispersed, the Richmond 
police force quickly proceeded to arrest known and suspected 
participants. The threat of riot remained even after the crowd 
dissipated. Many eyewitnesses noted the formation of unruly 
women on the morning after the riot, April 3
rd
. Herbert 
Augustine Claiborne reported, “Riotous Spirit again 
manifested to day. Several women gathered. Doubtful whether 
the spirit assunder [sic] will cease until blood is shed. The 
government will do it if necessary. The actual suffering used 
by the rioters is a pretext.”268 Others reported that the women 
attempted to resume rioting. On April 3, John Waring wrote, 
“The women started to brake [sic] in a store this morning but 
the officers stopped them.”269 However, the Richmond City 
Council and the Confederate government took several steps to 
prevent the outbreak of any riots in the future. The councilmen 
placed cannon on Main Street and called Confederate troops 
into Richmond.
270
 Ultimately, the authorities arrested forty-
three women and twenty-five men.
271
 These individuals stood 
trial in the Richmond Hustings Court throughout the months 
of April and May 1863.  
 In the aftermath of the riot, the Confederate Secretary 
of War, James A. Seddon, issued a notice ordering the 
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suppression of all public reports concerning the riot.
272
 The 
government and the local elite believed reports of the riot 
would allow the Northern press to exaggerate accounts of 
suffering on the Southern home front. Catherine Edmondston 
elaborated on common perceptions of the Northern press: 
“Their hope now is to starve us out. They think we are 
suffering, ignore the fact of the depreciation of our currency, 
& quote the high price of provisions to prove it, [they] are 
jubilant over some mobs & riots which they call „bread 
riots.‟”273 Thus, the day after the riot, April 3, J.B. Jones 
recorded, “No account of yesterday‟s riot appeared in the 
papers to-day [sic], for obvious reasons.”274 He was slightly 
mistaken. The first report appeared in the Richmond Examiner 
on April 3. In some respects, this account was not surprising 
given the editor‟s open anti-administration position. On the 
other hand, the Richmond Enquirer, Sentinel, Dispatch, and 
Whig complied with the government‟s request not to print 
articles related to the riot.
275
 Those dailies did, however, 
publish accounts of the riot once the trials began. 
The local press and diary portrayals of the riot 
conveyed a markedly biased tone against the rioters. Almost 
all of the diarists who included descriptions of the Bread Riot 
believed many citizens in Richmond suffered, but they did not 
think the riot participants were actually desperate for food. 
William Walter Cleary noted, “while provisions are scarce and 
prices high there is no doubt much suffering by the poor—the 
persons engaged in this were not poor or starving—but were 
actuated by motives of plunder, dry goods, jewelry, and Fancy 
goods seeming to be the objects of their Robbery.”276 Margaret 
Brown Wight also suspected the rioters had ulterior motives: 
                                                        
272
 Thomas, The Confederate Nation, 204; idem., “The 
Richmond Bread Riot of 1863: „A Manifest Uneasiness in the 
Public Mind,‟” The Virginia Cavalcade 18 (Summer 1968), 
46. 
273
 Crabtree and Patton, “Journal of a Secesh Lady,” 378. 
274
 Jones, A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary, 286. 
275
 Chesson, “Harlots or Heroines?”, 169-170. 
276
 William Walter Cleary Diary, April 2, 1863, Virginia 
Historical Society.  
 121  
 
“The worthy women among the poorer class had not concern 
in it.”277  
Similarly, the absence of beggars in Richmond 
convinced many that starvation was not a serious problem in 
the city. J.B. Jones commented, “To-day [sic] beef was selling 
in market at one dollar per pound. And yet one might walk for 
hours in vain, in quest of a beggar.”278 He went on to 
elaborate, “Not a beggar is yet to be seen in this city of 
100,000 inhabitants!”279 Judith McGuire, another Richmond 
resident, concurred with Jones‟s analysis. She wrote:  
I saw the Rev. Mr. Peterkin, who is perhaps more 
thoroughly acquainted with the state of the poor than 
any man in the city. He says that they are admirably 
attended to. Large sums of money are put in the 
hands of the clergy for their benefit; this money is 
disbursed by ladies, whose duty and pleasure it is to 
relieve the suffering. One gentleman gave as much as 
$5,000 last winter. Besides this, the industrious poor 
are supplied with work by the Government, and 
regularly paid for it.
280
 
 
McGuire failed to recognize two things. First, 
although most individuals were indeed employed by the 
government, their wages were not sufficient to provide the 
necessary food and clothing for their families. Secondly, she, 
like many of the elite, underestimated the pride of the poor. 
They were not seeking charity. T.C. DeLeon conveyed his 
surprise when a poor woman refused to accept his money. He 
wrote, 
A poor, fragile creature, still girlish and refined under 
the pinched and pallid features of starvation, tottered 
to me one day to beg work.  
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“It is life or death for me and four young 
children,” she said. “We have eaten nothing to-day; 
and all last week lived on three pints of rice!” 
Will Wyatt, who was near, made a generous 
offer of relief. Tears sprang into the woman‟s eyes as 
she answered, “You mean kindness, major; but I have 
never asked charity yet. My husband is at the front; 
and I only ask a right—to be allowed to work for my 
children!”281 
 
DeLeon, had difficulty understanding this reaction, but 
attributed it to her dedication to the Southern cause, rather 
than to pride. In a similar manner, the Bread Riot began when 
women attempted to procure the right to purchase food at 
reasonable prices. These individuals were not accustomed to 
receiving aid and were often too proud to beg.
282
 
This misconception carried into the printed media‟s 
view of the rioters as foreigners, “Yankees,” and prostitutes. 
The rhetoric of the press was decidedly biased against the 
rioters. The Examiner depicted the leader of the riot, Mary 
Jackson, as “a good specimen of a forty year old Amazon, 
with the eye of the Devil.”283 Even the Confederate First Lady 
utilized these stereotypes in her description of the incident. 
Varina Davis also described Mary Jackson as “a tall, daring, 
Amazonian-looking woman.”284 The term “Amazonian” 
evoked notions of public women—prostitutes, not worthy of 
the sympathy of the community.  
In its representation of the Richmond Bread Riot, the 
Examiner similarly depicted the crowd as composed solely of 
“prostitutes, professional thieves, Irish and Yankee hags and 
gallows birds from all lands.”285 Many of the diarists used the 
same descriptions. In an attempt to deny that serious need 
existed in Richmond, the elites used stereotypes to blame the 
motivation on external agents. After the riot, Catherine 
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Edmondston wrote, “We call them mobs for plunder & believe 
that they were instigated by the Yankees. They are composed 
of low foreigners, Irish, Dutch, & Yankee and in place of 
wanting bread they threw Rice, flour, etc., in the street & 
mobbed dry goods & shoe stores!”286 Sallie Putnam also made 
dubious claims about the composition of the mob. She wrote, 
“The rioters were represented in a heterogeneous crowd of 
Dutch, Irish, and free negroes—of men, women, and 
children…”287 T.C. DeLeon blamed the mob on the hated 
speculators and turned his description into praise for the 
loyalty and dedication of the Confederate soldiers. He 
recorded, 
Suffice it that the human hyenas of speculation did 
prey upon the dying South…that thrice they stored 
the flour the people felt was theirs, in such great 
quantities and for so long, that before their maw for 
gain was gutted, serious riots of the starving called 
for the strong hand to interfere. And to the credit of 
the Government and southern soldier, be it said—
even in that dark hour, with craving stomach and 
sickening soul—“Johnny Reb” obeyed his orders and 
guarded the den of the hyena—from his own 
hungering children, perhaps!
288
 
 
These classifications allowed the upper class members of 
Richmond to legitimize the riot as externally motivated.  
These illustrations were extremely inaccurate. 
Historian Elizabeth R. Varon is highly critical of the portrayal 
of the rioters. She writes, “The response of the Confederate 
authorities, press, and elite to the riot reflects a distinct lack of 
empathy for the poor, a virulent sexism, and deep anxiety 
about the machinations of the „secret enemies‟ of the 
South.”289 Varon‟s conclusion, although harsh in her criticism, 
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is accurate. The Richmond elite, in an attempt to deny that any 
fissures existed in the Southern social system, blamed the riot 
on outsiders and social outcasts. 
Contrary to the descriptions provided by the elite, the 
women who participated in the riot came mostly from the 
local poor of Richmond. Scholars detect only one instance of a 
wealthy individual‟s participation. One member, Mrs. 
Margaret Adeline Pomfrey did actually possess land and 
property which made her fairly wealthy. According to the 
United States Census of 1860, she owned a total of 127.5 acres 
and a few slaves.
290
 Mrs. Pomfrey, however, was an anomaly.  
The majority of rioters did not own slaves or 
substantial property. One protester, Martha Jamieson, testified 
that over 300 women employed by Weisiger‟s clothing factory 
took part in the riot.
291
 Indeed, many of the rioters were 
starving, according to both J.B. Jones and Sara Pryor‟s friend, 
Agnes.
292
  
In terms of starvation, historian Paul D. Escott 
believes that it was a real possibility in the Confederacy. He 
writes, “The extent of suffering was staggering…Some idea of 
the dimensions of poverty can be grasped from the fact that at 
the end of the war more than a quarter of Alabama‟s white 
citizens were on relief.”293 Hospital matron Phoebe Pember 
believed soldiers‟ concerns about providing for their families 
encouraged desertions from the army. She wrote,  
Almost all of these letters told the same sad tale of 
destitution of food and clothing, even shoes of the 
roughest kind being too expensive for the mass or 
unattainable by the expenditure of any sum, in many 
parts of the country…how hard for the husband or 
father to remain inactive in winter quarters, knowing 
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that his wife and little ones were literally starving at 
home—not even at home, for few homes were left.294  
 
In Richmond, as much as in the regions Escott 
describes, a similar situation emerged. Even middle class 
members observed the suffering. In reference to President 
Davis‟s designation of March 27, 1863, as a day of fasting and 
prayer, J.B. Jones despaired, “Fasting in the midst of famine! 
May God save this people!”295 Even the middle classes, 
previously comfortable, could not afford to provide sufficient 
nourishment for their families. Jones described a common 
dinner for his family. It consisted of “…twelve eggs, $1.25; a 
little corn bread, some rice and potatoes. How long shall we 
have even this variety and amount?”296 Richmond‟s rampant 
inflation due to overcrowding, impressment, and speculation 
made it impossible for an increasing number of citizens to 
provide for themselves and their families. Jones relayed a 
chilling narrative about his daughter‟s encounter with a 
starving rat: 
Some idea may be formed of the scarcity of 
food in this city from the fact that, while my 
youngest daughter was in the kitchen to-day, 
a young rat came out of its hole and seemed 
to beg for something to eat; she held out 
some bread, which it ate from her hand, and 
seemed grateful. Several others soon 
appeared, and were as tame as kittens. 
Perhaps we shall have to eat them!
297
 
 
This suffering permeated throughout the middle and 
lower classes of the city. Although working class women and 
children from the city of Richmond composed the majority of 
the mob, men also participated in the Richmond Bread Riot. 
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Chesson postulates that historians have estimated the role of 
men incorrectly. He writes, “The role played by men in the 
bread riot may have been somewhat understated. Although the 
organizers and leaders were women, the riot had masculine 
support.”298 Almost every eyewitness commented that men 
aided the women. Often, these men received harsher 
judgments than the women involved. Margaret Brown Wight 
wrote, “They were accompanied by men of the worst character 
who no doubt were at the bottom of this infamous 
proceeding.”299  
Similarly, a few women from outside the city of 
Richmond participated in the riot. Margaret Adeline Pomfrey 
lived over 11.5 miles away from the city.
300
 Most likely, she 
traveled to her home in Port Mayo (directly outside 
Richmond) the night before the riot in order to take part the 
next morning. Her participation in the Richmond Bread Riot 
proves that word of the April 1
st
 meeting had spread 
throughout the city. Regardless of the elite observers‟ attempts 
to dismiss the riot as a spontaneous, insignificant event, it was, 
in actuality, a protest planned in advance as a result of general 
discontent among the poorer citizens of Richmond. 
Disapproval existed in the city and the women refused to 
continue complying with the outrageous demands which the 
government placed on its citizens.  
Although the riot was deemed a “bread riot,” the 
participants needed much more than just food. The price of 
clothing increased in a manner comparable to all other prices 
in the Confederacy. Kate Cumming, a Confederate nurse, 
noted in her diary, “In the matter of dress we are pretty „hard 
up,‟ and if the war lasts much longer, I for one will have 
„nothing to wear.‟”301 Phoebe Pember noted that many wives 
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applying for furloughs for their husbands cited the deficiency 
of clothing and shoes on the home front. She wrote, “Almost 
all of these letters told the same sad tale of destitution of food 
and clothing, even shoes of the roughest kind being either too 
expensive for the mass or unattainable by the expenditure of 
any sum, in many parts of the country.”302 J.B. Jones noted 
that in Richmond specifically, many individuals suffered for 
lack of clothing. He wrote, “We are all in rags, especially our 
underclothes.”303 Although food presented a more immediate 
concern, clothing was a matter of more than mere fashion in 
the Confederacy. 
In actuality, clothing represented the most basic sense 
of social standing for women in the South. Werner Steger 
cautions scholars not to underestimate the importance of 
clothing in the minds of the female rioters. He writes, “On the 
one hand, good and clean clothes were a symbol of 
respectability for many women; on the other, women were 
often socially judged solely based on their physical 
appearance.”304 By April 1863, many women were clothed in 
threadbare material that barely sufficed to cover their bodies. 
Shoes were also an almost unheard of luxury. Thus, the 
looting of clothing and shoe stores during the Richmond Bread 
Riot did not constitute rampant thievery as many of the 
accounts portrayed. Instead, the women seized goods which 
were a necessity for their survival and for their standing as 
respectable women. 
The trials of many participants confirmed the 
importance of clothing in Richmond society. The better 
dressed and more attractive women often received more 
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lenient sentences from the Richmond Hustings Court.
305
 The 
cases of Laura Gordon and Mary Woodward display this 
tendency.  Mary Woodward was described as “genteel 
looking” and “pretty and handsomely dressed.” Although she 
was charged with assaulting a police officer and was caught 
with stolen goods including flour, soap, and bacon, she was 
quickly released after her prosperous mother-in-law posted her 
bail.
306
 Similarly, Laura Gordon was depicted as “a young 
lady of some means” and “neatly dressed.” The police 
discovered stolen items in her home and she was originally 
sentenced to thirty days in jail. After she fainted in the court 
room, however, the judge reduced her sentence to four 
hours.
307
 
 By way of contrast, older women often received 
harsher sentences. Chesson notes, “Middle-aged and elderly 
women, even if nicely dressed and able to afford an attorney, 
did not escape so lightly.”308 Two older women, Mary Johnson 
and Frances Kelley, were indicted despite the fact that they 
were well represented by lawyers. Johnson, a mother of two 
older children, received the harshest punishment of all of the 
individuals tried in court: five years in the Virginia State 
Penitentiary. Kelley, a widow, was sentenced to thirty days in 
jail even though she was convicted of stealing goods worth 
less than twenty dollars.
309
 These older women received 
notably harsher sentences than the young, well-dressed 
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women. This  obvious bias underscores the importance which 
clothing and outward appearance held in Richmond society.  
 These women‟s complaints about the scarcity of 
clothing represented their desire for relief and assistance. The 
Confederacy‟s detached policy regarding support for the poor 
created a distinct sense of abandonment. Paul Escott believes 
that the Confederate government unwisely took an inactive 
stance toward poverty. The elite members of the government 
did not foresee the problems their legislation created. Escott 
notes, “Jefferson Davis and his administration were slow to 
recognize poverty as a major internal problem which 
demanded their attention, and they tended to respond to it in a 
piecemeal way.”310 Moreover, the government supported 
private or state-run charities rather than assuming an active, 
visible role. Many of the people who would have benefited 
from Confederate poor relief were he families of Southern 
soldiers. Proper measures for the support of families on the 
home front would have decreased desertions from the 
Confederate army and aided the Confederate war effort. 
One factor which contributed to the inactivity of both 
the government and the elite was the notion of shared 
sacrifice. The rhetoric of the Richmond press was steeped with 
accolades for Confederate women‟s untiring sacrifices on 
behalf of their country and their soldiers. Among the upper 
classes, many believed that shared suffering lessened class 
distinctions. The Richmond Dispatch reported, “All classes, 
because of the impossibility of procuring delicacies, have to 
go without them, but the substantial of life, such as meats, 
bread, and vegetables, are plentiful, and the few that cannot 
purchase them readily find aid in their more fortunate 
neighbors and friends.”311 The Richmond Bread Riot 
illuminated the errors in this assumption. Often, the elite could 
afford to arrange for goods to be delivered from country 
plantations. Mary Chesnut wrote in the fall of 1863, “We had 
sent us from home wine, rice, potatoes, hams, eggs, butter, 
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pickles. About once a month a man came on with all that the 
plantation could furnish us.”312  
This disparity between the goods available to the 
poor and wealthy members of society only increased as the 
war progressed. Many of the upper class continued to host 
elaborate parties with an abundance of meat, fruit, and cakes. 
Although the elite contended they supported the war effort by 
attending starvation parties (parties where no food was 
served), they fed themselves in the privacy of their homes 
prior to attending.
313
 Mary Chesnut, as well as many of the 
elite in Richmond, complained about high prices, yet 
continued to procure the delicacies. For example, as late as 
December 1863, Mary Chesnut recorded the food provided at 
dinner on Christmas Day. She wrote, “Today my dinner was 
comparatively a simple affair—oysters, ham, turkey, 
partridges, and good wine.”314 Chesnut and others believed in 
the nobility of their monetary sacrifice in purchasing such 
goods, but they failed to notice that the lower classes could not 
afford to purchase items of basic necessity such as bacon, 
corn, or peas.
315
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Another notion which influenced the Confederate 
government to take a detached stance toward relief was the 
antebellum tradition of paternalism. As Drew Gilpin Faust 
notes, “The farm or plantation also served as the primary site 
of social and political organization.”316 The Southern elite 
adhered to the notion that those who possessed the means 
were responsible for caring for the less fortunate members of 
society.  Thus, the many small farmers or squatters on the 
outskirts of plantations often looked to the plantation owners 
for both advice and support. According to one scholar, George 
Wythe Randolph served on in the Richmond City Council 
because of “a sense of enlightened social responsibility. His 
elitist sense of responsibility required him to do what he could 
for society when the able-bodied men were in the field.”317 As 
the war progressed, however, and the notion of universal 
suffering dominated the minds of upper class Southerners, 
many neglected their responsibility of assisting the poor. The 
rich also felt the stresses of war and often chose to provide for 
themselves and their families rather than fulfilling the 
antebellum responsibility of aiding the poorer members of the 
community. The poor‟s sense of abandonment only 
contributed to the idea circulating among the lower classes 
that the War was essentially a “rich man‟s war and a poor 
man‟s fight.” 
Although the poor contended that the elite had 
neglected their paternalistic responsibility, Richmond actually 
had a distinct tradition of poor relief in the antebellum era. 
Samuel Mordecai, in his description of pre-war Richmond, 
emphasized the city‟s dedication to the care of those who had 
difficulty providing for themselves. He wrote, “The Amicable 
Society was instituted in 1788, with the benevolent object of 
relieving strangers and wayfarers, in distress, for whom the 
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law makes no provision.”318 He also noted the existence of 
other charitable organizations, including the Male Orphan 
Asylum and the Female Humane Association.
319
  
In the patriotic afterglow of secession, however, the 
wealthy lost sight of the tradition of assisting the poor. The 
Richmond City Council demonstrated its lack of consideration 
for the city‟s lower class citizens when, on June 5, 1861, it 
resolved, “That the Committee on the Alms House be 
authorized to stop the work, or any part of it, on the said Alms 
House…That the said committee be authorized to allow the 
use of the Alms House as a temporary hospital for sick 
soldiers…”320 Thus, Richmond‟s leaders proved that their 
priorities lay in supporting the Confederacy and the 
Confederate Army, rather than providing security for their 
own domestic poor. 
Although the reaction came too late, the Richmond 
Bread Riot spurred an alteration of both city and Confederate 
policies regarding poor relief. The Richmond City Council 
took the first measures to create a long term solution. On April 
13, 1863, the council passed “An Ordinance For the Relief of 
Poor Persons Not in the Poor House.” It established a free 
market and provided relief in the form of “provisions or 
fuel.”321 The ordinance made it explicitly clear, however, that 
it would provide relief only to the deserving and “worthy 
poor.” The “unworthy poor” were those individuals who had 
“participated in a riot, rout, or unlawful assembly.”322 Thus, 
the Council asserted the notion that riots were not the proper 
forum of popular protest. The councilmen refused to accept 
the legitimacy of the claims of the participants in the 
Richmond Bread Riot. Their reaction, however, proved they 
acknowledged that at the time of the riot, the city did not 
employ sufficient relief measures for the lower classes. 
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The sense of neglect was not isolated to Richmond. 
The Richmond Bread Riot coincided with numerous other 
Southern food riots in places as diverse as New Orleans, 
Louisiana, Dalton, Georgia, Salisbury, Greensboro, and 
Durham, North Carolina, Mobile, Alabama, and Atlanta and 
Savannah, Georgia.
323
 Historian E. Susan Barber believes that 
the riots corresponded to the shortage of supplies that occurred 
every winter.
324
 The riots that erupted in the early spring 
months of 1863 may have encouraged the women of 
Richmond to undertake similar action. Moreover, the 
Richmond Enquirer’s favorable portrayal of the Salisbury 
rioters in March 1863 may have contributed to the women‟s 
initiation of the Richmond Bread Riot.
325
 
The Confederate Congress also reacted to the Bread 
Riot. Soon after, on May 1, 1863, the Confederate government 
passed another exemption act that “gave Confederate officials 
another means to alleviate individual cases of poverty.”326 
This act exempted individuals “in districts…deprived of white 
or slave labor indispensable to the production of grain or 
provisions.”327 Essentially, this change in policy allowed more 
men who were necessary for the survival of their families to 
remain home and continue farming. These acts did little to 
reverse the damage to public morale, however. One historian 
classifies this Confederate government initiative “as offering 
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too little, too late.”328 The Confederacy had already lost much 
of its support on the home front. The failure of the elite and 
the Confederate government to provide for its needy citizens 
from the beginning of the war contributed to the outbreak of 
the Richmond Bread Riot. The legislative responses could not 
repair the sense of abandonment the poor classes felt. 
*  *  * 
The Richmond Bread Riot and the other food riots 
that wracked the Confederacy were visible signs of the 
inability of the Southern elite and the Confederate government 
to adapt to changing wartime requirements. The policies of the 
government and the stresses of a wartime atmosphere created 
a volatile social environment. The massive mobilization of 
war took the elite‟s focus off support for the community and 
toward the war effort at all costs. The poor felt neglected, and 
had a difficult time providing for themselves and their 
families. Confederate policies aroused dissent among the 
lower classes, fuelled discontent, and spurred accusations of a 
“rich man‟s war and a poor man‟s fight.” The ineptitude of the 
government in dealing with financial matters contributed to 
rampant inflation and speculation, which further accentuated 
the disparity between the upper and lower classes. The stresses 
of war added to the overcrowding in Richmond and drove 
prices to even more unrealistic levels. These factors, in 
combination with the brutal weather of the spring of 1863, 
made an uprising of some sort almost inevitable. The riot, 
then, was the result of both Confederate mismanagement and 
the inaccurate elite perception of the plight of the poor. 
The major consequence of the government‟s 
shortcomings was the reinforcement of loyalty to the state 
governments at the expense of loyalty to the Confederate 
government. Escott believes that the states provided for the 
welfare of its poorer citizens when they saw that the 
government in Richmond failed to do so. According to Escott,  
Responding to their constituents‟ needs, state leaders 
attempted to shield their citizens from further 
sacrifice, and when they came into conflict with 
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Confederate programs, they raised the familiar cry of 
state rights as justification. Thus, the quarrels over 
state rights in 1864 were a symptom of the welfare 
problem rather than an independent cause of 
difficulties.
329
  
 
Stephen Ambrose reached a similar conclusion. He 
also believed that the refusal of the Confederate Congress to 
incorporate the concerns of the common man in its legislation 
undercut the war effort. According to Ambrose, “The 
government had forfeited the support of the Yeomen, and 
without them the South could never win.”330 Hence, the 
harmonious society on which the South had prided itself in the 
antebellum era proved a mere illusion. The “aristocracy of 
color” served only as an instrument to hide the fissures of 
class in Southern society; the requirements of war shattered 
this illusion. Drew Gilpin Faust summarizes the consequences: 
“The upheavals of war created conceptual and emotional as 
well as social dislocations, compelling Southerners to rethink 
their most fundamental assumptions about their identities and 
the logic of their places in the world.”331 The Richmond Bread 
Riot was the most obvious example of this destruction of 
traditional identity. It forced both women and the poor to re-
evaluate their role in society.  
After the War‟s end, the remaining men returned to 
their homes and their families; however, they found life much 
different than they had left it. Their wives had been forced to 
assume previously unacceptable duties in their absence. 
Blacks were no longer bound in slavery. Many of the members 
of the elite stood side by side with the working class in 
destitution. The boundaries between class, race, and gender, 
on which Southerners had previously determined their place in 
society, had shifted beyond recognition. Thus, Southern 
society remained forever changed and the Reconstruction 
South became a world of uncertainty and doubt. 
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Table 1 
Relative Values of Estate of Confederate Congressmen
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 Thomas B. Alexander and Richard E. Beringer, The 
Anatomy of the Confederate Congress: A Study of the 
Influences of Member Characteristics on Legislative Voting 
Behavior, 1861-1865 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
1972), 20. Alexander and Beringer compare the 
congressmen‟s estates with the average estate in their home 
counties. According to the authors, and as the above table 
illustrates, “More than half (130, or 54 percent) of the 
congressmen for whom this information has been located held 
estates that were at least 600 percent of the average ownership 
in their home counties.” See page 18. 
Relative Value of 
Estate 
Total Number Percentage 
No Estate (0%) 1 .4 
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Table 2 
Comparison of Food Prices for Small Family 
Richmond, Virginia, 1860 and 1863.
333
 
 
                                                        
333
 Barber, “Civil War Bread Riots and the Development of a 
Confederate Welfare System,” 20. Barber sites the Richmond 
Dispatch article from 29 January 1863 for the information in 
the above table. The prices only continued to rise as the effects 
of weather and impressment increased throughout the spring 
of 1863. However, the Dispatch article blamed only the 
speculators for the sharp increase in prices. It reported, “So 
much we owe the speculators, who have staid [sic] at home to 
prey upon the necessities of their fellow citizens.” It never 
mentioned the government‟s responsibility for inflation. 
Below Average (1-
50%) 
11 4.1 
Average (21-
200%) 
35 13.1 
Above Average 
(201-600%) 
64 24 
Much Above 
Average (601%+) 
130 48.67 
Unknown Estate 
Category 
26 9.7 
TOTAL 267 100 
Item 1860 1863 % Increase 
Bacon, 10 lbs. 1.25 10.00 700 
Flour, 30 lbs. 1.50 3.75 150 
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Appendix I 
A Factual First-Hand Observation 
 
Letter from Hal Tutwiler to Nettie Tutwiler, April 3, 1863 
 We have had a dreadful riot here yesterday, 
& they are keeping it up today, but they are not near 
as bad today as they were yesterday. But I will begin 
at the first. 
 Thursday morning I went to the office as 
usual. A few minutes after I got in, I heard a most 
tremendous cheering, went to the window to see what 
was going on, but could not tell what it was about & 
So we all went down into the street. When we arrived 
at the scene we found that a large number of women 
had broken into two or three large grocery 
establishments, & were helping themselves to hams, 
middlings, butter, and in fact every thing they could 
find. Almost every one of them were armed. Some 
had a belt on with a pistol stuck in each side, others 
Sugar, 30 lbs. .40 .75 88 
Coffee, 4 lbs. .50 20.00 3900 
Green Tea, ½ 
lb. 
.50 8.00 1500 
Lard, 4 lbs. .50 4.00 700 
Butter, 3 lbs. .75 5.25 600 
Meal, 1 peck .25 1.00 300 
Candles, 2 
lbs. 
.30 2.50 733 
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had a large knife, while some were only armed with a 
hatchet, axe or hammer. As fast as they got what they 
wanted they walked off with it.  
 The men instead of trying to put a stop to 
this shameful proceeding cheered them on & assisted 
them all in their power. When they [the women] 
found that the guards were on Cary st. they turned 
around & went up on Main street and broke into 
several stores. In the morning before they began they 
went up to the Capitol, & Governor [John] Letcher 
made them a speech, but it was like pouring oil on 
fire. After that the Prest. [Jefferson Davis] made them 
a speech, and while they were engaged in their 
robbery the mayor of the city [Joseph Mayo] came 
down to make them another. But it did no good. 
 I think there were fully 5000 persons on 
Cary st., if not more, besides that many more on 
Main and Broad. This morning they began again but 
they were told that if they did not disperse they 
would be fired on. 
 One woman knocked out a pane of glass out 
of a shop window, of which the door was fastened, & 
put her arm in to steal something, but the shopman 
cut all four of her fingers off. I was right in the 
middle of the row all the time. It was the most 
horrible sight I ever saw… 
 Have heard how the riot ended this morning. 
Gov. Letcher told them he gave the five minutes to 
disperse & if they did not disperse he would have 
them fired on by the city guards. They immediately 
began to leave the streets & in a few minutes they 
were comparatively vacant. The stores have been 
closed for the last two days.
 334
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 Ambrose, “The Bread Riots in Richmond,” 203. This is one 
of the most straightforward depictions of the riot. It contains 
few editorial comments and bears a striking contrast to Sallie 
Putnam‟s judgmental tone. 
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Appendix II 
An Upper Class Observation 
 
Sallie Brock Putnam 
Originating in Richmond in the Spring of 
this year, (1863,) a most disgraceful riot, to which, in 
order to conceal the real designs of the lawless mob 
engaged in it, was given the name of the “bread riot.” 
 The rioters were represented in a 
heterogeneous crowd of Dutch, Irish, and free 
negroes—of men, women, and children—armed with 
pistols, knives, hammers, hatchets, axes, and every 
other weapon which could be made useful in their 
defence, or might subserve their designs in breaking 
into stores for the purpose of thieving. More 
impudent and defiant robberies were never 
committed, than disgraced, in the open light of day, 
on a bright morning in spring, the city of Richmond. 
The cry for bread with which this violence 
commenced was soon subdued, and instead of 
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articles of food, the rioters directed their efforts to the 
stores containing dry-goods, shoes, etc. Women were 
seen bending under loads of sole-leather, or dragging 
after them heavy cavalry boots, brandishing their 
huge knives, and swearing, though apparently well 
fed, that they were dying from starvation—yet it was 
difficult to imagine how they could masticate or 
digest the edibles under the weight of which they 
were bending. Men carried immense loads of cotton 
cloth, woolen goods, and other articles, and but few 
were seen to attack the stores where flour, groceries, 
and other provisions were kept. 
 This disgraceful mob was put to flight by the 
military. Cannon were planted in the street, and the 
order to disperse or be fired upon drove the rioters 
from the commercial portion of the city to the Capitol 
Square, where they menaced the Governor, until, by 
the continued threatenings of the State Guards and 
the efforts of the police in arresting the ringleaders, a 
stop was put to these lawless and violent proceedings.  
 It cannot be denied that want of bread was at 
this time too fatally true, but the sufferers for food 
were not to be found in this mob of vicious men and 
lawless viragoes who, inhabiting quarters of the city 
where reigned riot and depravity, when followed to 
their homes after this demonstration were discovered 
to be well supplied with articles of food. Some of 
them were the keepers of stores, to which they 
purposed adding the stock stolen in their raid on 
wholesale houses. 
 This demonstration was made use of by the 
disaffected in our midst, and by our enemies abroad, 
for the misrepresentation and exaggeration of our real 
condition. In a little while the papers of the North 
published the most startling and highly colored 
accounts of the starving situation of the inhabitants of 
Richmond. By the prompt preventive measures 
brought into requisition this riot was effectually 
silenced, and no demonstration of the kind was 
afterwards made during the war. 
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 The real sufferers were not of the class who 
would engage in acts of violence to obtain bread, but 
included the most worthy and highly cultivated of our 
citizens, who, by the suspension of the ordinary 
branches of business, and the extreme inflation in the 
prices of provisions, were often reduced to abject 
suffering; and helpless refugees, who, driven from 
comfortable homes, were compelled to seek relief in 
the crowded city, at the time insufficiently furnished 
with the means of living for the resident population, 
and altogether inadequate to the increased numbers 
thrown daily into it by the progress of events. How 
great their necessities must have been can be 
imagined from the fact the many of our women, 
reared in the utmost ease, delicacy and refinement, 
were compelled to dispose of all articles of taste and 
former luxury, and frequently necessary articles of 
clothing, to meet the everyday demands of life. 
 These miseries and inconveniences were 
submitted to in no fault-finding spirit; and although 
the poverty of the masses increased from day, to-day 
there is no doubt that the sympathies of the people 
were unfalteringly with the revolution in all of its 
phases. Our sufferings were severe, and the 
uncomplaining temper in which they were borne was 
surely no evidence that there was in the Southern 
masses a disposition of craven submission, but rather 
of heroic devotion to a cause which brought into 
exercise the sublime power „to suffer and be strong.‟ 
While our enemies in their country were fattening 
upon all the comforts of life, faring sumptuously 
every day, clothing themselves in rich garments, and 
enjoying all that could make existence desirable, they 
made merry over the miseries endured by the South, 
and laughed at the self-abnegation of a people who 
surrendered luxuries and comforts without a murmur 
for the cause of the revolution.
335
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 Putnam, Richmond During the War, 208-210. Sallie 
Putnam‟s description of the Richmond Bread Riot is colorful 
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Appendix III 
Comparison to European Food Riots 
 
 The Richmond Bread Riot bears a striking 
resemblance to the European food riots of the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. However, few modern 
accounts of the Richmond Bread Riot incorporate this 
comparison. Michael Chesson briefly references the European 
riots; however, E. Susan Barber conducts the most extensive 
analysis. She seeks to understand whether the Richmond 
Bread Riot follows patterns similar to the ones exhibited by 
the European food riots and she concurs that the two do, 
indeed, correspond in both form and motive.
336
  
Barber correctly concludes that the riot exhibits many 
of the characteristics of the European food riots of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One of the foremost 
                                                                                                 
and critical in its incriminating language. She blames the mob 
on citizens with criminal intentions rather than considering the 
fact the many of the rioters may have been suffering. Many of 
the diary entries and newspaper editorials also contain many 
of the same stereotypes. The common theme in all of the 
portrayals is the tendency of the author to deny the legitimacy 
of the rioters‟ complaints. The riotous actions of the women 
violated that long standing veneer of class harmony in the 
South. Many of the upper class members refused to accept that 
transition and justified the actions of the women by blaming it 
on external agents or citizens of ill repute. They developed the 
concept of the “worthy poor”: those who suffered silently and 
did not engage in unconventional behavior. 
336
 Chesson, “Harlots or Heroines?”, 136-137; Barber, “Civil 
War Bread Riots and the Development of a Confederate 
Welfare System,” 106-109. 
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historians on women‟s studies in Western Europe, Louis A. 
Tilly, proposes that three classifications of food riots existed 
in France in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
centuries. According to Tilly, the first type of riot, the market 
riot, took place in the cities and “was usually aimed at bakers 
whose prices were too high and whose loaves were too few, at 
city residents who were suspected of hoarding supplies of 
grain in their houses, and at government officials who failed to 
act swiftly to ease a food shortage.”337 The next classification, 
the entrave, occurred only in rural settings. In this form, the 
rioters took the grain from wagons on their way to market. 
Tilly calls the last kind of food riot, taxation populaire. In this 
type, the rioters seized goods, set a fair price, and sold the 
goods in order to reimburse the original seller.
338
   
 The Bread Riot in Richmond most closely resembles 
the market riot. The riot took place in an urban environment 
and the women first approached the government officials who 
they believed had not done enough to solve the problem of 
unreasonable prices. There is also evidence that the rioters did, 
in some instances, target known speculators, foreigners, and 
Jews.
339
 The class tension which had been building in 
Richmond created resentment among the poor toward the 
successful merchants in the city. The less prosperous members 
of society believed that these speculators and wealthy 
merchants were merely profiting from the war effort and had 
little cause for patriotism, loyalty, or sacrifice. The 
newspapers were rich with exhortations against these 
individuals. Many of the women involved in the bread riots 
had at least one, and in most cases, multiple family members 
involved in the war and thus, wealthy merchants and those 
with no apparent ties to the Confederacy constituted the prime 
targets for looting and violence.
340
 This targeting reveals that 
the Richmond Bread Riot closely resembles the market riots 
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which occurred in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  
 The riot also closely resembles the qualities of the 
English crowd in the eighteenth century as described by E.P. 
Thompson. He believed that: 
It is possible to detect in almost every eighteenth-
century crowd action some legitimizing notion. By 
the notion of legitimation I mean that the men and 
women in the crowd were informed by the belief that 
they were defending traditional rights or customs; 
and, in general, that they were supported by the wider 
consensus of the community.
341
 
 
Essentially, every community possesses a set of moral norms. 
When these norms are violated, the crowd believes that 
unprecedented action becomes permissible. Thompson 
elaborated on this idea by defining what he calls the “moral 
economy of the crowd.” He writes that a violation of societal 
standards and responsibilities, “taken together, can be said to 
constitute the moral economy of the poor. An outrage to these 
moral assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation, was 
the usual occasion for direct action.”342 In the case of the 
Richmond Bread Riot, the legitimizing notion was the belief 
that every individual deserved the opportunity to purchase 
necessary items at a reasonable price. Thus, the rioters exactly 
resembled Thompson‟s descriptions of the rioters in the 
English crowds. 
 Another similarity between the European riots and 
the Richmond Bread Riot was the existence of political 
motives. Both George F. E. Rudé and Louise Tilly believe in 
the close correlation of political undercurrents and food riots. 
Tilly states, “The emergence of the food riot marked the 
nationalization and politicization of the problem of 
subsistence, and was based on a popular model of how the 
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economy should work.”343 The first connection between 
motives of hunger and political change surfaced during the 
French Revolution. Public animosity rose first over the price 
of bread in April, 1789. However, this unrest evolved into 
political upheaval.
344
 The trend did not cease with the end of 
the Revolution. Rudé wrote, “there are political, „patriotic,‟ 
and antiroyalist undercurrents and accompaniments 
(particularly in the riots of November 1792) …In Paris, too the 
grocery riots of 1793, at least, had political undertones.”345  
 These political motives also surfaced in the 
Richmond Bread Riot. The women desired the availability of 
reasonably priced food at government prices. They abhorred 
the legislation that legalized impressment and the Tax-in-
Kind. They first desired to bargain with the Governor, but 
when he took no direct action, the women took what the 
government refused to provide them. The rioters took direct 
action toward remedying the problem of affordable goods.  
 The Richmond Bread Riot bears a striking 
resemblance to the European food riots in both form and 
motive. Although the women of Richmond may not have 
known about the utilization of the food riot in Europe, they 
undertook the same method in order to achieve change. Thus, 
the food riot was an effective mode of protest in both America 
and Europe.
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